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
# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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## BULGARIA

### BCP Central Committee Monthly Examines Power, Opposition

22000015 Sofia *POLITICHESKA PROSVETA*  
in Bulgarian Aug 88 pp 37-50

[Article by Dimitur Georgiev Mitev, professor, doctor of philosophical sciences, scientific associate at the BAN Presidium Institute of Contemporary Social Theories: "Democratization of the Communist Party Under Conditions of Restructuring". Editorial note: The author supports some viewpoints that are currently subject to lively debate in several fraternal parties.]

[Text] After the National Conference of the Bulgarian Communist Party (January 1988) and, particularly, after the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference (June 1988), it would be difficult to add anything to what was already said on the question of the democratization of the Communist Party. The study made at these fora indicates that the communists feel great responsibility in this area and are deeply aware of the fact that without the democratization of the Communist Party the democratization of socialist society and the development of the initiative and creativity of the popular masses would be inconceivable.

In other words, in the final account, the question of the democratization of the Communist Party is related to the fate of socialism and the possibility that the socialist social system will implement its historical mission both in terms of its own peoples and the global revolutionary process.

#### Some Initial Postulates for Our Consideration

The 27th CPSU Congress, which discussed the overall laws of the socialist revolution and the building of a socialist society, formulated a new feature which was described in the CPSU program as "the development of socialist democracy."<sup>1</sup> In M.S. Gorbachev's reports and speeches, this law was concretized with the inspiring thought of "more democracy, more socialism!"

However, the Communist Party would have been unable to observe the law of "developing socialist democracy" without instilling its own basic principles in the development of the type of changes which would enable it to democratize itself, to become a model of democracy.

We are familiar with the concept that the Communist Party is the prime model of the socialist society, that it is the mirror in which the working people must see the moral principles which must guide them in their social practices. For that reason now, when it is becoming increasingly clear to an increasing number of people that without the democratization of socialist society there can be no successful development of socialism, the problem of the democratization of the party itself becomes central.

The following question is legitimate: Has the party not been so far a model for the other social organizations and institutions? Has it not set an example for emulation?

The answer to these question cannot be a simple "yes" or "no." We know the crucial changes which were made under the guidance of the Communist Party. At the same time, however, we must also bear in mind the assessment made by T. Zhivkov, BCP Central Committee general secretary, who stressed the following at the July 1987 Central Committee Plenum: "We cannot advance unless we look at the truth in the eyes, unless we restructure the work of our party as well."<sup>2</sup> At the November 1987 BCP Central Committee Plenum, strengthening this thought, he emphasized that, "Under conditions of self-government as well, the guiding principle will be the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. However, it will be applied in a new manner.

"What does this mean?

"It means converting from the present administrative-bureaucratic centralism to the true combination of democracy with centralism in all areas and on all levels of our social life."<sup>3</sup>

This concept is found also in the resolution of the National Conference of the Bulgarian Communist Party on the restructuring and further development of socialism in the Bulgarian People's Republic.

I believe this assessment to be extremely important. What naturally proceeds from it is the following question: Was the administrative-bureaucratic centralism one of the reasons for the numerous negative phenomena which took place in socialist society?

By nature, the socialist system is a highly centralized system. This centralization is based on the national nature of means of production and the fact that such means of production are essentially managed by the socialist state as a new type of state. This state has not only superstructural but also base functions. The history of human society is unfamiliar with any other socioeconomic system with such high degree of centralization. Centralism is the reason for the exceptional strength of socialism. The fact that it was able to resist the pressure of fascism at a rather early period in its development, while still not sufficiently strong, and when huge human, economic and military resources of virtually all of Europe were thrown against the Soviet Union, is one of the most outstanding manifestations of this strength.

However, although under extreme circumstances this centralism can make miracles, under normal circumstances, unless structural institutions have been created in both the base and the superstructure, including the Communist Party, to counter it, to act like a counterbalance, it becomes a potential threat to the normal functioning of socialism.

If we study the "cult of personality" and the reasons which created it we are bound to reach the conclusion that it developed on the basis of the monopoly of power, while the monopoly itself was based on strong uncontrolled centralism. Monopoly provides the possibility neither of developing the struggle of opinions nor the prompt manifestation and respective elimination of nonantagonistic contradictions within socialist society. Conversely, such contradictions accumulate and, at a latter stage, naturally become antagonistic. This was one of the main reasons for the appearance of the cult of personality during Stalin's time and of stagnation and other phenomena alien to socialism, during Brezhnev's time.

Until the 27th CPSU Congress, the Communist Party sought the solution of this problem in eliminating the specific reasons for the crises without undertaking changes in the very structure of socialist society. Such was the case, for example, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and elsewhere. In those countries individual leaders were removed from power (or else the event coincided with their natural death) and some demands of the masses were met. However, no serious changes were made in the structure of socialism, as a result of which the crises were either repeated or else once again there was stagnation in the development of society.

The restructuring which was initiated after the 27th CPSU Congress in virtually all socialist countries took an entirely different path. All in all, it is following two basic lines:

First, new methods are being applied in economic management, characterized by the fact that centralized planning is reduced to the basic strategic directions and combined with the extensive application of the principles of enterprise self-management. Thus, for example, the Regulation on Economic Activities, which was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Bulgarian People's Republic (1987) stipulates in chapter 2 "Self-Governing Economic Organizations," the following: "The enterprise is a technologically, economically, structurally and socially separate self-governing economic organization which is a commodity producer and through which the labor collective manages and controls the socialist property assigned to it. It operates on a cost accounting basis and ensures its self-support and self-financing, including foreign exchange, and is a juridical person" (Article 4).<sup>4</sup>

Second, the principles of socialist democracy, such as glasnost, electiveness, replaceability, and so on, are formulated.

As we can see, this is an entirely different formulation of the question of centralism in the economy and in the entire socialist society. Countering this centralism is self-governing by the working people, guaranteed through the defense of their own interests and their right

to govern their own enterprises assigned to them. This raises a number of new questions, such as material incentive, autonomy and others, which were absent in the past and were prerequisites for the "strong centralization of power to the point of absurdity."<sup>5</sup>

#### **The Principle of Replaceability Is a Major Prerequisite for the Democratization of the Party and the Enhancement of Communist Activities**

In our consideration of this matter we proceed from the circumstance that the parties of a new, Leninist type prove their advantages, compared to the parties of the Second International, which were based on the old principles. These principles prevented the social democratic parties from converting from parties of social reforms into parties of the socialist revolution, for which reason nowhere was the capitalist system replaced under their leadership, although in frequent cases they headed the government.

We know, however, that Lenin's book "One Step Forward and Two Steps Backward," in which he developed the principles of the party of a new type, was published in 1904. This was 84 years ago. Socialism is now a global system. In a number of countries the communist parties became ruling. They faced a number of problems not only of how to destroy the old society but also how to build the new one. The most advanced segment in the nations which are trying to promote the conversion of socialism into the bearer of a new, democratic socialist civilization, turned to these parties.

The excessive centralism which dominated the life of these parties and which was based on the clandestine conditions and tasks dictated by the building of socialism under the conditions of a sharp class struggle and of capitalist surroundings, lost its objective justification. The old conditions were replaced by a new, more tranquil domestic and international situation, the disappearance of the classes promoting restoration and the peaceful coexistence between the two systems. Under these circumstances, the party as well had to experience some changes and it (like the economy) had to abandon the strong centralism, for under the new circumstances such centralism indeed assumes a bureaucratic nature.

What does this mean? It means an enrichment of internal party life based on the principle of the replaceability of leading cadres. Such cadres are no longer isolated individuals, as they were in the past. For that reason the replaceability itself is no threat to socialism at all. However, the positive result of the application of this principle is the elimination of the monopoly of power and, hence, the prerequisites for the appearance of a cult of personality, arbitrariness, crises in the socialist system, etc.

For that reason the problem of cadre rotation, not in the sense of having the same people remain in control for short periods of time, but in the sense of having the

leading positions on all levels held for no more than two terms, should be considered a clearly manifested necessity. Such a system would provide scope in the struggle between the old and the new as the main motive force of socialist society and would contribute to the prevention of stagnation phenomena within the party and ensure its steady self-renovation.

However, that is not all. If we look deeper into the facts which were brought up in connection with Lenin's testament,<sup>6</sup> we can see several very important circumstances which are directly related to the question of rotation and lead to the conclusion that replaceability is one of the basic principles in the development of the Communist Party. For example, looking at the minutes of the 13th VKP(b) Congress, it becomes clear that there was a certain disparity between what the delegates were told and what Lenin's "Letter to the Congress" stipulated. The delegates were told that "Lenin spoke only of the possibility of replacing Stalin as general secretary. Actually, Lenin spoke not of the possibility but of the means of replacement. To Lenin the question of the possibility of replacement was not considered. He spoke of such replacement as being entirely determined, as something already decided."<sup>7</sup>

What are the considerations on the basis of which Lenin proceeded? The fact that Stalin, "by becoming general secretary, gathered in his own hands boundless power, and I am not sure whether he would be able always to use such power quite circumspectly."<sup>8</sup>

Consequently, in the final account, the question is reduced to preventing the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual.

It is true that at that time Lenin did not formulate the idea of replaceability (the experience of the communist movement was still small). However, even that which he said leads to that conclusion, the more so if we bear in mind the "wisdom," which has been acquired over the past 70 years. This entire matter has a certain psychological aspect which, in this case, is very important. The present structure of socialism creates conditions for the perpetuation of power. It makes it possible for millions of human destinies to depend on a single individual. This fact tickles the feeling of conceit and creates a sense of infallibility and an atmosphere according to which without the "great one" the life of the people is impossible. Given such a political atmosphere even the greatest crime committed for the sake of staying in power begins to seem natural, something normal. In the eyes of millions of people such crimes are presented as acts committed on behalf of and for the good of the people.

And when all of this takes place against the background of a great economic backwardness and a patriarchal mentality, related to the traditions of absolutism or of

Turkish slavery, and when there are no standards in scientific and political debates, repressive measures taken against loyal workers for socialism turn into standard practice.

These precisely are the considerations which explain what occurred in Bulgaria in the case of Traycho Kostov, the second most important person in the party and the state after Georgi Dimitrov.

As we know, Traycho Kostov was pulled out of the ranks of the BCP and destroyed, for his views were different from the official views which prevailed at that time. Naturally, this was influenced by some external factors. This, however, does not refute the main idea.

For that reason, in connection with the Traycho Kostov case, naturally the following question arises: If the principle of replaceability had been prevalent, would those who were morally responsible for his death not start thinking before signing the decision for his execution? This is not a matter of a single individual who, unquestionably, had historical merits in terms of the elimination of the left sectarian course in the party and the victory of the 9 September uprising, but also the destruction or effort to convert into political corpses an entire galaxy of political leaders.

These and many other questions may arise when we consider the problem of the harm which uncontrolled centralism caused and continues to cause. They lead to the conclusion that along with the other reasons which brought about the grossest possible violations of legality in the socialist countries, perhaps one of the most important is found in the old economic and political structure of socialism, which creates objective conditions for the appearance of such negative phenomena.

Consequently, the question of surmounting the cult of personality cannot be reduced merely to replacing one individual with another or even the elimination of the violations of legality, however important this may be. The question goes far deeper. In the final account, it is reduced to the need for an overall democratization of socialist society and the implementation of a sequence of important steps in this respect. We must (something which is being done now and which could not be done in the past) clarify and surmount Stalin's erroneous views and methods of building socialism. We must create the type of legal guarantees which will exclude, once and for all, the manifestation of such faulty phenomena in socialist society.

One such guarantee is instilling the principle of replaceability of leading cadres and eliminating the possibility of keeping them in leading positions for long periods of time. For that reason, the resolution adopted at the National Party Conference stipulates the following: "Henceforth the leading positions in the party, from BCP Central Committee general secretary down to the secretary of a primary party organization, will be held for

two consecutive terms or, on an exceptional basis, for three terms. This stipulation is entirely consistent with the Leninist principles and requirements of renovation of leading cadres and enhancing their responsibility and authority; upgrading the requirements concerning their political, moral and spiritual qualities; and educating all party members in the spirit of the ideals of Marxism-Leninism."<sup>9</sup>

With this the National Party Conference laid the beginning of the creation of a new political atmosphere in the party and socialist society, which will be of historical significance in terms of its further development.

#### **On the Struggle of Opinions Within the Party and Relations Between the Majority and the Minority**

We already pointed out that in the future as well the Communist Party will be built on the principles of democratic centralism. The main stipulation in the system of such principles is the fact that the minority must obey the decisions of the majority.

It is unlikely to come across a party member who believes that this principle must be rejected. A socialist system and a party which naturally lay the claim to represent the most progressive and most democratic class—the working class—cannot abandon such principles. The viability of such principles was confirmed by life itself.

However, such truths must not be absolutized, for this will lead to their negation. We should also take into consideration some lessons learned from recent and not so recent history. What are they?

For a certain period of time a given viewpoint may be supported by a minority and even by isolated individuals. Later, however, it may become the opinion of the majority, i.e., it may turn out that the minority held a better view. Furthermore, such a view may even become state policy. Such was the case with Lenin during the time of the signing of the Brest Peace Treaty.

Actually, this is not unnatural in the least. What is even unnatural is the opposite: to expect that a given truth could reach the awareness of everyone all of a sudden. In his work "What Is To Be Done?" Lenin stipulated that the party's task is to instill a socialist awareness in the working class, for it is the entity which is the most familiar with the development of social processes. Now, however, when the building of socialism has become an exceptionally complex process, the party as a whole cannot attain some truths rapidly. It is natural to expect that such truths will be realized first by individuals who are involved with them more directly. It is through debates that their realizations and evaluations become popularized through the periodical press and only then take the shape of party and state decisions. The opposite conceals a number of threats and conflicts with the objective course of human knowledge.

That is why the minority should not be hindered in supporting its views, even in the press, providing that these are views dictated by the socialist interests of the people and that the discussion is kept within the bounds of party ethics.

Some people tend to see in this idea the danger of the appearance of prerequisites for the establishment of factions. Naturally, this threat exists. However, under circumstances in which socialist society is rapidly advancing toward its maturity and the communist outlook has become, on a much broader scale, the outlook of the active part of the socialist nations, the other threat is worse: instilling in society a political atmosphere characterized by mental stagnation.

Very carefully, and with a view not to hinder the development of creative thinking and approach, V.I. Lenin considered the question of party unity even when the danger of a split existed. Such was the case, for example, at the 10th VKP(b) Congress of March 1921. At that time, on Lenin's motion, the familiar resolution on banning factions was adopted in answer to Trotsky's claim to leadership.

Here is an example proving that the resolution on banning factions, as approved, was not entirely consistent with Lenin's views but, rather, with a Stalinist interpretation which, because of its extremes, in this matter objectively made somewhat helpless the spirit of Leninism.

In the course of discussing the resolution at the 10th congress, D.B. Ryazanov submitted, in support of Lenin's resolution, the following motion to be included in it: "At the same time, the congress firmly opposes elections for congresses based on platforms."<sup>10</sup>

Lenin countered Ryazanov's motion as follows: "I believe that however regrettable, the wish expressed by Comrade Ryazanov cannot be implemented. We cannot deprive the party and the Central Committee members of the right to address themselves to the party should a basic problem trigger differences. I cannot conceive of how we could do this! This congress cannot bind elections to a future congress in any way whatsoever: What if a question arises, such as the conclusion of the Brest Peace Treaty? Can you guarantee that no such questions could arise? One cannot guarantee this. At that point it may become necessary to choose among platforms (Ryazanov: 'For a given question?'). Naturally. However, your resolution stipulates that there would be no elections based on platforms. I believe that we are in no condition to ignore this. If our resolution concerning unity and, naturally, the development of the revolution unite us, elections based on platforms would not be repeated. The lesson which we learned at this congress would not be forgotten. If circumstances are such as to

trigger radical differences, could we forbid such differences to be submitted to the judgment of the entire party? This cannot be! It is an excessive wish which cannot be met and which I motion that it be rejected"<sup>11</sup> (author's emphasis).

What basic ideas stand out in these Leninist thoughts?

First, the concept of the existence of factions within the party is rejected out of hand.

Second, however, elections based on platforms may become necessary.

Actually, this means that the struggle of opinions within the party and the press must be retained. We must not create an atmosphere in which the Central Committee members can support a single view only or, at best, keep their viewpoints concealed from the party, as a result of which a single opinion will emerge on the political stage.

Third, this viewpoint shows that Lenin did not link the resolution passed at the 10th Congress with resolutions passed at other congresses and, to an even lesser extent did he conceive of making this resolution permanent. As we saw, he said that the present congress should not affect any elections to a future congress.

Actually, this view indicates that any favorable change in the domestic and international situation must be such as to stimulate the broadening of democracy within the party and the creation of conditions in which the struggle of opinions will be supported. Lenin firmly opposes the creation of factions within the party. However, he is in favor of preserving the right of the minority to support its own essential positions.

Subsequent historical developments fully confirmed Lenin's concept of the need for such a democratic atmosphere within the party and the fact that the views of the minority may turn out, in some cases, to be more accurate, for which reason they must not be suppressed. Such was the case of the majority of repressed party members in the Soviet Union during Stalin's time, which we mentioned, and such were the cases of Janos Kadar in Hungary, Gustav Husak in Czechoslovakia, Wladislaw Gomulka in Poland, Teng Xiaoping in the PRC and others who, after having been subjected to repressive measures, had even to be released from jail to help normalize the political atmosphere in their respective countries.

Such an undemocratic way of solving the major problems of society confirms the existence of a certain immaturity in social relations and the weak role of public opinion. They can be surmounted only if, along with replaceability, steady efforts are made to develop the struggle of opinions within the party and within the entire society.

The restructuring in our country, as in the other socialist countries, is taking place in order to enhance the activities of the popular masses, so that they may join even more actively in building a socialist economy and culture. Unquestionably, the main feature in the implementation of this objective is to develop greater material incentive within the framework of socialist production relations. Along with this, however, it is equally important to create the type of mechanism and introduce the type of standards in the process of seeking the truth which would be consistent with the spiritual needs of the masses.

I shall try to back this concept by citing the views of the noted Soviet academician and Nobel Prize winner Petr Kapitsa. In his view, "The main difference between man's material and spiritual needs is that material needs can be satisfied but spiritual needs have no limit."<sup>12</sup> The available contemporary means of production in the developed capitalist countries and in the majority of socialist countries have reached such a high level that, if spending huge funds on military objectives becomes unnecessary, the could satisfy to a large extent the material needs of the people in their respective countries.

As to spiritual needs, however, the question is much more complex. Essentially, in the capitalist countries the spiritual needs of the people cannot be met, for the system itself obstructs the flight of the human spirit. This is not something noted by Marxist-Leninists alone. Even some U.S. presidents after World War II have spoken of the spiritual poverty of contemporary capitalist society and the fact that it has dollars and bombs but lacks ideas which could fire up the masses.

In the case of socialism, the question is formulated in a radically different way. Essentially, this system does not put limits to the development of human thought, for it is free from exploitative class restrictions. Nonetheless, the question of the satisfaction of spiritual needs under socialism has not been entirely resolved.

What is the reason for this? It does not rest on material conditions only but on the fact that the social sciences are still not entirely fulfilling their role. They have not rejected some of yesterday's "truths." Most social scientists have not developed the habit of studying more profoundly the processes which take place in society.

Why is this? According to Academician Kapitsa, the social sciences do not need any kind of expensive material facilities. Their laboratory is society itself. That is why he stresses that "here the question is reduced to moral conditions.... We must frankly say," he goes on to say, "that the situation which developed in our country does not favor daring and independent thinking, which is necessary for such creative work...."<sup>13</sup>



The socialist countries are advancing toward communism down unfamiliar paths. It is natural for the Marxists to begin, first of all, theoretically to clarify many problems, at least those pertaining to the foreseeable future. Going back to what the classics of Marxist-Leninist theory have left us, we can see that virtually all of their works and theoretical discoveries were made in the course of debates with the then prevailing idealism, anarchism, opportunism, dogmatism, etc. When Lenin had to develop problems of the NEP, the role of cooperatives, and so on, he did this in the course of engaging in polemics with his supporters.

This leads us to consider that the restoration of a democratic atmosphere within the Communist Party and society can only stimulate the rejection of the "quiet atmosphere" in which we frequently fall and which is another contributory factor to alienation, as noted in the resolution of the National Conference. The struggle of opinions not only will not weaken but, conversely, will lead to constant theoretical mobilization, to seeking and developing ever new arguments and rejecting erroneous concepts.

These views are supported also in some of Engels' letters to A. Bebel: "Your 'nationalization' of the press," Engels writes, "may have major shortcomings if pushed too far. Within the party you must have a type of press which is not directly dependent on the party leadership and even the party congress, i.e., a press which within the framework of the program and the adopted tactic, freely oppose one action or another taken by the party and, within the limits of party ethics, freely and critically evaluates programs and tactics. In the party leadership you must encourage this type of press, and even create it. At that point you would have a greater moral influence on it than if it develops halfway, despite your will. The party has already outstripped the framework of the strict discipline of the past; with 2 or 3 million supporters and a constant influx of 'educated' elements, a broader scope for action is necessary than the one which has existed so far and which was not only adequate but also useful, by setting certain limits. The sooner you adapt yourselves and the party to this changed situation, the better. The first thing here is to have an officially independent party press. Such a press is bound to appear, so that from the very beginning it should be under your moral influence instead of developing despite you and as a counterbalance to you."<sup>14</sup>

Engels developed similar views in others of his letters to Bebel.

#### On the Social Opponent of the Socialist Society

Another problem closely related to the democratization of the Communist Party and the democratization of socialist society itself is that of the social socialist opponent.

The tremendous importance of this question is determined by a number of circumstances. Let us stress above all that after 9 September, by virtue of the objective development of the class struggle the opposition of the exploiting classes was crushed. Broad opportunities appeared in society for nonantagonistic development. In Marx's words, under such circumstances social evolutions no longer have the aspect of political revolutions. Both Bulgaria and the other socialist countries made a leap in their development. The trouble appeared later, however, in the fact that after the criticism of socialism based on hostile positions was eliminated, on a parallel basis and to a large extent criticism voiced from the positions of the interests of socialism was eliminated as well since, as we already quoted from Academician Kapitsa, the social scientists were assigned the task of discovering and interpreting only the positive aspects of socialist society.

This deprived society itself of criticism or, put more accurately, criticism remained but only on the territorial level, essentially in plants, residential districts, villages, and so on. However, the major problems of socialism are not solved on the territorial but on the national level.

This problem of socialism is well understood by the capitalist ideologues, for which reason they insist, insinuate, persuade, finance and organize all reactionary forces in the socialist countries, as well as those around the international centers, such as the Voice of America, Free Europe, Liberty, Deutsche Wele, and the BBC and others in solving this problem, naturally from the viewpoint of their own interests, the viewpoint of the restoration of capitalism.

Their main thesis is the creation of opposition parties in socialist society, the introduction of the principles of bourgeois pluralism and allowing the existence of a "Trojan horse," which would erode the socialist system from within. Without bourgeois pluralism, they claim in a single voice, there can be no democracy.

However, this idea must be categorically rejected. The experience of the "Prague Spring," Poland's Solidarity and others cannot be forgotten. We cannot allow the creation of an atmosphere in which true democracy would be buried for the sake of the "struggle for democracy."

When we reject the principles of bourgeois pluralism we must not forget that the struggle between the old and the new is the basic law of any social development. Consistent with the interests of socialism, it must be solved in the political life of socialist society as well.

At this point someone may object by claiming that in a socialist society the struggle between the old and the new is found in the law of the leading role of the Communist Party. Unquestionably, this is true. The Communist Party, in addition to its other functions, has the task of bringing to light and eliminating what is old, obsolete

and holding back the development of society, and opening the path to the new. However, the 70-year old history of socialism has proved that this function is not always successfully implemented. It is no accident that many socialist countries found themselves in conditions of severe crises or in pre-critical situations. It is this precise circumstance that, in the final account, made the restructuring of socialism necessary.

Consequently, the advancement of the socialist mechanism, which must promptly free the socialist society from accumulating contradictions, is a necessity which must be met sooner or later. Socialism needs a social socialist opponent, its own escape, a social safety valve in solving naturally arising contradictions.

Those were perhaps the considerations on which Comrade Todor Zhivkov based himself when he raised this question for consideration on several occasions, in his speeches and reports. The first time was at the 10th Fatherland Front Congress (May 1987), where he said that "consequently, the Fatherland Front is both a partner and an opponent of the self-management agencies."<sup>15</sup> He later pointed out that "the party and state authorities can be not only partners but also opponents should this become necessary."<sup>16</sup>

At the November 1987 BCP Central Committee Plenum, Comrade T. Zhivkov emphasized that after RABOTNICHESKO DELO, the central organ, stops being the organ of the BCP Central Committee and becomes the organ of the party (which is expected to be resolved at the next congress), it would be able to consider also the work of the Central Committee and, if necessary, to act as its opponent on one problem or another.

The status of the periodical NOVO VREME as well should be changed similarly.<sup>17</sup>

As we can see, the problem of the opponent has been very much in the mind of the party and state leadership. Therefore, in the light of the appeal addressed by the party to the social scientists of not only repeating what has already been said but contributing to the formulation of new questions, let us express a few considerations on this topic.

As we know, the functions of the state authorities concerning party and state policy are executive, for which reason they are hardly able to play the role of opponents. It is difficult to accept that a state or party institution or organization could play the role of opponent when its leadership is directly appointed by those to be opposed.

Before presenting my own concept, let me point out that this question was a topic of serious discussions in the statements of several delegates to the 19th All-Union Conference in Moscow, such as L.I. Abalkin, M.A. Ulyanov and others. For example, L.I. Abalkin believes

that the role of opponent in a socialist society should be assumed by science. In turn, M.A. Ulyanov stressed that it is the press that must play the role of opponent.<sup>18</sup>

On the basis of my statements in this article, one can see that I do not exclude either the social sciences or the press as opponents. That is the reason for which I quoted from Engels' letter to Bebel and gave the example of the views expressed by Academician Kapitsa.

The problem, however, is that when the question of the social opponent in a civilized socialist society is resolved, we must take to a greater extent the following two basic aspects into consideration:

First, the profound ties linking this opponent to socialism and his interest in developing a classless society, so that if any distortion along the line of bourgeois liberalism cannot be entirely excluded, at least have its likelihood reduced to a minimum;

Second, in terms of social status in the socialist society, the opponent must be maximally independent and autonomous so that he can be daring in exposing the weaknesses in socialist society.

Taking all of this into consideration, in my view this role should be awarded to the trade unions. Because of its class nature, this organization has been called upon by history itself to be one of the main promoters of socialism and main assistant of the Communist Party in the formulation and implementation of its policies. From the class viewpoint, after the Communist Party the trade unions are the most homogeneous organization which can directly feel the pulse beat of the working class. It is no accident that in his speech at the ninth Congress of Bulgarian Trade Unions (1982), Comrade T. Zhivkov emphasized that the trade unions are the "public guarantor for the implementation of the party's economic and social policy."<sup>19</sup> At the 18th Soviet Trade Union Congress, M.S. Gorbachev stressed that the trade unions must be "a kind of counterbalance to technocratic encroachments...."<sup>20</sup>

Taking all of this into consideration, let us emphasize that from the viewpoint of the place which the trade unions occupy in socialist society, it would be difficult to find an organization which could better perform the functions of socialist opponent.

It may be objected, in this connection, that the leaderships of the trade unions are also directly named by the party and that, in this sense, they are not entirely independent. Furthermore, the idea has been raised that they would be the only channel through which the leading role of the Communist Party can be exercised.

However, this is not the full truth. When we discuss this question we must bear in mind that the trade unions as well are and must be subject to serious changes in terms of the enhancement of their autonomy. To begin with,

the Communist Party is changing its overall attitude toward them. In his report submitted to the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and in his concluding speech, M.S. Gorbachev repeatedly emphasized that we must "respect their (the trade unions—author) autonomy," that we must reject the concept that "the ruling party must directly rule,"<sup>21</sup> and that we must not allow "any change in the state authorities or diktat over the trade unions, the Komsomol and the other social organizations and creative and other associations. Does this mean, Gorbachev goes on to say, that the party's leading role would be thus weakened? Such doubts were expressed. In my view, the conference provided a sufficiently clear and convincing answer to the question: It would not. By remaining a ruling party, the party has all the necessary levers with which to implement its leading role. The main among them is the 20-million-strong party membership through whom the party implements its political course in all areas of social life."<sup>22</sup>

What does this mean? It means that party members and nonparty people who work in the trade unions must make independent decisions and, based on the interests of this largest of all worker organizations in socialist society, play their role of both cooperating and acting as an opponent.

Unquestionably, such a freedom of action by the trade-union personnel may occasionally lead to conflict situations. To begin with, however, they will be within the framework of socialist pluralism; second, from the viewpoint of the global interests of socialism, it is better to have conflict situations than the "peaceful atmosphere" which always leads to social stagnation.

Under contemporary conditions, when many matters are being reassessed, a variety of opinions have appeared on this matter as well. For example, the following questions are asked: Under the conditions of restructuring, when the humane approach will increasingly prevail, from whom, actually, will the trade unions protect the working class?

In answer to such questions let us quote the following thought expressed by Petur Dyulgerov, chairman of the BPS: "Furthermore, for a number of years urgent problems have accumulated here, which create discontent within a number of collectives and among working people. The situation is indeed alarming: 220 enterprises employing 90,000 people work under inadmissible conditions; nearly 1 million working people work under adverse conditions from all aspects; 1.1 million people work in some adverse circumstances."<sup>23</sup>

Consequently, if we must give a brief answer to the question of against whom, under the new humane conditions, should the trade unions defend the working class, the answer is, against anyone who violates these conditions.

In the final account, everything I have said so far is subordinated to the main idea that it is the way that as in economics, where with the introduction of enterprise self-management the necessary counterbalance was found to the strong administrative-bureaucratic centralism, the same type of counterbalance must be found in the superstructure.

The resolutions of the July 1987 BCP Central Committee Plenum and of the National Party Conference have already laid the beginning of this process of renovation. With this the Bulgarian Communist Party finds its place in the ranks of the pioneers who are implementing one of the behests of the Marxist-Leninist classics, to the effect that the proletariat, after assuming power, should formulate the type of mechanism which "would protect it from its own representatives and administrators" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Such." [Works], vol 22, p 192) and "in politics it is not serious at all to rely on convictions, loyalty and other splendid spiritual qualities" (V.I. Lenin, "Subr. Such." [Collected Works], vol 45, p 97.

#### Footnotes

1. See "Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. New Edition." Partizdat, Sofia, 1986, p 14.
2. T. Zhivkov, "Osnovni Polozheniya na Kontseptsiyata za Po-Natatushnoto Izgrazhdane na Sotsializma v NR Bulgariya" [Basic Stipulations of the Concept of the Further Building of Socialism in the Bulgarian People's Republic]. Partizdat, Sofia, 1987, p 90.
3. T. Zhivkov, "Nyakoi Prakticheski Merki i Podkhodi za Po-Natatushnoto Osushtestvyavane Resheniyata na Yulskiya Plenum na TsK na BKP (1987 G.)" [Some Practical Measures and Approaches for the Further Implementation of the Resolutions of the July 1987 BCP Central Committee Plenum]. Partizdat, Sofia, 1987, p 14.
4. "Regulation on Economic Activities. Council of Ministers." Sofia, 1987, p 1.
5. T. Zhivkov, see note 2, p 93.
6. See PRAVDA, 26 March 1988.
7. Ibid.
8. V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 45, p 345.
9. "Reshenie na Natsionalnata Partiyana Konferentsiya za Preustroystvoto i Po-Natatushnoto Izgrazhdane na Sotsializma v Narodna Republika Bulgariya (28-29 Yanuari 1988 G.)" [Resolution of the National Party Conference on the Restructuring and Further Building of Socialism in the Bulgarian People's Republic (28-29 January 1988)]. Partizdat, Sofia, 1988, p 23.

10. "Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party. Minutes. 15-16 March 1921." State Publishing House, 1921, p 292. Remark: We know that during that time each of the existing factions presented to the party and the respective congress a specific political platform. It was precisely this that D.B. Ryazanov opposed.

11. V.I. Lenin, op. cit., vol 43, p 103.

12. P. Kapitsa, "Science and Society," KOMMUNIST No 13, 1987, p 87.

13. Ibid.

14. K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 33, pp 431-432.

15. RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 17 May 1987.

16. T. Zhivkov, see note 2, pp 28-97.

17. T. Zhivkov, see note 3, p 36.

18. See PRAVDA, 30 July 1988.

19. "Ninth BPS Congress. Materials and Documents. Part 1," Partizdat, Sofia, 1982, p 24.

20. PRAVDA, 26 February 1987.

21. M.S. Gorbachev. "On the Course of the Implementation of the Resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks of Restructuring." RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 29 June 1988, No 181.

22. M.S. Gorbachev. "Frank Discussion in a Leninist Spirit. Speech at the Closing of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference." RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 3 June 1988, p 185.

23. "Tenth Congress of Restructuring of the PPS. Documents." Profizdat, Sofia, 1987, p 69.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Relations With Soviets Examined

24000012 Prague MEZINARODNI VZTAHY in Czech No 7, 1988 pp 2-11

[Article by Jiri Kalasnikov: "CSSR-USSR: New Stage in Mutual Relations"]

[Excerpts] As based on the resolutions of the 17th Congress of the CPCZ, the key principle of Czechoslovak foreign policy is a strengthening of friendship and a systematic developing and deepening of cooperation with fraternal socialist countries, primarily with the Soviet Union, and doing so in the spirit of restructuring and democratization. These relations, as the minister of foreign affairs of the CSSR, B. Chnoupek, emphasized in his exposition to the Federal Assembly, "represent the

organic moving force of our foreign policy activities which stem from the most profound interests of our existence." [passage omitted]

Taking place now is an all-around activization of relations among socialist countries which marks the beginning of a new stage in their cooperation. There is a collective search under way for a new model of socialist society which will lead to growing mutual benefits and responsibility; the independence and sovereignty of each socialist country are being strengthened, both in relation to the national as well as international interests of a given country; the collective element in the activities of socialist international organizations grew stronger and there has been an increase in the exchange of experiences in socialist restructuring and in the rate with which they are being incorporated into general practice. This applies fully in relation to our country as well. As B. Chnoupek pointed out in this connection, in the Czechoslovak relations with other socialist countries "an ever more challenging dimension of cooperation" is becoming more prominent. Seen in a broad historical context, it stems from the closest coherence of mutual trust and understanding. [passage omitted] It will be characterized by a search for challenging, even more effective forms and methods.

One of the main directions in which Czechoslovak foreign policy is being oriented in relation to socialist countries is a tireless effort to develop a broad spectrum of bilateral relations. The preeminent and in no way replaceable role in this area belongs to relations with the Soviet Union. The entire recent history of Czechoslovakia convincingly proves that the friendship, alliance, and all-inclusive cooperation with the USSR based on Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism fully conform to the life interests of our nations and help ensure the security of the country. [passage omitted]

Today, the field of Czechoslovak-Soviet cooperation is very extensive indeed. The mutual relations between the CSSR and the USSR are developing broadly and successfully in all areas—in political, economic, cultural, and many other spheres. It is a logical outcome of the processes of restructuring and democratization in all aspects of societal life which are taking place in the internal life of our fraternal countries.

It is certainly not exaggerating to state that the development of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, same as the internal political developments in Czechoslovakia, is undoubtedly deeply and inspirationally influenced, particularly in the political and psychological sense, by the policy of restructuring which is being implemented in the Soviet Union under the leadership of the CPSU, whether it concerns the course of political and economic reforms, the processes of democratization, glasnost, or spiritual rebirth. Soviet restructuring, as has been said already, is not only an inspiration and an incentive for the CPCZ and our people, but also a source of invaluable experiences which must be properly applied and optimal

possibilities sought to use them creatively, at which—and it must be said frankly—we have not been always successful. It is beyond dispute that it was precisely under the influence of the innovative policy of the CPSU and in the interest of further developing society and its elevation to a qualitatively higher level, that it became necessary in Czechoslovakia, too, to begin restructuring all areas of societal life. That is why the 17th Congress of the CPCZ worked out a concept of accelerating the socioeconomic development and national restructuring, and the subsequent plenums of the CPCZ Central Committee then formulated the action steps of that effort. The goal, above all, is the realization of economic reform and a broad democratization of political, economic and spiritual life, an extensive application of socialist self-government. [passage omitted]

However in this instance this does not mean just "straight road ahead." The Soviet Union and the CPSU, too, taking their cue from Lenin's words that "only through a number of experiments—each of which by itself will be one-sided, will suffer from a certain discord—will arise a complete socialism out of the revolutionary cooperation of the proletariat of all countries" . . . [passage omitted]

In this spirit Czechoslovakia and the CPCZ, too, when searching for optimal ways for the further development of society, dynamization and democratization of the entire national life, when restructuring the economic mechanisms, proceed from the road which they have travelled and from their own historical experiences. The Czechoslovak concept of restructuring thus takes into consideration some of our different, specific conditions about which M. Jakes also spoke, among other things, in his interview for Time magazine. Our approach stems from our own cultural historic traditions, the course of historical developments, economic ratios and results; there are other customs, mentality and experiences of the people, forms of political system, etc.

However, if we talk about certain Czechoslovak specific conditions and special characteristics, it has to be unconditionally stressed, on the other hand, that the CSSR does not make these national interests and special characteristics absolute, it does not place them in contradiction with the common, international interests of socialist countries. We are striving for a dialectic link between the international and the national, between the general and the particular. We can state that even though Czechoslovakia is creating its own concept of restructuring, in the basics, as was said in the words of M. Jakes, it goes hand in hand with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The main goals of restructuring in the Soviet Union as well as here and in other socialist countries are identical.

In this connection we deem it necessary to touch on yet another problem which is being discussed, misused, and twisted by Western propaganda in connection with the

August anniversary of the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia, that is, an attempt to "draw a parallel" between the Soviet restructuring, in which they are now removing under the leadership of the CPSU all that is causing stagnation and slowing down growth, and the Czechoslovak events of 20 years ago, when as a result of weakness and disunity of the then party leadership the program of renewal drawn up by the January plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee in 1968 was not carried out. As a result, socialism in our country became threatened. A clear answer to the efforts to draw a parallel between the current restructuring in the USSR and the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was given by M. Jakes when he stated: "I wish to say that I can see a parallel only in the positing of many analogous questions. The manner of resolving them had nothing to do with the present. After all, a mechanical comparison of individual phenomena without consideration of the concrete historical conditions never leads to true understanding." The commentator of the agency TASS A. Kondrasov made an apt observation on this point when he wrote: "Even if the concept of Western propaganda about the similar aspects of the restructuring and the 20-year-old events in Czechoslovakia is as ingenious and crafty as can be, it will hardly influence people's consciousness. These common characteristics lack one element—the truth."

The above mentioned facts are directly reflected in the level, intensity, depth, and complexity of mutual Czechoslovak-Soviet relations which are thus entering into a new, qualitatively higher stage of development. The overall direction of the processes of reconstruction in the USSR and CSSR agree in the specificity of the extent and rate of the changes, the forms and methods of achieving set goals. Favorable conditions are thus being created for a further broad-based development of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations in economy, foreign policy, ideology, science, and culture. As M. Gorbachev stated during his talks with M. Jakes in January of this year in Moscow, "there is a common agreement that the restructuring and democratization in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia will contribute to a further intensification of Soviet- Czechoslovak cooperation, and among other things will be gaining ever stronger momentum from its development. However, at the same time it will require bold searching, new approaches, and removal of all the layers and obstacles which prevent the bilateral cooperation from fully developing.

In the entire system of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, those in the political sphere are of determining importance, most of all in the systematic cooperation and unbreakable links between the CPCZ and the CPSU. From the close cooperation between the two parties and their central committees evolve relations into all areas and spheres, along party, state, and social lines. The full unity of opinion on action, a total agreement on all matters of internal as well as international developments is an expression of immutable respect for the principles of socialist internationalism, equal rights, and independence in the relations of both fraternal communist

parties, as well as an expression of commonly held responsibility for the fate of socialism and world peace; they concur fully in unity of action and are in absolute agreement on all issues of internal as well as international developments.

From the viewpoint of further developments and marked out perspectives of mutual cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, of extraordinary importance are above all the meetings and discussions of the highest representatives of our parties and governments which now occur with regularity and are intensive and efficient.

An important event in the development of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship and alliance was above all the official friendship visit of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M. Gorbachev, in Czechoslovakia from 9 to 11 April 1987. The political effect of that visit was delivered by the enormous attention given to it by our entire public. "I think," said G. Husak replying to questions from RUDE PRAVO, "that this attention is an expression of feelings of respect and admiration not only toward the person of Comrade Gorbachev, but also toward the Soviet Union and its Communist Party."

During the course of the discussions, the Czechoslovak side expressed full support for the innovative course which the CPSU embarked on during its April Congress in 1985, the line toward restructuring and accelerated development of society which, as was emphasized by G. Husak, "we consider to be a most valuable source of new incentives and ideas which help us in accomplishing our tasks." M. Gorbachov appreciated the results achieved in the process of socialist build-up in the CSSR and the new strategic line of the CPCZ. He stated in that connection: "If our experiences can be useful to fraternal Czechoslovakia in some respects, we shall, of course, be glad. As far as we are concerned, we are diligently studying and using all that is positive, and which brings about the practice of restructuring socialism in your country and other socialist countries."

But the main attention was given to prospects for the growth of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, and to increasing the intensity and effectiveness of mutual contacts in the political, economic, ideological, as well as other areas. As was evident from the joint communique, both sides and their highest representatives agreed on the necessity to activate the potential of political cooperation, broaden and increase the effectiveness of party contacts at all levels—from the central agencies to the basic organizations. They spoke in favor of a further development of contacts between state, social, trade union, youth, women, and other organizations. It was emphasized that new motivation for a spiritual coming together of the nations of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union should be provided by an enhancement of cooperation in the ideological sphere, development of contacts between mass media, scientific, cultural, health, and educational institutions, broadening of direct contacts among the working people of both countries, and exchange of young people.

As far as the economic sphere is concerned, the basic aims of common economic strategy are reflected in the Program of Long Range Economic and Research and Development Cooperation between the CSSR and the USSR and in the Comprehensive Program of Research and Development Progress of CEMA Member Countries. Both sides emphasized the importance of working out the concept of cooperation for the next 10-15 years to further develop mutual economic contacts.

The questions of bilateral cooperation went hand in hand with questions concerning the course of action by both countries on the international field. During the discussions, the Czechoslovak side expressed full support for all steps taken by the Soviet Union to make the situation in the world healthier, particularly for the program to liquidate nuclear arms and other types of weapons of mass destruction. During the exchange of opinions on the main issues of current international developments, both highest representatives emphasized the need for new political thinking and a constructive approach to complicated and organically interlinked realities of today's world in the interest of bolstering security for all. A concrete manifestation of such an approach to global issues is the readiness of the Soviet Union, expressed in Prague by M. Gorbachev, to constructively resolve the issue of nuclear missiles with a range of 500-1000 km so that it would not complicate an agreement on RSD [as published]. A call also went to countries—signatories of the Zaverecneho aktu KBSE [as published]—to arrange a conference of foreign ministers which would make preparations for extensive discussions with the aim of radically reducing tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces, and conventional weapons. [passage omitted]

A continuation of the April 1987 Czechoslovak-Soviet discussions was the working visit of the newly elected general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, M. Jakes, to Moscow in January 1988. It was a manifestation of the continuity of the tradition of regular meetings of Soviet and Czechoslovak leading representatives, and a follow up on the agreements about deepening and developing mutual cooperation. From the political viewpoint the importance of that visit lay in the fact that it was the first trip abroad for M. Jakes in his new function. Comrade Jakes underlined another significant instance when he said: "...the point also was to emphasize and demonstrate again support for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which is very close to us, be it in domestic or international policies, and above all to take further steps to an all-around development of cooperation in all the areas of activities of our communist parties. After all, this is, for us in particular, one of the important preconditions in order that we can succeed in our work. [passage omitted]

M. Jakes and M. Gorbachov highly appreciated the level of relations between the CPCZ and the CPSU, as well as the broad-based Czechoslovak-Soviet cooperation. At the same time, however, they arrived at the conclusion

that there exist many possibilities to extend this cooperation even further and to enhance it by increasing its efficiency. M. Gorbachev stated in this connection: "We highly appreciate the current state of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations and are convinced that in the interest of both sides it is essential to advance our cooperation in all directions, including the superstructure sphere. Our discussions were substantive, and we decided that on a number of issues we shall designate specific tasks." [passage omitted]

In a three and one-half hour talk with Comrade Gorbachev, M. Jakes acquainted Soviet comrades with the lessons drawn from our effort to fulfill the strategic line of the 17th Congress of the CPCZ, provided information about the 7th Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee at which extensive resolutions were adopted for future procedures in the comprehensive restructuring of the Czechoslovak economic mechanism and the deepening of socialist democracy, as well as about basic determinations on restructuring party work, consolidating the unity and the capacity for action of the party, improving the quality of cadre work, and on the struggle against formalism. And he said frankly that in resolving these issues, in developing the policy of openness, keeping the public informed, and in public control, we shall make use of what the Soviet Communists have learned. M. Gorbachev informed the Czechoslovak representatives about the work of the party in the new stage of restructuring, and he also spoke about preparation for the 19th CPSU all-union conference.

Nor were world problems and international politics outside the scope of the Czechoslovak-Soviet discussions. Their views were in accord, totally consistent not only in the evaluation of past developments, but also as far as prospects for the future were concerned, while fully respecting the distinctive responsibilities of both our countries. The Czechoslovak side stressed the importance of reaching a Soviet-American treaty on liquidating two classes of nuclear arms as a historic step which will create preconditions for limiting the feverish arms race and for better prospects for humanity. The Soviet side on the other hand highly appreciated the joint proposal of the CSSR and the GDR for creating a corridor free of nuclear and chemical weapons in Central Europe. [passage omitted]

Another link in the chain of actively and dynamically developing relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was the official friendship visit of the president of the CSSR G. Husak to the Soviet Union (11-14 April 1988). The main substance of the talks between Comrade Husak and A. Gromyko, M. Gorbachev, and other Soviet representatives was a specific discussion about how to implement agreements which were reached during proceedings at the highest level and how to best utilize the favorable conditions for an all-around deepening and perfecting of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations and for coordinating common positions on basic issues of socialist build-up and international policy.

The communique which was issued shows that neither side is satisfied with what has been achieved thus far, on the contrary, they are looking for activation and innovativeness. It appears that unused resources for further growth in cooperation exist also in the ideological area, in culture, education, science, in contacts along the lines of local and borderland relations, among the creative intelligentsia, youth, and in direct contact among people. Contributing to the consolidation of fraternal friendship and activation of relations in the spiritual sphere will be the creation of an inter-governmental commission for cooperation between the CSSR and the USSR in cultural matters, education, and science and the planned opening of a Czechoslovak information and cultural center in Moscow. Appropriate agreements were signed during the visit of G. Husak in the USSR.

Also of great importance in the entire complex of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations is the cooperation and concurrence of the highest representative bodies of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union—the Federal Assembly and the Supreme Soviet. The visit of the delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR headed by N. Sljunktov to Czechoslovakia in September 1986 as well as the discussions of the delegation from the planning and budget commissions of the Supreme Soviet in Prague in February of this year became [word missing] to the exchange of practical experiences about the role of representative and legislative bodies in the process of societal restructuring and in accelerating socioeconomic development. At this occasion the chairman of the Federal Assembly A. Indra spoke, among other things, in favor of a more effective and more coordinated cooperation among the parliaments of socialist countries, for which regular meetings could also prove useful. A new phenomenon in the cooperation of our parliaments was the active participation of the deputy chairman of the CSSR Federal Assembly, deputy chairman of its Chamber of Nations, and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Assembly V. Stafek (together with representatives of the GDR Parliament and delegates from the general public of many Western countries) at one of the meetings of the planning commission of the foreign affairs committees of the Soviet legislative body for the ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the liquidation of intermediate range missiles and operational tactical missiles.

The material basis of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations is mutual economic cooperation, which stems from the resolutions of the working meeting of the highest representatives of the fraternal parties of CEMA member countries in November 1986 in Moscow, from the Program of Long-term Economic and Research and Development Cooperation to the Year 2000, as well as from the Comprehensive Program of Research and Development Progress of CEMA Member Countries.

The Soviet Union is our largest trading partner—approximately 45 percent of our foreign trade is with the USSR. The value of the exchange of goods in 1988



represents a sum of more than 13 billion rubles. The total turnover of mutual deliveries will exceed 73 billion rubles between 1986 and 1990. As the CSSR Premier L. Strougal declared during his discussions in Moscow in November 1987, "we greatly value the experiences gained over the years, the partnership, solidarity, and above of all the prospects for the bonds we created. They are one of the principal certainties of our economy."

During the discussions between L. Strougal and N. Ryzkov both sides came to the conclusion that the restructuring of the economic mechanism being implemented in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia creates entirely new opportunities for the deepening of economic cooperation between both countries and for utilizing all its efficient forms. Great attention is now being given to the drafting of the Concept of Cooperation Between the CSSR and the USSR for 15-20 Years, which is to become a strategic program in the development of economic relations between both countries, and is to change in a corresponding manner the structure of foreign trade and its volume. Of great importance is also the broadening of cooperation between cooperatives and enterprises in the CSSR and the USSR within the framework of direct production and R&D relations, including establishment of joint enterprises and organizations. To this end Premiers L. Strougal and N. Ryzkov signed two basic documents in 1968.

Czechoslovak and Soviet enterprises and organizations already concluded roughly 350 agreements on direct relations. A prospective form appears to be, for example, cooperation in the area of cooperatives and its new, progressive form—direct production relations. Under such an agreement, more than 30 industrial enterprises and agricultural cooperatives are cooperating in the East Slovak Kraj and the Ruthenian Oblast alone.

The results and experience thus far show, however, that the level of direct relations is by no means commensurate with the potential of both countries. In a number of cases, the agreements on direct relations were not made because of the economic need of the organizations involved to resolve their economic problems. As a result, the primary motivation—increasing the technical and economic level of production—is sometimes replaced by an effort to engage in "retail trade" with just about anything that one can get hold of. These problems and other unresolved issues were pointed out, among other things, in the analysis of the current state of direct relations at selected 20 pairs of enterprises and organizations in the CSSR and the USSR, undertaken on the initiative of the Intergovernmental Czechoslovak-Soviet Commission for Economic and R&D Cooperation, together with the Commerce and Industry Chambers and interested central agencies of both countries.

But some problems have been concretely resolved with success even now. To this explicitly attests the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement on using national currencies for

settling accounts in direct relations, signed at the beginning of this year in Moscow. It represents not only an important incentive for the development of direct relations between our and Soviet enterprises, but in its importance it goes beyond the framework of bilateral Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, because it is the first agreement of this kind concluded between CEMA member countries; it is the first step toward the convertibility of the currencies of CEMA countries. On the Czechoslovak side, an important impetus to develop new forms of cooperation will undoubtedly be provided by the amendment to the law on foreign economic relations whose importance lies in the fact that it will contain a legal adjustment of direct relations (on the Soviet side, this issue was resolved by the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers No 992 of 19 August 1986). [passage omitted]

An organic component of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations is the uniform course of action of both our countries, together with other member countries of the Warsaw Pact, in the international sphere. The contacts of the foreign ministers of the CSSR and the USSR, B. Chnoupek and E. Scheverdnadze, as well as a flexible systematic cooperation of our foreign policy departments, are helpful in insuring close cooperation in the struggle for peace, disarmament, and overall democratization of international relations, as well as for an immediate coordination of tasks for developing bilateral relations. The protocol on cooperation between the foreign ministries of both countries signed in Moscow in April this year also contributes to this goal. [passage omitted]

A manifestation of an active approach by Czechoslovakia to the process of disarmament is the agreement among the CSSR, the USSR, and the GDR on inspections signed in Berlin on 11 December 1987 in connection with the agreement between the USSR and the United States concerning the liquidation of two classes of nuclear arms. Moreover, even prior to the ratification of this agreement, Soviet operational tactical longer range missiles were withdrawn from the territory of Czechoslovakia where they were placed toward the end of 1983. The importance of this step is significant—Czechoslovakia again became a country free of nuclear weapons.

In her foreign policy objectives, the CSSR pays great attention to promoting the philosophy of a unified European house. That is because "it intrinsically accords with the principles of our policy, but also with the humanistic, historically proven ideals of our people." To this end is directed also the Czechoslovak initiative to create a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighbor relations along the line where countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO meet, which contains all aspects of international security—political, military, economic, ecological, and humanitarian. [passage omitted]

Our country, together with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, is also active within the framework of the coordinated policy of ZSS [as published] as well as in



multilateral international forums. For example, at the 3rd special plenary session of the United Nations on disarmament, the Czechoslovak, Soviet, and Bulgarian delegations placed on the table a working document containing proposals to create under the auspices of the United Nations a mechanism of broad international verification of compliance with agreements on reducing international tension, verification of arms control and military situations in areas of conflict. [passage omitted]

In conclusion it can be stated that the current level of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations is in many respects a reflection of profoundly revolutionary processes which are now under way in our countries. Here, too, there is an obvious effort to implement non-traditional approaches and ideas and remove all barriers which prevent the potential of the new political thinking to be fully reflected in our mutual relations. One of their emblematic characteristics, however, has also become the application of higher standards, openness, and criticism. [passage omitted]

#### **Party Functionary Stresses Social Benefits of Danube Dam**

24000013 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 Oct 88 p 3

[Article by Stefan Csibrey, deputy chairman of the Dunajska Streda District national committee: "A Structure That Will Give Citizens a Firmer Ground Under Their Feet"]

[Text] Ten years have passed since the construction of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Waterworks System (SVD) began. The Gabčíkovo stage of the waterworks is slowly nearing its completion; in about one year the builders will finish the inlet (derivation) channel, and by 1990 the waterworks are expected to generate electric power. The fulfillment of the plan for the Danube River Waterworks System is the result of the dedicated efforts of its builders and many other experts. In conjunction with this investment project we—the administration of the okres of Dunajska Streda—have the urgent duty of developing the communities in this region according to required standards, and to meet the needs of the population; this cannot be done in a haphazard way but following well-planned and well-designed programs. The waterworks system will not stunt the future development of the neighboring communities and of this territory; on the contrary, it will help accelerate it. Naturally, the construction of the SVD has brought also other changes in the life of the people living on the banks of the Danube.

What kind of changes are they?

It must be said without equivocation that the planners of the waterworks proceeded really cautiously when planning the inlet channel. The land in the cadastral area of 9 communities through which the channel passes was legally bought and a total of 52 dwellings, isolated settlements, etc., were razed. Their owners were offered a choice: either to build new houses, or to move to

state-owned first-class apartments in Dunajska Streda, Gabčíkovo or Samorin. Three villages—Bodiky with 542 residents, Vojka on the Danube with 725, and Dobrohost with 458—will be located between the inlet channel of the waterworks and the old Danube riverbed; they are still standing and will remain standing, and in fact, it may be presumed that they may look forward to their comprehensive development. The party and state agencies in our okres, in the communities and in all settlements affected by the construction have prepared long-range plans for their future growth.

Material and financial funds for the fulfillment of those plans have been guaranteed. The greatest changes brought about by the construction of the waterworks are taking place in the life of the residents of the three above-mentioned communities. For instance, the inlet channel separates Bodiky from Horny Bar, a community in the hinterland, and Vojka on the Danube and Dobrohost from the highway to Samorin and Bratislava. In Bodiky we established an independent political administrative unit, a community with its own local national committee.

The construction of the inlet channel has affected above all the life of the residents in these three communities by changes of passenger transport or of their connections with the outside world. Under the new circumstances, mass passenger transport had to be reorganized. The CSAD [Czechoslovak Automobile Transportation] company in Dunajska Streda set up new routes through Gabčíkovo and Dunajska Streda which meet the demands and needs of the population. Although the route and the travel time have been extended, the fare increase will be covered by the state and will not be charged to the public. Especially persons employed in the SSR capital must spend more time commuting. Furthermore, the solution of this particular problem required a new transportation network at a cost of over Kcs 30 million, although this may be regarded as a temporary expedient, because when the waterworks begin to operate, a ferryboat will shuttle between Vojka on the Danube and Kyselica, which will reduce the travel time to its original period. We are creating opportunities for the residents of these three communities so that as few of them as possible must work outside this area. The manufacturing cooperative DATEX and the local united agricultural cooperative offer new job openings directly in these communities, and at present, we are organizing a small service center which will be managed by the local national committee in Vojka on the Danube. Agricultural production and forest economy in this territory are undergoing gradual reorganization. To interested individuals we offer the opportunity of building their own family houses. In these communities 9 new family houses now under construction received state subsidies in the amount of Kcs 360,000. In accordance with the election platform of the National Front, our okres administration will continue to strive to develop this territory in every conceivable way.

An important part of these efforts concerns protection of the environment and of the underground sources of drinking water, as confirmed by the construction of a sewer system, a waste water purification plant, garbage dumps, etc., in Vojka on the Danube, Dobrohost, Bodiky and Gabčíkovo at the cost of Kcs 85 million, and by gasification of the community of Gabčíkovo.

Without any doubt, adequate supplies of goods and services are of great importance to the public. It may be noted that the retail network is satisfactory. Of course, supplies of consumer goods must be continuously improved, so that our citizens have a good selection not only of foodstuffs but also of the basic line of household needs, sports goods, and pharmaceuticals. There must be no shortage of vegetables and fruit. We are delivering fuel, especially coal, to the local population on a priority basis. In Bodika we are organizing an exchange of gas containers and are planning additional public service.

Once the inlet channel is open for operation, the community of Gabčíkovo will obviously become the center of the three above-named communities, and therefore, our development program is focused precisely on that town. Gabčíkovo has been growing very rapidly. A new shopping center, a modern service center, and a new municipal cultural hall in the total value of Kcs 33 million, and other facilities have been opened in that community.

Next year we shall begin to build in Vojka on the Danube a new supermarket, a department store, and a service center at the cost of Kcs 5 million. Service and local trade companies managed by the okres national committee and small service shops run by local national committees offer various services, such as radio, television and appliance repairs, etc.

Moreover, we are proceeding with important programs in communications.

Recently we opened a new post office in Bodiky. The extension of the telephone network is progressing rapidly, and the number of telephone party lines is increasing; also, we are setting up automatic telephone centrals.

We do not underestimate the importance of the construction of schools and pre-school facilities which is planned under the guidance of the department of education at the okres national committee. After all, parents cannot be happy unless they can be sure that their child is safe and in good hands. In particular, small children should not have to commute too far, because children get tired commuting to and from schools and such travel may involve certain risks. Therefore, our okres administration is doing everything in its power so that each of the communities on the other side of the inlet channel may have their own 4-grade elementary school. The children from Vojka on the Danube who attend school in Dobrohost must commute 1 to 1-1/2 km. Children from 3 to 6 years of age are cared for in well-equipped local

nursery schools which prepare them for compulsory school attendance. Nursery schools provide day-care and meals for children. All nursery and elementary schools offer instruction in the children's mother tongue. The 5th to 8th graders study in the fully organized elementary school in Gabčíkovo where a new 8-grade elementary school building in the value of Kcs 17 million was opened 2 years ago. The construction of a gymnasium which will cost Kcs 4 million will soon begin.

A modern new elementary school building was opened in 1985 in the community of Baka on the left bank of the inlet channel. Also, school-age children in Horny Bar and Sulany enjoy a good environment for their study.

The development of public health care services in this territory deserves in particular to be mentioned. In the community of Bodika we organized a health center which is equipped with an ambulance for rapid transport of patients and physicians. The community of Vojka on the Danube already operates a clinic which is now being expanded. The construction of a special county health center and pharmacy which will cost Kcs 5 million was launched in that same locality, in Vojka on the Danube. In addition, three months ago a new polyclinic was opened in Dunajská Streda; it cost over Kcs 100 million and it offers public health services. It is now being expanded into a hospital. Soon we shall add two new pavilions, each with 150-bed capacity.

Thus, the development of our communities is quite comprehensive. In the Ninth 5-Year Plan a new elementary school in Vojka on the Danube will be built at the cost of Kcs 6 million to serve children from all three communities. A new post office, a local branch of the Slovak State Savings Bank, and a new autobus station will enrich and embellish Gabčíkovo where 320 new housing units will help substantially improve services. In this respect, these localities will offer great opportunities once the construction of the SVD is completed. A total of 3,500 additional jobs will be available. It may be realistically assumed that more recreational sites will be gained in this area not only on the Danube but also on the ponds in gravel quarries. A new modern hotel and restaurant are now under construction in Cílitov at the cost of Kcs 20 million to replace the old recreational center in Hrusov. Moreover, the recreational site in Bodik will be expanded. One could mention other new opportunities for social and cultural enjoyment as well as for the development of sports in this area.

Although this article does not permit us to enumerate every positive change in our region stemming from the construction of the SVD, the data presented here prove beyond any doubt that our okres and local party and state agencies and organizations of the National Front are systematically focusing their attention on the further comprehensive development of the Zitny Ostrov [Rye Island] territory. Naturally, the construction and development of this area are not without problems. We must deal without delay with various temporary difficulties

and obstacles; nevertheless, it is obvious that we are doing our best to continuously satisfy the needs of our people and to help them create an even more lovely home.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

**'Green Network' Links Environmental Groups**  
23000028 Bonn VORWAERTS in German  
1 Oct 88 p 21

[Article by Dieter Staecker: "A Dearth of Information"; first paragraph is VORWAERTS introduction]  
re becoming increasingly active in the GDR. A "Green Network" is at work in church parishes—and across the border in "Energy Policy Counsel."

A visit to the small 800-year-old city of Moelbis turned into a shattering experience for three young environmentalists from East Berlin. "There isn't just a stink, there's a penetrating stink," they recorded in their notes. "Depending on individual sensitivity, after a short time mild headaches, dizziness, or just the feeling of smelling bad oneself spread."

In the town located 20 km south of Leipzig the visitors from the capital of the GDR found houses blackened by soot and smoke, crumbling facades and grass with an unusually green tinge. The inhabitants told them: "The apple trees lose their leaves in May. The parsley is white then. And the flowers, if any bloom, have to be washed before they are put in a vase."

The report of the trip into nature destroyed can be read in ARCHE NOVA, a mimeographed bulletin from the "Green Network of the Protestant Church in the GDR." The first, 82-page number of the "Forum for Ecological Shaping of the Environment and Society," (the subtitle), with a run of about 2,000, concentrates on the industrial area around Leipzig in Saxony. The largest garbage tip in the republic is located to the south of the city, near Moelbis: the Espenhain soft coal refining installation, a technically obsolete power plant, which has been in operation since 1939-40. It was actually supposed to have been scrapped in 1975. But because there is an almost catastrophic energy shortage in the GDR, the shutdown was constantly postponed. The result, according to the ARCHE NOVA: "The release of unimaginable quantities of pollutants." The "Green Network," established early this year, wants to use its frank documentary articles to draw attention to environmental damage that is covered up by GDR authorities and passed over in silence by the state-directed newspapers. The organization is intended to be a coordinating body for local and regional initiatives operating under the aegis of the Protestant church. "Many of these groups," the ARCHE complains, "are isolated and have to rely on their own resources. The exchange of information is extremely imperfect." This is now going to stop: the workers in the network meet every Wednesday in the Church of St

Andrew and St Mark in East Berlin for an open discussion group, in which, according to ARCHE NOVA, there is "unsparingly critical and open analysis" of the environmental situation in the GDR. The publication states: "We are committed to the principles of glasnost and perestroika."

The East Berlin "Green Network" is also working across the border. It made contact with West Berlin environmentalists who have formed a group called "Environmental Policy Counsel" and whose members regularly participate in the discussion groups in the church in East Berlin. Both organizations want "to support each other," as Hartwig Berger from Environmental Policy Counsel phrases it. Recently they published a joint press statement in which they demanded that the West Berlin Senate and the East Berlin Municipal Council finally work "across the wall" to combat joint Berlin environmental problems such as smog, garbage and water.

The groups from the West are also learning a great deal about the zeal of their fellow fighters in the East. Hartwig Berger says: "We over here are almost smothered in too much paper and we are often working with too much red tape. In the GDR there is a dearth of even the most elementary information. So they have no alternative but to go out into the country and to investigate environmental violations on site."

That is easier said than done—GDR environmentalists are watched with mistrust by the State Security Service. By law environmental data are classified information. A group from Leipzig was able to take a water sample from the polluted Pleisse only under the critical gaze of the People's Police and civilian security forces. The result was depressing.

An ecological group from the kreis city of Perleberg had similar experiences. They were not deterred by the stern gaze from a police car parked nearby from photographing the garbage dump of a cellulose factory in Wittenberge on the Elbe. These friends of nature found a clear infringement of GDR environmental laws: "Substantial amounts of celluloid remnants were being burned at the dump, and that has been against the law for a long time."

Workers on the church environmental newsletter found even more environmental pollution a few kilometers north of Leipzig in the region around Halle and Bitterfeld. During the open face mining of soft coal, huge areas were turned into "lunar landscapes" (in the words of ARCHE). Chemical factories were also being built, with a total of 6,000 large smokestacks, which pollute the air day after day with sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, and ammonia and contaminate the soil with dangerous sewage. "The subsoil under the plants is poisoned with an indefinable, colored, stinking (soup), some of which is highly corrosive," recounts one of the articles.

A contributor to the newsletter who lives in Bitterfeld describes the social consequences of the unrelenting destruction of the environment: "One can see the spiritual impoverishment of the population, especially among young people. Alcoholism, sadism involving people, animals, and the countryside are everyday occurrences." The author's summation: "Years of mismanagement by the city administration have turned Bitterfeld into a grey, dirty, dying city."

## HUNGARY

**March Front Compared To Revived Front**  
*25000014a Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian*  
23 Sep 88 pp 40-41

[Article by Endre Varkonyi: "March Front"]

[Text]

### It Began at the Universities; Broad Rallying

In the beginning, there were the Central Wednesdays. Popular writers and university students of Budapest came together on Wednesday evenings at cafe tables (which they called "tables of public opinion"). However, they were not gathering in the Pilvax; not so much because of their respect for the memory of their great predecessors but rather because that place was under closer surveillance by detectives.

For at that time, Hungary's internal politics displayed increasing tension. Although the great world economic depression came to an end, Hungary's unemployment rate hardly decreased; there were still too many unemployed persons with degrees, and the situation of the "3 million beggars," i.e., the agrarian proletariat, remain unsolved. (The National Assembly even enacted 2 laws in 1936 regarding this issue, namely, Article XI, dealing with family entail, and Article XXVII, dealing with "settling and other provisions of land policy". The big landlords were the beneficiaries of both.)

### The Founders and the Name Debate

The relations between the University Circle of Budapest and that of Debrecen were becoming closer and closer when the leadership of both was taken over by the left wing. Already in March 1935, the first Diet was organized in Debrecen, in which—as Gyula Kallay writes in his book—"answers were sought for questions defining the present and future of Hungarian society." At that time this still represented the joint effort of all political forces, namely, that of the representatives of parties, fraternal societies of various ideologies, local high schools, and the youth of Transylvania.

The second Diet was already organized by Communist students: by medical students Istvan Tariska, Beno Vajda and Sandor Zold, by liberal arts students Imre Jonas, Jozsef Kiss and Geza Losonczy, and by law

student Szilard Ujhelyi. The declaration was presented by Sandor Zold, member of the underground Hungarian Communist Party and secretary general of the University Circle. (After the liberation Zold took various government positions of leadership, in 1948 he was Minister of the Interior for a short while, then fled from the new campaign against Hungarian Communists and later committed suicide, together with his family.)

Ferenc Donath, also a member of the Hungarian Communist Party, was the liaison between Budapest and Debrecen. He was the one who organized, together with Imre Kovacs, the Central Wednesdays and who prepared the 12 points that became known in Hungarian history as the program of the March Front.

The list of names of the cafe meetings' participants is interesting: in addition to university students, several writers were also present. Among the latter were Imre Kovacs, already mentioned (he was one of the leaders of the Hungarian Peasant Party after the liberation, then, following the abolition of the coalition parties, he emigrated to the United States where he lived until his death), Gyula Illyes, Aron Tamasi and Gyorgy Sarkozi as well as Geza Feja, Lorinc Szabo and Janos Kodolanyi who had leanings toward the right wing. Lajos Nagy, Ferenc Jankovits and Lajos Zilahy also took part in some of the discussions, indeed, soon Jozsef Erdelyi, too, became an arrow-cross man.

At the recommendation of Gyorgy Sarkozi, a popular writer working in the editorial office of the Athenaeum, deputies of the University Circle gave an "official" visit to the writers of the Central cafe on a Wednesday in early 1937. They read the 12 points. The writers recommended a few modifications but—as the organizers related later—were talked out of most of them.

The name of the new movement was also debated. Many names, including Petofi's Youth, March 15 Movement, Youth of March, came up but there was a consensus that they considered themselves the successors of the revolutionary youth of 1848. Finally they agreed: let it be March Front.

Gyula Kallai writes (in his autobiography entitled "My Life's Law"), "...political oppression and exploitation were increasingly unbearable for the working classes. Understandably, their best representatives, in their struggle for solving the pressing problems of their time, were turning more and more toward our revolutionary traditions. This is what the name and stand of the March Front expressed."

### The Hitler Salute

The opening meeting was held in Budapest. The fliers calling on the capital city's residents, especially the youth, to be present at the rally in the park of the National Museum on 15 March 1937 were printed by Erno Pataki and Lajos Porga on a hand press in a small

printing shop. They were the ones who posted—mostly at night—the bills of similar contents. Such fliers were used for introducing the 12 points as well. (In this, too, following the example of the youth of '48.) Balazs Lengyel was the flier's "responsible editor."

In Pest's Vigado theater in the previous evening, the celebration of 15 March, in which the Daranyi administration was represented by Geza Bornemisza, Minister of Industry, ended up in a scandal. It was changed by extreme-right-wing university students into a demonstration for the release of Imre Kerner Nagy, their infamous leader, who had been imprisoned for instigation and provocation of fights. It was highly probable that the troublemakers would also come to the Museum park.

Indeed, during the singing of the national anthem, a group of young men stood there with the Hitler salute, with their right arms extended forward. But people standing around them loudly protested against this insult against the nation, and the pro-Nazi group—seeing it was outnumbered—did not dare continue with its noisy behavior.

#### Twelve Points

After Lajos Porga's opening address, Lajos Zilahy, the popular writer, spoke and then called upon Imre Kovacs to speak. "A new kind of 15 March is needed today, we must act in the spirit of 1 March. We are a betrayed and discredited generation. Certain people in this country gained a great deal through us and they were the one who always made decisions concerning our matters without us," he said, among other things, then continued: "We uplift the embezzled spiritual legacy of 1 March again and demand:

1. A democratic change in the country;
2. Freedom of thought, speech, press, and organizing;
3. A general and equal right of secret voting without any corrections;
4. A strictest adherence to the incompatibility of the National Assembly's deputies: no deputy should be allowed to be a member of a directorate or lobby;
5. The dispossession of properties over 500 cadastral acres;
6. The abolishment of the control of banks, cartels and monopolies that is consuming the Hungarian people;
7. The introduction of a progressive tax system;
8. Work for every Hungarian who wants to work, the introduction of the 40-hour workweek in both intellectual and physical work, and the abolishment of pluralism and mammoth incomes;

9. The establishment of minimum wages that are above subsistence level;

10. Freedom for workers to organize in economic forums;

11. In the interest of the lower classes of society, the introduction of a progressive tuition system and qualitative selection in high schools and colleges;

12. The right of self-determination of the peoples alongside the Danube Basin as to where they want to belong, and the implementation of the concept of Danubian autonomy and confederacy in opposition to the imperialistic efforts of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism.

Signed/ The March Front."

According to contemporary estimates, at least 5,000 people shouted, "Long Live the March Front!" (The speeches and the reading of the 12 points could be clearly heard at a good distance in the neighborhood, for young social democratic workers took care of the sound amplification ahead of time.)

The commissioned police officer, who was present officially, ordered Porga, who was presiding, "End the meeting right now!" The mass of people dispersed in an orderly manner, only a young worker, Bela Lay, had a tussle with the Kerner gang. Lay was taken to the Jozsefvaros police precinct but was soon released.

#### National Public Reaction and Prosecutions of Writers

The huge public reaction to the opening session of the March Front was beyond expectations. It was greeted by Pal Ignatus in the Magyar Hirlap and by Attila Jozsef in the Szep Szó, and there were reports on the meeting in the Budapest papers of the bourgeois left wing, the Hungarian papers in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania and in the Dolgozok Lapja, the publication of the underground Hungarian Communist Party.

It was in Debrecen where the greatest waves were stirred by the open appearance of the March Front. Lengthy reports appeared in the Debrecen and the Debreceni Független Újság, and the University Circle of this "civic city" as well as its Werboczi Fraternal Association (which had been known earlier as a right-wing organization but which was now under new leadership) immediately sided with the Budapest group.

However, because of right-wing "brothers-in-arms" who constituted the majority, Hajduszoboszló was the only place where they could read the 12 points.

In Debrecen, a group of lower class students of the Calvinist Boarding School soon joined the initiators; it included Elemer Balogh, Odon Barla Szabo, Lajos Feher,

Gabor Nagy, Kalman Vranay, and outside students Jozsef Szilagyi, Jozsef Bolla, and Agnes and Erzsebet Udvardy. The list is far from being complete.

In Budapest, the Hid and the Valasz were the papers of the March Front and, when these were discontinued, the TOVABB! of Debrecen assumed their role. (According to what Kalman Kovacs, professor of law, said in 1974, "We met at Szilard Ujhelyi's place, at 5 Hadhazi Street. To my recollection, even the paper's title was Ujhelyi's idea.")

Only 3 issues of the TOVABB! appeared. (According to Gyula Kallai, "Communist students, young workers and poor peasants of the area were the writers, editors and distributors of the paper. But nationally recognized writers and poets, such as Jozsef Darvas, Geza Feja, Gyula Illyes, Imre Kovacs and Peter Veres, also wrote in its columns.") The TOVABB! reached the cities and towns in Hajdu, Bihar and Szolnok megyes and even Diosgyor. (Janos Menes, for instance, who was then an employee of the Karoly Nagy printing shop in Debrecen and later became the mayor and then president of the city council. He for example, he delivered the paper on his bicycle to Balmazujvaros and to the cities of Hajdu county.)

Apparently, the March Front was becoming a national movement. It was joined by the Youth Order of Gyor, a local group was being established in Szeged (the right wing succeeded in preventing it in the token of the "Szeged Idea") and in other places. Its mass support was steadily growing, and this was indicated by the fact that its meetings were held now in the premises of the Calvinist association called Soli Deo Gloria and then in those of the Catholic Young Men's Club. Several bourgeois associations, such as, for example, the Miklos Bartha Society, expressed their sympathy toward the youth that stood up against the half-feudal state and the fascist orientation.

At the beginning, the authorities manifested a certain degree of patience, waiting to see into what the March Front would develop. Although its founders were expecting prosecution because of the 12 points, the sympathetic reaction of the press prevented that. But in the following year, in 1938, a series of legal actions was taken against the "front" writers, including Ferenc Erdei, Imre Kovacs and Geza Feja. Their books were confiscated. Peter Veres was arrested and maltreated by the gendarmes. The TOVABB! was also confiscated, the 3rd issue was smuggled out of the print shop in suitcases at night. (The paper was subsequently "resurrected": in 1947 a few issues appeared under Geza Losonczy's editorship but this time it became a victim of the Rakosi-Gero "press policy.")

#### Afterlife and Resurrection

The March Front existed for only a short time and, although it was never formally abolished, it could not survive the pressure of increasing fascism. In the first

years following the liberation, many people made many references to it, justifiably considering it the forerunner of the antifascist coalition. In the years of the Rakosist tyranny, several founders were imprisoned, and others were forced to flee the country.

Even in the most recent years, the evaluation of the March Front was ambiguous. It was often heard that "tradition is not progressive but residual," and the antifascist Front, which permeated society from the Communists and Social Democrats through the bourgeois left wing through the churches, was included among the latter. By the same token, it was a misinterpretation that the March Front allegedly was exclusively a "front organization" of communist university students.

A new and freer political atmosphere was necessary for the March Front to elicit a wider interest again. Although the times have changed and some parts of the 50-year-old program are either obsolete or have a different significance, the New March Front is appearing today on the political scene. Its program—which has been described in detail in several articles—is summarized in 8 points. The following quote is from its call:

"We accept the historical past, the legacy of 1848-49, 1918-19, the Hungarian worker movement, the March Front, and the People's Front. We identify with the policies and spirit of the postliberation people's democracy. We condemn Stalinism, the personality cult and dogmatism as a social-political system which has deep roots and contains elements which have been inherited and are still alive today."

It is written in the postscript: "The New March Front begins its work in the sense of the above." It is apparent even from the first reactions that this work will be accompanied by a general consensus and willingness to help.

**Justice Minister Kulcsar on Associations, Multiparty System; Transitional System Needed**  
25000033b Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian  
29 Sep 88 p 3

[Gabor Karsai interview with Justice Minister Kalman Kulcsar: "There Is a Great Confusion of Roles"; time and place not given]

[Text] Justice Minister Kalman Kulcsar, a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, recently participated in the 14th World Congress of the International Political Science Association which was held in Washington DC. Gabor Karsai inquired about his experiences there and some of the recent events of domestic politics.

[FIGYELO] Have you encountered any new trends or sensational new scientific achievements at the world congress?

[Kulcsar] Since the 2-3,000 participants had the opportunity to attend a total of 300 sessions during the three days, there has not been enough time for them to develop a comprehensive picture. In any event, the theme of the congress, "Toward Global Political Science," permitted a rather far-ranging choice of topics. There were 14 of us representing Hungary, a number of them young researchers between 30 and 40 years of age, and every one of our sessions was well received.

Of primary interest to me were the presentations dealing with the relationship between modernization and political systems. For example, one Canadian researcher studied the sequence of political systems in Southeast Asia, also utilizing experiences from Latin America. He determined that modernization began with a populist trend, characterized by nationalization, the protection of domestic industries and a rhetoric opposed to multinational firms. These trends, however, soon "died out," and were followed by tyrannies and military dictatorships. The latter succeeded in achieving economic development and attracted foreign capital, but in the process certain strata came into being or gained prominence that demanded, or continue to demand, political democracy. It was determined that, beyond a certain point, modernization ceases to be a process that can be controlled entirely from above, and the start of democratization came to characterize the whole region examined by that scientist. The reason this was of special interest to me is that at last year's meeting of the Academy I examined a similar topic (and published my study in the FIGYELO, No. 19, 1987) even though there was no connection between me and the above mentioned research project.

[FIGYELO] Did you pursue any negotiations in your capacity as Justice Minister, as well?

[Kulcsar] Yes. I visited the Departments of Justice and State, the Congress and the Washington Federal Appellate Court, and met with experts working on problems of constitutional law. They were greatly interested in the constitutional process that was started in our country, and several thought-provoking ideas surfaced during our conversations. According to one researcher who knows our situation well, the spirit of political pluralism that was recently introduced in our country probably does not call for an immediate declaration of a multi-party system; rather, a transitional period is needed, because realities cannot be changed from one day to the next. He also cautioned that, in the event a multi-party system were to develop, efforts should be made to avoid splitting the votes among many small parties because, in light of international experience, this is a destabilizing factor. There was much talk about political parties at the world congress, too. While we are preoccupied by the eventuality, advantages and disadvantages of a multi-party system, in a number of countries an opposing trend is under way, with the reduction in the number of parties being discussed.

There was another noteworthy observation concerning the parliamentary system. According to this, in a country that is in such dire economic straits as Hungary there should not be much illusions attached to it, because a strong executive is better suited for implementing the unpopular measures required in order to escape the crisis.

[FIGYELO] Domestically, however, the government alone has been unable to resist the various demands for subsidies, and one of the things we expect from the growing role of the legislative is budgetary control, bringing about a growing ability of the government to resist local interests.

[Kulcsar] Just to clarify things, when the above mentioned researcher referred to a strong executive, he did not mean primarily the government, but a president elected through general elections. The tenure of a president is not qualified by his daily actions, but by the total accomplishment of a longer period, say, four-five years. Thus, he can make decisions that are painful in the short run, but necessary in the long run. To be sure, the representatives are also cyclically evaluated by the electorate, but in the interim they are in constant touch, and thus inevitably there are many more subjective elements.

[FIGYELO] This theory reminds me of the proposal made by Gorbachev at the Soviet party congress.

[Kulcsar] There are similarities, although it was not proposed that the first secretary of the party be the president. I would like to add, however, that in our situation I would not think of questioning the National Assembly's significance. I, too, favor a strong executive, but only in the form of government that is accountable to the National Assembly and, if need be, could be voted out of power; something along the lines of the British model.

I consider the role of parliament significant also because I see that in today's Hungary the courts and the National Assembly are the two institutions that people trust the most. This is indicated by the strengthening demand for making governmental decisions subject to court testing.

[FIGYELO] Is not this, in fact, a demand primarily supported (with justification) by a certain segment of intellectuals?

[Kulcsar] I do not believe so. There are several signs indicating the prestige of the courts. It may appear insignificant, but it is interesting to consider that Hungary is the only socialist country that failed to institutionalize the so-called societal courts, because people do not trust those. Nor is it accidental that there are many court cases filed in our country; this is due in part to confidence in the courts.



As for the National Assembly; the process of modernization has made democratization inevitable, and this includes an increased role for the National Assembly. Contradicting this are the present restrictive economic policies, which, however, cannot alter the main trend, only interfere with its progress.

[FIGYELO] Many people feel that reforms exist mainly in rhetoric; that other things, especially in the field of economics, hardly change, and that whatever has happened is attributable more to spontaneous social movement than to action on the part of the leaders. At the same time, there are others who (referring primarily to the latter phenomenon) are worrying about anarchy and thus concentrate on reestablishing the old order. What is your view of this?

[Kulcsar] As I stated at the most recent meeting of the Central Committee, many things happen about which (due to the remnants of old political attitudes) the public is not informed or informed late, and this influences our policies. Thus, numerous decisions can be seen as having been made in response to popular pressure, when in fact they were evolving over a long period of time, only they could not be publicized because of faulty political instincts. For example, last summer I ran across the issue of the samizdat publication BESZELO which contained an essay titled "Social Contract" focusing on the transformation of our political system. When that article appeared, our political and governmental bodies were considering more radical proposals (based on academic research), but the public knew little of that.

[FIGYELO] Not only did these remain unpublished, but they were not reflected in the documents ratified.

[Kulcsar] I would not say that: Not only were [those proposals] formally prepared and debated, but some of them (such as items referring to constitutional courts and administrative adjudication) were specifically ratified and their implementation has already begun. These research projects and documents have significantly contributed to the acceptance and preparation of constitutional revision. However, we're not talking much about this; so that governmental decision-making, its background, and political leadership have a worse image than reality warrants.

It is more problematic, I feel, that we still cannot implement real changes in our economic activities. Much may happen in Hungary, but if the economy does not escape its present standstill, then the political situation will deteriorate, in which case it will be more difficult to implement political changes. As we used to say, the economic reforms cannot be continued without political reforms; however, we must realize that the reverse is also true: It is very difficult to implement political reforms in a declining economy.

As a member of the government, officially I have to represent the government's point of view. However, within the government there are debates about many things, and this is only natural. What I see as problematic (although, as a researcher who has completed analyses of organizational sociology, I consider it natural) is that when it comes to the process of execution, neither words nor active measures enable us to eliminate the differing interests of various governmental organs. This is why, for example, I consider it important for the law on associations not to contain executive instructions; as soon as such details are included, we would see the various lobbies go into action [in opposing the instructions], and that would significantly restrict the law's effectiveness.

[FIGYELO] What you have said illustrates the government's weakness. In this regard, there is agreement between those who want reforms going beyond words and those who worry about reforms: According to them, this weakness (or divisiveness?) is evident even from within.

[Kulcsar] In my view, it is an oversimplification to call a government weak or strong. First of all, the government is an organization operating within the environment of society and politics, and is subject to all consequences. In fact, for a long time Hungary did not even have a government in the true meaning of the term, because when the Council of Ministers met, even the best ministers could only represent their own interests, instead of governmental ones. This was illustrated by the fact that usually few comments were made about proposals that someone else made; it was almost an accepted practice that "I will not meddle in your affairs, as long as you do not interfere with mine." In addition, the government was frequently faced with cases that were substantially decided by political bodies, on the basis of compromises between various parts of the apparatus.

Researchers and politicians have criticized this practice for years, and the prime minister elected last year proclaimed the idea that members of the cabinet represent the views of the entire government at their individual ministries, instead of conveying the ministries' wishes toward the government. This initiated a significant transformation which, however, could not be completed overnight. I would like to see faster progress along these lines, but, once again, I have to refer to my experiences in organizational sociology and state that we also need patience. Some of the ministers have to get used to the new work style, and this is even more true for the bureaucracy, which are indispensable for the ministries' work. In other words, realistically we can look forward to gradual changes only.

[FIGYELO] I find it particularly troubling that at least a portion of the processes do not even point in that direction. For example, one of the main arguments for



tax reform was the reducing of subsidies; yet, according to all indications, the government is still unable to resist demands coming from the sphere of enterprises.

[Kulcsar] I have opposed the high rate of subsidies for years. Since I am not familiar with every economic component of the issue, I do not know whether it is simply the matter of the government being unable to resist, or there are other considerations involved. As a member of the Cabinet, each time a question comes before us, I vote for the elimination of subsidies. I am afraid, however, that these issues are decided below Cabinet level, probably with the participation of individual contacts, fragmented interests and organizational interventions. At the same time, I was also intrigued by the view expressed by Bela Csikos-Nagy in the FIGYELO (No. 34, 1988) and in the Radio, according to which frequently a losing enterprise does not need to be eliminated, only to have its managers replaced.

[FIGYELO] There is much truth in that. However, I feel that it might be seen as a call to halt bankruptcy procedures involving a great many enterprises; when, in fact, such procedures are rare, and have only involved one or two sizeable enterprises.

[Kulcsar] I agree. I also feel that unemployment resulting from the elimination or reduction of certain enterprises is not as great a problem as it is presented in the mass media.

[FIGYELO] To be more precise, it has not yet become a great problem. While politicians one after another assert that we must accept the social tensions brought on by unemployment, concrete measures have been taken to prevent it [unemployment], even if this proves to be costly in the long run and even leaves the situation of people involved in an uncertain state.

[Kulcsar] Again, I agree. I, too, feel that we must accept conflicts in practice as well as in theory. I, too, am convinced that conflicts are inevitable, and the longer we delay facing them, the more difficult it will be to solve them. I can also assure you that this view is held by the government. However, do not assume that society accepts this economic argument. The ambivalence of political leadership has its roots in the ambivalence of society. Interestingly enough, even those who demand more decisiveness from the government on economic issues frequently reject the inevitable consequences of such a policy in implementing reforms, which is an absurd position.

[FIGYELO] Many people think that a fundamental question is the unsolved problem of property. This leads to the kind of confusion of roles that was evidenced during the recent strikes. Against what were the miners of the Mecsek Mountains striking: their enterprise or against the government? Is enterprise management an independent actor, or does it represent the workers or the state? Does the state commissioner of mining represent

the interests of mining or those of the government? By the same token, I could mention the cases involving the "Visoran" eyeglass-frame factory, or that of the MOFEM, where the strikes, or the threat of strikes, focused attention on the enterprises' internal conditions, including such matters as the relationship between larger enterprises and their subsidiaries, between workers and management, or the authority of social organizations inside and outside the enterprise. These are also connected to the problem of property. What is your view of this?

[Kulcsar] I have never examined the theoretical issues involved in property conditions, but the changes necessarily influence them as well. I can only say that the ratification of laws on associations will improve the situation somewhat. However, the law can only open the way for the real processes of the economy; it cannot create them. Much will depend on what kind of solution we can find for handling nationalized shareholding properties. We must avoid at all costs the possibility that institutions dealing with these properties allow external considerations, such as those of state administration, influence their consciousness as shareholders.

There is indeed a great confusion of roles when it comes to the strikes. In my view, the miners struck against the enterprise, thinking that they did not receive something to which they considered themselves entitled. However, as of today, the enterprises are not prepared to handle matters like that. I would like to add here that an experienced labor movement considers the use of strikes as the last resort.

I feel that there is a need to regulate the right to strike, to determine whether a strike is legal or not. In today's Hungary the right to strike is guaranteed by international agreements, but it is not regulated.

We have started to formulate the necessary regulations. Interestingly enough, the same people who until now called for the direct declaration of the right to strike, have also stated that such a declaration is unnecessary, because it would only introduce limitations. By the way, the same objection was also made concerning the laws on assembly and association. Of course, it is the nature of laws that inasmuch as they announce the opportunities connected with a right, they also establish certain limitations.

[FIGYELO] As Minister of Justice, what is your opinion of the events of the recent months; the demonstrations, strikes and the establishment of associations?

[Kulcsar] I always felt that society needs pluralism, that we must allow society's varying interests to express and implement their will. In a state based on laws, all of these things must take place under regulated circumstances. The laws now under consideration serve this purpose. They have already evoked many debates, but in several cases we have actually strived for that.

[FIGYELO] Are you referring to the various statements concerning the place of the political party?

[Kulcsar] That, too.

[FIGYELO] When it comes to the party, what kind of statement would you personally like to see in the new law on associations?

[Kulcsar] The reason I cannot answer this is because I do not yet know if the "expression" fits in this new law or not; although the debates point in that direction, and in this debate we were and are truly curious about society's opinions. Several solutions are possible: According to one, the principle of political pluralism (together with the [Communist] party or not) would appear as part of the Constitution. We can also imagine a separate law concerning the party or parties. This has its own advantages and disadvantages. Whether in the long run we visualize a single- or multi-party system, on the one hand we could consider the regulatory problems of a transition period, and on the other hand the place and operating principles of the party or parties could be regulated by a law under consideration. Finally, we can take the position that we should allow any political organization to function as long as it acts in accordance with the Constitution, leaving it up to everyday life to determine what will become of them. However, these are not part of the codifier's decision-making authority; we need to take a political position on these issues, after having evaluated the lessons of the debates taking place in our society.

**Network of Free Initiatives Hosts Proreform Meeting**  
25000035a Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG  
in Hungarian 15 Oct 88 p 8

[Article: "Economic Reform Debate"]

[Excerpt]

[Passage omitted]

Can there be political reform without an economic one? This was the title of an afternoon debate held on Sunday at the Jurta theater. According to the leader of the debate, Zita Maria Petsching, it is more appropriate today to phrase the question this way, for it appears that recently there has been less talk about the economy. As she put it, quoting a leading official of the planning office: "We should be implementing version A, are working on version B, while in reality nothing is really happening." In just exactly what part of the "ditch" the Hungarian economy was actually located was the subject of disagreement among the invited speakers (Laszlo Antal, Lajos Bokros, Pal Juhasz, Ivan Peto, Erzsebet Szalai and Marton Tardos).

According to Laszlo Antal, the reason why today's apparatuses like to present the economy in a worse light than what it is really in is so that by doing so they can

perpetuate the present practice, i.e., the system of case-by-case assessment and central distribution. In Marton Tardos' view, our situation is more critical than ever before, which is further underscored by the fact that—as he put it—neither society, nor the government know exactly what it is they want. The two tasks most urgently awaiting realization, in his opinion, are the implementation of some radical changes in our relations of production and the reduction of our foreign debt; for now, however, there is no recipe for accomplishing either.

Erzsebet Szalai and Pal Juhasz spoke against the regrettably still easy assertion of the inflexible enterprise concept in industry and agriculture, and in support of cutting back state subsidies. In Lajos Bokros' assessment, the high profits earned by the commercial banks should be attributed not to any real competition, but to the fact that they serve only as the mere administrators of state subsidies; by virtue of that role, paradoxically, their high earnings have come from the penalty payments of delinquent firms.

The speakers more or less agreed that in theory at least the program of economic liberalization seemed to be the way out. Laszlo Antal, however, also added that in order for that program to succeed, every bureaucratic and semibureaucratic barrier would have to be torn down; state redistribution, central import regulations and price control activities would have to cease. Society no longer has faith in programs announced and reannounced for the umpteenth time; it believes only in what is obtainable—said Ivan Peto before a packed auditorium of 500 listeners attending the debate sponsored by the Network for Free Initiatives.

## POLAND

**POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup**  
26000106 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish  
No 42, 15 Oct 88 p 2

[Excerpts]

### National News

The security services and militia celebrated the 44th anniversary of their formation. In an interview published on this occasion, Czeslaw Staszczak, deputy minister of internal affairs, announced, among other things, that 75 percent of the functionaires of the ministry belong to the PZPR (in the security services the percentage is even higher). Of the functionaries and soldiers, 1,420 have been elected to people's councils at various levels. A typical service region of the Warsaw Commisariat has 70,000 residents, 350 employees, three precincts, 1,340 stores and service outlets, 15 embassies, 7 hotels, 7 dormitories and hostels, 30 cafes, 25 restaurants (with alcohol), and Pewex and Baltona stores. During one day about 1 million individuals pass through this region. In 1988, there were 1,173 crimes reported in this

region (chiefly break-ins and thefts), 80 robberies, 705 misdemeanors. Of the 65 positions, 6 precinct officer positions and 29 patrolman positions are unfilled.

The Moscow Days have begun in Warsaw. The program includes reviews of theaters and films, visits, and exhibitions.

The Dean's Club has begun its operations; Stanislaw Stomma, the president, presented the club's program plan to journalists. It aims to be "a distinct center of Polish opposition," a legal institution in our political life, including many independent groups and individuals; it desires to present "a broad range of political views derived from Christian thought." The club desires to form relations with other opposition circles and with the authorities on the following principles: "on essential issues, unity; on secondary issues, difference and discussion; in all issues, respect and decency in relation to the partner."

The Christian Democratic Club for Political Thought has begun operations. The weekly LAD published the program declaration of the founders. Janusz Zablocki, the initiator of the club, told journalists that it may become the seed of a future Christian Democratic party!

The Conference of the Episcopate met in Warsaw with Jozef Glemp presiding. The participants familiarized themselves with the contents of the proposed documents prepared by representatives of the Episcopate and state authorities. They are to form the permanent foundation for the normalization of relations between the Church and state and are to help establish diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of Poland and the Vatican. The work was given a positive evaluation. The bishops "listened with interest" to the preparatory work for roundtable discussions. The bishops "expressed their conviction that the right of employees, especially of workers and farmers, to appropriate unions of their own choosing will be guaranteed."

The procedure to liquidate the Lublin-Chelm Coal Mining Association has begun. Action was initiated on the basis of a decree of the minister of industry, which also said that the mining association should end all operations on 31 December 1988. Its assets, agenda, and tasks, and rights and obligations will be taken over by the Dabrowski Coal Mining Association in Sosnowiec. The mining association employs 254 people. The majority will be employed in the pilot-working mine, which at the beginning of next year will double its daily production to 5,000 tons of coal. About 100 individuals will, however, have to find other work.

A decision has been handed down in the case against four individuals accused of attacking an industrial guard functionary at the Dolmel Plant in Wroclaw during the first days of May 1988. The court sentenced Jozef Pinior to one year imprisonment and a 60,000 zloty fine;

Czeslaw Borowczyk to one and one-half years imprisonment and a 70,000 zloty; Aleksandra Sarata to one year imprisonment and a 40,000 zloty; and Jolanta Skiba to 8 months imprisonment and a 40,000 zloty fine. The Regional Court suspended the prison sentences of all of them for three years.

The Plock harvest machinery factory is taking the Polish State Railways to court because the factory's newest product, the Bizon BS Z-110, did not reach the Brno Fair 88 on time due to the railway's fault; moreover, it was damaged during shipment. The combine, in the opinion of the producer, had a chance to win a medal which would have led to the financial benefits that derive from winning one.

WCZORAJ I DZIS will be published as a monthly of the Szczecin-Kamien diocese; the press run will be 45,000 copies.

Three new titles have been announced by the Union of Polish Writers: two weeklies, one of which will be devoted to the works of young writers, and the monthly ARKONA, which will be published in Bydgoszcz.

The new Stefan Batory is to be a stock partnership. The partnership Zegluga Polska in Szczecin wants to issue stock valued at 25 billion zloty, the cost of the construction of a new transatlantic ship. The Adolf Warski Shipyards in Szczecin would build the ship.

#### On the Left

"There is nothing to hide," said M. Gorbachev during a meeting with N. Ceausescu at the Kremlin. "There have been disputes in our relations, but both sides have been able to maintain the essential, irreplaceable principles that make it possible constructively to solve questions that occur during the course of cooperation." N. Ceausescu also mentioned that bilateral relations "have not always been ideal; there have been disputes, when the socialist principles have not been fully observed. However, these situations have been overcome through joint efforts."

An article has appeared in the Bucharest SCINTEI indirectly referring to the Romanian position that differed from that of the majority of the participants at the Vienna conference on European security and cooperation. Fragments: "Romania believes, naturally, that the problem of freedom of thought, conscience, and convictions cannot be limited only to religious beliefs and thinks that the proposals of some countries in this area encourage a return to past centuries, a regression, against which, in their times, the most enlightened minds have fought all over the world. Romania will never support proposals encouraging and promoting mysticism and obscurantism—positions clearly opposed to the current demands for a new scientific and technical revolution. It must be emphasized that Romania does not agree with attempts by some countries to develop generally binding

norms for questions which belong exclusively to the sovereign competence of every state. . . ." The last sentence refers, in the opinion of observers, to the problems of human rights and the rights of national minorities.

H. Kessler, the GDR minister of defense, stated in an interview for the Hamburg weekly *DIE ZEIT* that during the proposed meeting with R. Scholz, the West German minister of defense, he is ready to discuss the military doctrines of both German states and the issue of orders to shoot along the western boundary of the GDR. "Never, but never, has there been an order to shoot! There is not one at present. Please believe me. Shooting is permitted only when the border is being crossed with the use of force."

A special government commission is to take up the investigation in the case of the tens of thousands of victims of Stalinist repression buried in Kuropatwy near Minsk. The graves of the victims of mass shootings were discovered in May 1988.

"Explain the Guilt and Responsibility" is the title of an article in the daily *RABOTNICHESKO DELO* on the subject of drug doping among Bulgarian weight lifters. The daily demands that the responsibility of the central sports activists be determined.

A new independent trade union has been formed in Hungary: The Democratic Trade Union of Cinematography and Television Workers.

In the recently created journal *REFORMA*, M. Bihari, a well-known political scientist at the university in Budapest (removed from the party just prior to the MSZMP national conference) calls for the creation of a multiparty system in Hungary during the course of the next year or year and a half, because the "single-party system cannot express varied interests and thus cannot be an effective instrument for directing society."

RUDE PRAVO informed those desiring to go to Poland at the invitation of friends that there has been no decision as yet on their case or on the administrative rules. Thus, it is possible to go to Poland exclusively through a travel bureau or with a group as part of an interplant exchange or exclusively at the invitation of one's closest relatives.

#### **Observations on First International Human Rights Conference in Krakow**

26000077 Warsaw *KONFRONTACJE* in Polish  
No 8, Sep 88 p 18

[Article by Zbigniew Zbikowski: "The First in East Europe"]

[Text] Lech Walesa was unable to come. "Union obligations kept him away," the meeting organizers said, using this elegant phrase to denote the strike at the Gdansk

Shipyards. Similar reasons kept several of his colleagues from being present in Krakow. Instead they sent letters, which were read one after another from the rostrum. Walesa's letter brought applause. The hall resounded with bravos from people on their feet, and hands went up all over when the subject came up of what was necessary for freedom.

The congresses of intellectuals half a century before must have looked the same, except that people at that time raised a clenched fist over their heads and shouted "no pasaran," while now they spread their fingers in the shape of the famous letter which does not exist in the Polish alphabet, [the letter V]. Then people had spoken about the rights of peoples and nations. Now it is the rights of the individual that have become the weapon in the struggle. Then they accepted the leftist world. Today the symbol of the left popular in those times is treated in every possible way with contempt, and efforts are being made to move world positions to the right, or at least a good share of them. In the 1960's pacifists spray painted on the town walls: "Revolution is the opiate of the intellectuals."

The church in the Mistrzejowice section of Nowa Huta had not hosted such an impressive spectacle yet, although it had witnessed several political and social events. Four times people had put up a black and white banner bearing the words "International Human Rights Conference—Krakow 1988" each morning over the entrance and had taken it down each evening. Moreover, the official PAP communique had tried to make light of the international nature of the event, the presence of the many foreign guests who had come to Nowa Huta at the invitation of Father Jancarz, pastor of the parish of St Maximillian Maria Kolbe, but the fact remained that they were nonetheless there. There would have been still more of them, had it not been for denials of several people's visa applications just a few days before.

You could sense the international nature of the spectacle right at the entrance. The small groups of people talking to one another usually spoke in English, less frequently in French, and rarely in German. You could also catch a sentence here and there in Italian, Hungarian, Russian, or even Serbo-Croatian. But at the tables of samizdats—this word came into prominence in several languages before perestroika did—the principle language was Polish. Because of the price shock, there has always been a ready supply of mimeographed pamphlets and brochures, Polish and imported.

After passing into the area of the chapel, you faced the meeting hall. It had room for several hundred people. A podium and microphone stood in the altar's usual place. Behind the table was an enormous cross, flanked by the same words that were at the entrance and the symbol of the conference. On the left side of the hall was a picture of the Blessed Mother and pictures of Pope John Paul II

and Father Jerzy Popieluszko, and below the words: "Mother of the striking steel mill workers," along with a mountain of candles, as is so characteristic of Poles.

The places of the worshippers were filled by people attending the conference, both those for whom the defense of civil rights is the content of life and those for whom it is only on the periphery. They represent all the splinter groups of the Polish opposition, from socialists with PPS party badges to the KPN. There are members of organizations which do not enjoy the benefits of the associations law, members of the Freedom and Peace movement and the Commission on Matters related to Intervention and the Legality of "Solidarity," which went to great effort to set up the conference. Foreign guests came from East and West, except that those from the East usually took a roundabout route, emigrating first. A large group of Hungarians and one citizen of the Soviet Union came directly from their countries. The capitalist world, after all, is mainly Western Europe and the United States, but it includes Chile, Guiana, and Japan as well. There were representatives from the foreign embassies in Poland, and also from peace movements and local Helsinki committees.

Representatives of the Polish authorities and representatives from the Ministry of Justice are seated in this company, among the socialists and anticommunists, the pacifists and radicals, and the conservatives and nationalists. All this is going on at a time when legal talks are being held with people illegally on strike, and the most legal sorts of agreements are being signed with them. Poland has not ceased to be a country of paradoxes which are difficult to explain to a foreign journalist. We could say that our authorities, however, are not monolithic, and the people representing the authorities need not even all agree with what the spokesman says, but explaining it is still more difficult.

Jerzy Turowicz, editor in chief of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, gives the basic address on the rights of the individual. "The problem of a person's rights is the fundamental problem of our times," he says at the beginning. Elsewhere he explains: "These are not laws which govern the individual or which can be used to govern the individual. They are rights given to a person which must be adhered to, respected, and defended. Defended from what? From other people and from institutions which people have created, from the state, the law, and lawlessness." The text is down to earth, logical, without a shade of demagoguery, and it emphasizes the position of the Catholic Church.

One of the conference's basic goals is to exchange information about adherence to such laws in various countries, but because of time and circumstances, greater attention is given to Poland and ... Rumania. It is understandable that Poland should be brought up, but the interest in Rumania stirs the interest of emigres from Rumania and Hungary. And this is the way it will be throughout the entire conference. The discussion on civil

rights in general serves as a backdrop for proposals and initiatives concerning specific events and situations, including our most recent history.

Now it is Herbart Ruitenbergh, who cites a short text which contains the proposals, the most basic principles for action on behalf of civil rights. Among these rights are freedom of speech, including freedom to write memoirs and compile archives, freedom of assembly, association, and travel, and a free press. Later he talks about the implications of this for defenders of these rights. [Censored material] (Law dated 31 July 1981, "The Control of Publications and Public Presentations," Article 2, Point 3 (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 20, Item 99, amended 1983, DZIENNIK USTAW, No 44, Item 204)). Then a delegate from strikers at the Manifest Lipcowy mine comes up to the microphone with his fingers up and rouses everyone by singing the beginning of the Polish national anthem, "Poland has not perished so long as we still live." Then he describes the background and course of the strike. In the evening a Mass is celebrated on the top floor for the intention of the striking workers. Groups of miners with flags stand on both sides of the altar. The Cricot theatre puts on a live untampered Polish performance. "The conference is going on in so many different places that I myself do not know what to write about," a journalist from Finland confides to me.

Private talks take place near the conference hall, for example, in the cafe next to the church, which serves drinks, crackers, and sandwiches in the catechism rooms in which midday meals are served. In a corridor around the chapel, there is an exhibit of Polish underground literature. In another, there is a photographic display portraying the stormy history of the Polish streets in recent years. Illegal publications from other countries appear in other display cases. At the end of the corridor is the Press Office, with whole runs of conference documents. It comes as a pleasant surprise to see a KONFRONTACJA journalist at the conference.

A Polish experimental performance. Sniady, an elderly man from the Afghan royal family removed from power as the result of an army revolt and formerly Afghanistan's minister of culture, who is now residing in West Germany. He came to Poland, which is an ally of the USSR, to talk about the war in his country, to talk as people used to at the court of the king [censored material] (Law dated 31 July 1981, "The Control of Publications and Public Presentations," Article 2, Point 3 (DZIENNIK USTAW, No 20, Item 99, amended 1983, DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)).

At the same time but in a different place, Gen Kiszczak presents a proposal for a roundtable conference with representatives of various sections of the opposition. In still another place, the text of an episcopal letter is being prepared in the spirit of Jasna Gora to be read from the pulpit next Sunday.

Michael Hammond, an American citizen representing the U.S. Senate's Rules Committee, talks about the fact that the Congress has allocated another million dollars for "Solidarity" and reads a resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives expressing disapproval of "Gen Jaruzelski's government" in connection with the way he has handled the strikers, but the content of the resolution shows that the issue is the May strike at Nowa Huta. It is therefore 3 months late. Hammond lifts up his hand and extends his fingers, and there is an ovation.

There is a flood of words, and a rainfall of draft resolutions. It becomes necessary to set time limits on people. Everyone wants to show their solidarity with the strikers and condemn injustice, wherever it appears. There is a representative of the Italian radical party, the same one that brought Ciciollina to the Rome parliament. Because time is of essence, the chairman does not permit him to finish his sharp demagogic statement, which contains nothing new. After somebody's elevated statement, Jan Jozef Lipski feels obligated to point out that in certain instances objectivity is more impressive than pathos.

Circulating among the people attending the conference, a pleasant Frenchman walks around with a card pinned to his shirt. It says "Citizen of the World." He shows anyone who is interested his documents of "citizenship" and answers questions about his project. "So can I too be a citizen of the world?" one of the students asks. "Of course. You already are one," the "world citizen" responds. "We all are."

One of many proposals is made at the microphone during deliberations in the large hall. "Mr Gorbachev talks about europeanizing Europe, about creating a joint European house. So I propose that the conference present an initiative to draw up and adopt a European Civil Rights Charter, which would be equally binding on all the countries of the continent, regardless of their form of government."

The people gathered in the hall agree that this should not be the last conference.

**Speculation on Socialist Presidential Model**  
*26000105 Warsaw PRAWO I ZYCIE in Polish*  
*No 42, 15 Oct 88 pp 3-4*

[Article by Ryszard Tupin: "A President for Poland"]

[Text] The PRL Constitution of 1952, modeled after the so-called Stalinist Constitution of 1936, abolished the system of a one-person head of state in Poland and assigned the duties of head of state to the Council of State—a collective body.

Unfortunately, the 35-year period of operation of the Polish system of government based on the Constitution of 1952 justifies the harsh criticism leveled at it. To be sure, it is hard, very hard to separate defects inherent in that system (a governance model not adapted to the

national character) from deviations occurring in practice. Thus, for example, the failure to distinguish between government direction and day-to-day administration and the universally pervasive presence of the state in social and economic life entailed disastrous consequences. Such consequences were foreseen by clear heads even before 1939. Stanislaw Grabski wrote: "Never and nowhere has a bureaucracy been successful in eliciting new, creative initiatives from society or in awakening its latent energies. The fundamental trait of a bureaucracy is its distrust of everyone that does not fit into one of its officially provided categories. The bureaucracy is suspicious of citizen initiative, and the average official distrusts most the person that is making money." Knowing the course of events since those words were written, we see no need to add or delete anything.

Right now, by long-term and well-conceived efforts, we must strive for the development of a citizen-based society in which social and economic links would be created through the initiative of citizens themselves and not dictated from above by the omnipresent state. As Professor Jerzy Wiatr writes, the role of the state ought to be limited uniquely to the establishment of legal parameters for the development of these links.

If, then, we wish to break with the notion of the state's unconditional supremacy over society, we must answer the question: What kind of state do we need? We probably need a state that is neither of the night watchman type nor of the syndicalist-anarchist type. Above all, we are looking for a system of government that would be suitable for Poland, a system that takes into account both the historico-cultural conditioning that has made its permanent mark on the Polish national consciousness as well as the conditioning by the current system that constitutes a value approved by a clear majority of the contemporary generation of Poles. That value is beyond any doubt the socialist system that facilitates the implementation of national aspirations.

However, in the new constitution, the idea that the socialist state is the state of all the people must be a guiding principle of the system.

The CPSU and the MSZMP (at its last ideological plenum) have already made this clear.

Thus, we ought to weigh the aptness of maintaining the qualifier "people's" in the name of our state since that qualifier indicates "an ethnic group distinguished from a nation by its lack of a strong tradition of statehood" ("Little Dictionary of the Polish Language," State Publishing House for Scholarly Works, 1969). Romania was the first to make a similar change in its constitution in 1965.

The Polish nation is a separate, wholly formed political-cultural entity that has had its own state since the 10th century. The passage of this state through various forms of sociopolitical systems formed and confirmed the

national psyche with its own politico-systemic and etatological tendencies. Dominant in the Polish national consciousness are the ideas of political freedom and of sovereignty residing in the nation, ideas expressed in the Third of May Constitution by the words "all authority in human society finds its origin in the will of the nation" (chapter V). The principle of freedom must be balanced against the principle of the strong and efficient executive authority desired by entire generations of Poles that resulted in the calling to power of "commanders in chief" and "dictators" in the difficult moments of our history of the struggle for independence. Still it must be said that even the introduction of authoritarian forms of government by the April Constitution of 1934 did not result in the transformation of government into a totalitarian one. What prevented such a transformation was the principle of political freedom deeply rooted in the national consciousness. Every state, as an emanation of the nation, possesses, therefore, certain individual characteristics that make of it the reflection of the national character.

The 20th century is coming to a close. We are ending it as a nation with a somewhat unfavorable balance sheet, and we are aware (or at least ought to be) that our future prosperity is going to depend on our ability to compete with other nations in the economic, research, technical and cultural arena. No ideology or membership in any grouping of states will make it easier for us to compete. This area, too, is one in which we have been slow to rid ourselves of certain illusions.

Our ability to compete with other nations requires a strong executive authority. As Napoleon stated: "the weakness of the highest authorities is the most serious misfortune of peoples." A socioeconomic system ought to advance to positions of leadership people of the highest professional and moral standards.

Our own experience and the experience of other nations (for example, Finland) indicates that in times of difficulty in the national life, it is necessary that the head of state be a leader that is intelligent and that speaks for the national will. This suggests the following solution: a presidential-parliamentary system of government capable of reconciling the following conditions:

- the principle of political freedom (a socialist democracy);
- a representative system of government (national representation);
- a strong and efficient executive authority, finding its support in the institution of the presidency.

However, the presidential-parliamentary system of government must be rooted in the realities of the Polish system. Among these I would list:

First, the leadership role of the workers' party carried out in the coalition configuration of the ZSL and the SD, together with the patriotic, creative forces that coalesce in the PRON social movement.

Second, basing the national economy primarily on the societal (nationwide) possessing of the means of production, while at the same time allowing the market to operate and treating equally the cooperative, light private industry and trade (i.e., up to 50 persons employed in a single enterprise) and private farm enterprises (up to 50 hectares).

Third, the democratization of formerly state-controlled socioeconomic relations, enabling the free development of private enterprise and the free banding together of citizens in legally permitted forms of self-government.

The presidential-parliamentary system of government ought to be rooted firmly in the preceding principles, so as to avoid the recurrence of a bourgeois-type state.

However, I do not exclude the possibility of using some tools and institutions, especially those that are linked closely to the historical-cultural development of the given nation. For us Poles, the institution of the president as head of state is such an institution. His domain includes:

- the strategic leadership of affairs of state;
- state representation abroad;
- supreme command of the armed forces.

Given Poland's political situation, the leader of the PPR ought to be appointed president, since he alone would have the real authority in such matters. On the other hand, his de facto exercise of such authority is not indicated on the national or international scene unless he is granted the powers of a head of state by the Constitution.

A unified model for the supreme officials of state authority has not yet been developed in the constitutional practice of the USSR and the states of the socialist community. It is true that one may apply the Leninist principle of the representative character of authority to conclude that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the PRL Council of State are both representative organs. However, this is not so in reality, since neither the members of these bodies nor their leaders are chosen by direct election, but are appointed by the highest representative body from among its membership.

If we try to be realistic about the political situation in Poland and about the history of constitutional practice, we arrive at three feasible variants of the presidential system:



a) the minimal variant based on renaming the office of the chairman of the Council of State the office of the PRL president and on assigning him some of the duties of the Council of State to be performed by him;

b) the radical variant, in which the current duties of the Council of State would be transferred to the PRL president who would be appointed in a general election and would be endowed with independent powers; these would extend to the issuance of legal documents (decrees and orders) that would compete with the lawmaking activity of the Sejm;

c) the compromise variant based on the experience afforded by the so-called socialist presidentialism, in which the PRL president would work alongside the Council of State and would assume some of its powers; as spokesman for the national interest, the PRL president should be independent of the Sejm and should be the real head of government operations.

Let us dismiss the minimal variant, since it would introduce a presidential system in name alone. In essence, it would retain the status quo, both with regard to the highest representative body, the Sejm, and with regard to the government.

While the radical variant is more consistent, it is not feasible because in our system it is irreconcilable with our representative system of government.

Thus, we are left with the compromise variant based on introducing the presidential-parliamentary system of government in conjunction with the principle of national representation. However, some constitutionalists envisage an authoritarian threat in such a system of government. They propose the absolute implementation of the principle of Sejm superiority both with regard to the Council of State and the president. However, they forget that they are in effect opting for an institutional facade that no more guarantees the greater democratization of public socioeconomic life than the official system of presidential-parliamentary government with powers unequivocally defined in the Constitution. This would guard against the degeneration of those governments into authoritarian governments by an individual.

The presidential-parliamentary system of government would facilitate the attainment of strategic economic and social goals within the strained situation at home and abroad. The experiences of other nations that have found themselves in situations similar to our own point this out. (Finland is one example of this). It is also manifested in our own history, which has molded the national character of the Poles. Where socioeconomic relations are complex, cultivating a policy from within a ruling elite is fruitless. Professor Stanislaw Gebethner correctly points out that it is necessary to shift to methods of steering social and economic processes that bring together the elite and the masses.

The system of the supreme organs of state must be rooted in great integrity.

The introduction of a democratic presidentialism cannot lead to the elimination of the Council of State. This should be retained as a permanently operative body, replacing the Sejm in a specific area (becoming its emanation). However, it is not a representative organ like the Sejm. The functions of the president and the chairman of the Council of State should be separated.

Thus, the following system of supreme bodies emerges:

- the Sejm as the supreme representative body and the lawmaking (legislative) body;
- the president, the Council of State and the government as the supreme executive authority in the state unified in the person of the president;
- the autonomous courts, subject only to laws in the area of meeting out justice.

In such a system, the government, the Sejm and the Council of State all would have the right to initiate legislation. The president should not be endowed with lawmaking powers (decrees, orders) that conflict with the legislative powers of the Sejm. On the other hand, he ought to have guaranteed influence over the government.

A key issue that impacts the degree of the democratization and legitimization of authority is the manner in which the PRL president is appointed.

For the sake of comparison, in the United States and Finland, the president is elected by indirect elections (by electors elected in a general election) while in France, the president is elected in a general election.

I propose that in Poland the president be elected in a general election from candidates nominated by the Sejm, with the exception that the first president of the PRL possibly would be elected by the Sejm.

The president should be elected for a term of 6 years (1-1/2 times the length of the Sejm term) and for no more than two terms.

In socialism, the structure of the presidency demands that the principle of the leading role of the workers' party be observed. Thus, the PRL president should also be the leader of that party. Naturally, when the Sejm nominates candidates, a consensus should be reached between the political partners and parties with regard to the nominees. The appointment of the workers' party leader to the office of PRL president will necessitate the logical redistribution of tasks in the party leadership for the duties of political leader (its chairman), the director of the Politburo and the president, who will have additional responsibilities. The duties of the general secretary and the organizational secretary of the party also will have to



be reassigned. Those running for the position of president should be: the secretary general (organizational secretary) of the party and the premier. The PRL president would be elected from among these in a general election. (The only exception to this would be the election of the first president in a situation where such a distribution of duties still does not exist in the party leadership.)

The new constitution should prohibit combining the position of president with other high positions in the state (incompatibilis).

A president's council should be appointed as an advisory body to the PRL president. Currently, the Consultative Council under the chairman of the Council of State is a prototype of such a council.

As a one-person head of state, the PRL president would be spokesman for the highest national interest and would integrate the people and the state. Consequently, he could only assume constitutional responsibility (before the State Tribunal) and not political responsibility before the Sejm.

The introduction of the presidential-parliamentary system of government in Poland should not affect radically the restriction of the power of the Sejm as the chief representative body endowed with lawmaking power.

Thus, there is no justification for replacing the session-oriented procedure of Sejm work with ongoing deliberations. Correspondingly, the powers of the Council of State regarding the calling of Sejm sessions and the administration of parliamentary elections following the expiration of the Sejm term are duties to be assumed by the PRL president. He likewise should take on those duties of the Council of State that must be fulfilled by a single individual (e.g., the reception of certified letters).

The president should be the real director of the machinery of government, chairing meetings of the Council of Ministers to discuss state issues of the highest importance (the ongoing leadership of the Council of Ministers should be exercised by the premier just as it is at present).

It would seem that the following division of powers between the PRL president, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers would be the most reasonable solution:

The president's duties would include:

1) state representation in international relations (the appointment of the diplomatic representatives of Poland in foreign countries, as well as the reception of the certified letters of the diplomatic representatives of foreign nations recognized by Poland);

2) ratification of international agreements after the appropriate Sejm commissions have stated their opinions of them;

3) supreme command of the country's armed forces and appointment of military leaders;

4) calling the Sejm into session and calling elections for the Sejm at the expiration of the previous Sejm;

5) signing laws passed by the Sejm and ordering the publication of laws in the Law Journal.

6) appointment and recall of the president of the Council of Ministers and, at his motion, of the ministers.

7) appointment and recall of the president of the Supreme Court and of the general prosecutor of the PRL;

8) appointment and recall of the voivodes.

Thus, cadre policy (items 6-8) as well as oversight of the observance of constitutionality (item 5) would be concentrated in the hands of the PRL president. As far as that oversight is concerned, the president would be empowered to appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal for its opinion about the conformity of a law to the Constitution, and he would be able to delay publication of a law until that opinion was obtained.

Since the president of the PRL will not be empowered to issue decrees (orders) with the force of law, as giving him that power would narrow the power of the legislative authority, the Constitution ought to grant him the right to have direct recourse to the electors (referendum) in the event that he affirmed that the Sejm was blocking the implementation of his policy. However, contrary to what is provided, for example, by the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, the referendum route could not be used to approve laws initiated by the president.

The fact that the president will not be endowed with legislative initiative does not mean, however, that he will not be able to call for such an initiative on the part of the Council of Ministers, for example, since he is the head of the governmental apparatus. In that same capacity, he likewise will be able to initiate the issuance of a decree with the force of law by the Council of State (in the interim between Sejm sessions).

Seemingly the proposals illustrated would constitute a reasonable compromise between the legislative power and the executive power.

The Council of State would remain an emanation of the Sejm and would retain its collective character.

The Council of State ought to become an important plane for the cooperation of the party and political factions and social, political and nonparty organizations.

In view of the separation of the functions of the president and the chairman of the Council of State, the latter ought to relieve the president in matters of representation at diplomatic ceremonies and at ceremonies for bestowing decorations, distinctions and honorary titles.

Of its current powers, the Council of State ought to retain the following: the exercise of supreme oversight over the people's councils, over the control of the press, publications and entertainment to the people's councils, the issuing of decrees during the interval between sessions of the Sejm upon the motion of the president of the PRL after having obtained the opinion of the appropriate Sejm commission, the right to grant decorations, distinctions and honorary titles, the application of the right of pardon, the declaration of a state of war and the imposition of martial law.

The premier would continue to be formally accountable to the Sejm (political accountability). However, just as in Finland, his actual accountability would be to the president who both appoints and recalls the premier, the president being the real head of the machinery of government.

The government would function on two levels: under the direction of the PRL president in state affairs of the highest importance and under the direction of the premier in ongoing administration of state matters (for example, the economy, social policy, state administration).

The principles of operation of the government as well as the particular scope of its competency ought to be defined by the law concerning the Council of Ministers as a concrete embodiment of the provisions of the Constitution.

The principles of operation and structure of the government must be tailored to the presidential system of government as well as to the requirements of a reformed economy. Particularly in need of strengthening is the role of the Council of Ministers as a collective organ that passes resolutions in pleno. The number of deputy premiers ought to be limited to one or two and their functions should be restricted to standing in for the premier.

As a remnant of the system of governing by decree, the Presidium of our government ought to be replaced by a professional body of the type formerly represented by KERM and this body ought to prepare decisions regarding economic matters at plenary sessions of the Council of Ministers.

The ministers in turn ought to become policymakers more than administrators, and cocreators of government policy as a whole.

The lawmaking activity of the government ought to be kept to an indispensable minimum. It should not compete with the Sejm. On the other hand, the government should continue to be the major source of legislative initiative.

The previously proposed scope of powers of the PRL president coincides significantly with the scope of powers enjoyed by the PR president during the years 1947-52 according to the terms of the Constitutional Law of 19 February 1947 and the March Constitution of 1921. Afterwards, we adopted a governance model based on the 1936 Stalinist Constitution.

The previously proposed concept of presidential-parliamentary government is above all practical; it issues from the real Polish experience of having confronted the constitutional solutions formulated against the background of statehoods other than our own. I am deeply convinced that, given Poland's situation, the presidential-parliamentary system of government is superior to other systems with regard to its more highly organized and effective executive authority. That should not entail negative consequences for citizen freedom and for the further development of democracy, provided that the following conditions are met:

First, the proposed constitutional solutions must strike the proper balance between the powers of the PRL president, the system of representation and the leadership role of the PZPR (the previously mentioned "socialist presidentialism"). Secondly, there must be an exact constitutional definition of the president's powers. That definition will erect an effective barrier against the transformation of those powers into an authoritarian form of government. However, the actual disposition of the creative political forces concentrated in PRON should constitute a practical guarantee against this. Finally, the system of nominating candidates for the position of president of the PRL and the method of conducting elections for the office ought to favor outstanding individuals with the highest moral and political qualifications, who express the national interest to the highest degree.

Entering the 21st century, Poland must regain its national identity, its strength and its faith in itself, and especially in those things that will accomplish its national aspirations within the framework of the socialist system. In large measure that will depend on the degree to which we attain the harmony of social and state goals and on the effectiveness of the state. These proposed constitutional solutions are intended to address this end.

#### **Workers' Councils Enter Reform Debate, Desire Roundtable Seats**

26000092 Warsaw *PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY*  
in Polish No 41, 9 Oct 88 pp 6-7

[Article by Andrzej W. Malachowski: "The Order in the Beehive"]

[Text] The function began as an All-Polish Meeting of the Representatives of Workers' Councils and ended by already becoming, in principle, a National Forum for

Workers' Self-Government. And, strictly speaking, this is not only a question of a name change but, above all, of creating in the near future of a plan enabling the exchange of outlooks and the working out of a common stand. In listening to the remarks of workers' self-government activists, one has the impression that they feel isolated; that every council is a closed circle of people and problems. Although, the apprehension of the activists can be felt that a central cap not form over the self-governments, the feeling dominates for the time being that it is easier and more reassuring to be in a group.

The integrationist tendencies of self-government activists have, thus far, been met with rather strong opposition from the administration. During the years 1984 and 1986, the planned meetings of workers' councils activists in the Torun based Elana [enterprise] fell through. The case was ultimately decided by the court. However, a positive verdict came through after the set dates for the meetings. The attempt at creating an association of self-government activists encountered similar opposition (we wrote about this in PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY No 39). However, owing to the intervention of the Spokesman for Civil Rights and a favorable decision from the appropriate MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs], this attempt ended according to the wishes of the initiators of this association. Two topic meetings also succeeded in being organized: one on the subject of profits and income and the other, on joint ventures with the participation of foreign capital.

For the third time, representatives of workers' councils met in Poznan on Thursday and Friday of last week at the Telekom-Teletra Wielkopolskie Tele-electronic Plants devoting their time to a discussion of the topic entitled "The Implementation of the Act of 11 May 1988 Regarding the Extraordinary Powers and Authority for the Government in the Light of Practice."

It may seem that the subject is somewhat outworn. Admittedly, the law is in force but the government which was to implement it has fallen. However, for activists of workers' councils, the May law means not only the limiting of self-government powers but, above all, a departure from the principles of the reform which was to find its base in self-government, thus, also in enterprise autonomy. There also exists the possibility, which workers' councils activists fear, that the new administration will reach for powers written into the law since it remains in effect until the end of the year.

To be sure, Premier Grabski's spirit seemed to hover over the meeting hall. Having also been provided with special powers, he worked to reform the economy. However, these powers had a strictly defined scope. Besides this, the activity of the former administration turned out to be extremely successful: after 1 month, the budget

deficit had been eliminated and the buying power of Polish-made products had been stabilized whereas after 3 months, a zloty with a stable rate and full exchangeability was introduced.

And it appeared as if within the context of these positive results, self-government activists and invited guests who presented a very broad spectrum of views on the subject of Poland's reality, had carried out an assessment of the May law and its effects thus far. The animated discussion frequently led to astonishing points.

Thus, for example, the representative of the "Lad i Wolnosc" [Order and Liberty] Wielkopolski Political Club reasoned that the catastrophe in Poland was caused by a departure from the natural economic and moral laws. "It is possible to turn this catastrophe around," he argued, "only by returning to private ownership." All other concepts are only subsequent experiments performed by people who—and here he quoted one of the church fathers—"had so much knowledge that they lost their senses."

A party activist and PZPR Central Committee worker replied who on the basis of, among other things, church teachings including the Pope's applicable encyclical explained an individual's right to work in suitable conditions which a return to unrestricted private ownership will not ensure.

In turn, Prof Gilejko from the Academy of Social Sciences affiliated with the PZPR Central Committee, noticed that there exists an urgent need for making changes in the economy and particularly changes within the sphere of social ownership. However, he warned that "bureaucracy will be more willing to go for private ownership than socialization."

However, it was not private ownership that was the main motive behind the pronouncements in the meeting hall in Poznan. The current position and the future of self-governments were discussed, above all. The above quoted party activist noticed that ruling out the existence of self-government is at the same time the ruling out of socialism in Poland. Prof Gilejko stated that there is a growing overall feeling both among those governing as among those governed, that without broad social self-government including workers self-government, nothing can be accomplished in any of the social spheres. That is why, an offensive on the part of self-governments is necessary (another speaker noticed that 70 percent of plant self-governments are weak in their operations or are not functioning at all). The kind of offensive needed is the kind that would be directed toward defending rights and reinforcing that which was capable of being retained. "There exists currently in the country competition for radical programs and attitudes," stated Prof Gilejko. "Because of the unavoidability of such actions, this should be sound radicalism—a movement of social common sense. And this is the kind of movement that self-government has a chance of being."

In any case, in listening to the remarks of workers' councils activists, it was difficult to detect opinions not well thought out or those not taking the current social and political realities into account. A note of genuine concern for the situation dominated. The proposal of one of the speakers that the concluding declaration prepared by the gathered participants of the roundtable be sent only to Lech Walesa excluding Gen Czeslaw Kiszczak was somewhat of an event. This proposal was rejected by an overwhelming number of votes. The sharp attack on the country's mass media made by the same speaker did not evoke any greater interest on the part of those gathered. In any case, it is interesting that radicals on both sides of societal life perceive evil in the mass media as if though there were a total lack of cyclists [pun?] in Poland. However, in Poznan, if there was mention of television, radio or the press, it was rather in the context that any and all critical comments with regard to the May law could not have been found in these media, thus, giving the impression of the general acceptance of this law.

The speakers appealed for maintaining a sense of reality; for detecting changes in the political climate and not ruining this climate. "Without denying one's own views, attention should be paid to what is said" (CEMI representative-Warsaw), "whereas the weakness of self-governments is also the result of their inertness and committed mistakes" (WZT-Warsaw). "We do not need politics; self-government should restrict itself to organizational and economic activity in the workplace" (Gdansk Lenin Shipyards). This trend of discussion, which has only been outlined here with ideas that are perhaps somewhat taken out of context, was summed up by the FSO representative in Warsaw with the sentence: "Radicalism on one side also causes radicalism on the other."

Such a view seems important in that significant social groups want to see a lasting element of our country's image in the workers' self-governments. As noted by Prof Wacław Wilczyński in the introductory remarks to the discussion, the authorities continue to approach government in a paternalistic manner and there is little searching for ways of integrating working people around good management and this is what could guarantee self-government. However, many definite achievements can also already be noted. Prof Ludwik Bar, one of the authors of the draft of the law regarding self-government listed them. At the same time, he noticed that the principles adopted in 1981, although described by some as exacted by the political situation, have not lost their social value. Their implementation encountered certain setbacks; "there were lean years," as described by the professor but it is now time to "take on the burden of eliminating hardships and overcoming adversity," and again, "it is necessary to take legislative undertakings into account."

According to Prof Bar, the time has come for preparing a new law on the basis of the experiences thus far that

could be passed by the Sejm in approximately 1991. He appealed to workers' councils activists to assist in this effort with their comments and proposals.

It appears that he surprised the self-government activists somewhat with this appeal, although he made them happy as well. Until now, they had concentrated themselves on defending the attained positions; however, searching for new, legal solutions—that is a completely different but striking quality.

However, today we need—and all those expressing their opinions agreed with this—a strongly pronounced presence of workers' self-governments in work establishments with the concurrent "depoliticization of the economy"—as Prof Gilejko described it. This thought, although perhaps in a somewhat different context has also found its reflection in one of the paragraphs of the declarations addressed to the participants of the roundtable in which workers' councils activists have announced their desire to participate, at the same time designating three of their representatives. Thus, in this declaration they propose, among other things, "that the PZPR desist from direct participation in managing and controlling enterprises, and in particular that officialdom with regard to the managerial cadre of enterprises be done away with; that state ownership be socialized, and that social and private ownership be allowed in the economy on the basis of equal rights." However, the last part of this proposal, i.e., equating the various types of ownership in terms of their rights may seem somewhat obscure, particularly in the light of earlier discussions on the economic situation of state enterprises. Is it a question of creating equally difficult conditions for private enterprise as for state enterprises? Or perhaps the reverse is true? Of course, this is only a joke which could be heard, however, in the hall where the deliberations were held. Because, in fact, the situation in which state enterprises find themselves is rather difficult and unless the fiscal policy toward them changes (some of them pay 15 different kinds of taxes), it will be impossible for them to function normally and grow.

A supplement to all this is the May law and the so-called stabilizing taxes introduced by the government.

Dr Jerzy Malkowski, government spokesman for issues related to the economic reform, who did not agree with the premise that the government wanted to assure itself a return to the directive style of governing, defended the May law. What was at issue was to not repeat the experiences of past periods when reform attempts were made and when the economy was completely out of breath, the public weary and the government weakened. However, sooner or later various obstacles have always appeared. To avoid them currently, the government has decided to reach for special powers. "However, the fact is," confirmed the spokesman, "that the impact of the May law on the economy and on its stabilization is minimal."

Those who spoke following Dr Malkowski, were not unanimously convinced as to the scope of consequences of the law concerning extraordinary powers for the government. To be sure, all stated unanimously that the law has brought more harm than good. However, they did not agree completely as to the extent of this harm. According to Dr Ryszard Bugaj, for example, the May law is not an episode but only a method which had already been used much earlier by previous administrations: material interest incentives—Boleslaw Jaszczuk's concept from the end of the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's which became an economic maneuver announced during 1975 and 1976—or, in other words, the use of temporary regulations when the authorities are uneasy about the situation and do not want to resort to a normal reform of the system. The belief that the economy can be reformed with the aid of surgical incisions is dangerous. And even though, according to Dr Bugaj, the May law and the resulting actions of the government did not bring about great losses, the fear exists, nonetheless, that these types of measures will be used in the future as well.

In turn, Dr Janusz J. Tomidajewicz concentrated primarily on the consequences of solutions introduced as a result of the law and taking place in enterprises. He discussed at rather great length the effects of the introduction of the so-called stabilizing tax paid by enterprises by virtue of excessive materials reserves, and the nonimplementation of fixed assets and services commissioned to units not paying the tax on above-standard wages, i.e., the private or Polonia-foreign sectors. These types of implements used in the management of the economy strike blindly and, repeating Dr Tomidajewicz's thinking in a somewhat simplified manner, there where this implement will allow to achieve a fiscal effect, i.e., there where an enterprise's management will not succeed in evading this tax through some clever maneuver, that is where the unsettling of the enterprise's situation may be expected in a short period of time and its tendency in the direction of insolvency, loss of creditability, etc. In order to bring an enterprise out of such a situation, the use of tax breaks is necessary.

It is a mistake to place obstacles in the way of the outflow of money from an enterprise, e.g., in the form of wages, because this blocks all innovative activity or activity contributing to an increase in production. Dams should be placed on the stream through which money flows to an enterprise—cheap money because it is obtained from the government in the form of tax exemptions, subsidies or easy credit.

Docent Marek Dabrowski, who also explicitly criticized both the idea of special powers for the government and their method of implementation remarked, at the conclusion of his presentation, that there continues to be a lack of a consistent and stable reform program. There is a continuing pursuit of artificial solutions which, in addition, are temporary and segmental in nature. Meanwhile, what currently appears to be of the utmost importance and what can most probably be interpreted as a

proposal addressed to the presently forming cabinet is "the formulation of an explicit reform program that is market oriented and the setting up of a coalition of social and political forces capable of supporting and implementing this program consistently."

According to Prof Teresa Rabska, the May law introduced serious legal disorientation and resulted in that two separate systems relating to enterprises and self-government began to function alongside each other: one resulting from earlier laws that are still in effect, and the other resulting from the May law and from decrees issued by the government which it did not have legal authority to do.

Considerably higher demand should be placed on legislative activity. Prof Rabska remarked that the solutions changing from year to year prompt one to conclude that the legal system is being shaped on the basis of the so-called negative good which as is well-known in cadre politics means the appointment of cadres through elimination.

The meeting in Poznan concluded with the passing of a declaration addressed to the participants of the roundtable, a declaration regarding the desire to participate in the roundtable, and drawing up of over 20 proposals which were submitted to the central authorities—in other words, they will make their way to the new cabinet as soon as it is established. And as stated by one of the discussion participants, we need a strong government but one that will not involve itself in the shaping of the level of costs, profits, wages, etc., in enterprises because these are elements which should arrange themselves by themselves. We need the order of a beehive in which every bee does its part whereas the queen does not interfere in this. After all, there is no cloud of disorder or anarchy in all this.

#### PZPR Voivodship Plenums Reported

##### Rural, Worker Situation Viewed

26000093 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
13 Sep 88 p 4

[Text] Pila—"I am almost the same age as the People's Polish Republic," stated Jerzy Susek from Rychlik near Trzcianka, "and as far as I can remember and also during the time that I have been a party member, there have been some sort of problems, setbacks, mistakes and aberrations to deal with at every turn. It is high time that we stop listening to comprehensive, well-put formulations and start occupying ourselves with issues that have a fundamental meaning for us—members of the lower party echelons."

This remark as well as many others in the discussion conducted at the PZPR Voivodship Committee plenum in Pila on the 10th of this month reflect the climate of these deliberations during which a review of the most

important problems troubling the communities and work forces of this region was conducted within the context of the resolutions of the Eighth PZPR Central Committee Plenum.

The analysis of the occurring phenomena and their causes signalled by party organizations was contained in the report paper leading into the discussion presented by Michal Niedzwiedz, PZPR Voivodship Committee first secretary.

The sources of the current tensions were pointed out both in the report paper and in the discussion. A large portion of the discussion was also devoted to issues involving enterprise work efficiency, the ratio between productivity and wages, profitability, the function of profits, and the proper functioning of market mechanisms.

The ups and downs of agricultural policy were also discussed whereby the essence of this policy should be equal access to the means of production, profitability, and stability of this policy. The decline in the head of cattle was discussed within this context with concern. The threatened environment in the region was pointed out.

In talking about the situation among work forces, Elzbieta Kolodziejczyk from Polam in Pila stated that genuine cooperation on the part of all plant organizations is the most effective countermeasure against the formation of tension and conflict situations. They [plant organizations] know best what upsets the work force. They are the best early warning system. However, at the same time the principle must be in force since we are incapable of quickly solving general problems, we must be capable of straightforward and responsible handling of issues that depend on management and the organizations themselves. The party needs greater openness and implementational consistency.

It was stated in the discussion that the today already outdated and ineffective forms of work must stop. We must look for new ones that are better suited to the needs. The setbacks of the interim period are causing apathy among part of society but also give rise to the search for new forms of manifesting social activity and codecisionmaking.

Because the plenary session of the Voivodship party echelon was treated as the executive portion of the resolutions adopted by the Eighth Central Committee Plenum, the final resolution was not subject to approval.

### **Inflation, Reform Discussed**

26000093 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
13 Sep 88 p 7

[Article by Ewa Jasinska]

[Text] Plock—"The need for substantial changes as exacted today's plenum," stated Adam Bartosiak, PZPR Voivodship Committee first secretary in Plock, upon

opening this Committee's plenary session on the 12th of this month. "We all realize that important changes not only in the country and in the economy but in our Voivodship party organization are indispensable. We must answer frankly the question: What have we neglected, what have we overlooked, and what have we implemented too slowly?"

During the joint, several hour-long deliberations held in three topic groups, the discussion participants analyzed the plenum theme: "Barriers on the Road to Party and Economic Renewal of the Voivodship and the Role of Work Forces in Overcoming Them." The main weaknesses of party activity were pointed out, among these being: the lack of consistency and confidence in that which is being done, and disregard for fleeing time.

Many of the discussion participants stressed that the current economic issues, with the curbing of inflation in the forefront, are a crucial problem requiring solution.

Wladyslaw Wawak from the Plock based Petrochemia presented four conditions which must be met in order to achieve this objective. First of all, a general income tax should finally be introduced of which there was been talk for many years and which is being successfully implemented all over the world. Secondly, the system of prices should be reorganized to conform to prices on the world market. Third, the applicable tax breaks for enterprises should be limited to a truly indispensable minimum while concurrently introducing tax stability. Fourth, enterprise self-government and self-reliance must be implemented within the framework of state policy and cannot be in conflict with its interests.

Roman Grzegorzczak, farmer from Krzyzanow, argued that the reform does not "suit" everyone. "There are rather large groups of people interested in having chaos continue for as long as possible because they draw material benefits from this. These are, above all, those people," he continued; "who currently have access to goods of which there is a shortage."

What is the role of the party members in eliminating these irregularities? The discussion participants from the group taking up intraparty issues tried to answer this question. Grzegorz Lemanski pointed out that the party all too often takes the blame for others. It is even saddled with responsibility for the manipulations of a warehouseman at the GS [Rural Commune Cooperative] and it is no wonder, since it is unable to repel these charges directed against it and point to those at whom the complaints should be directed.

Dobieslaw Szustowicz, vice chairman of the Voivodship Supervisory-Audit Commission took a stand on the issue of the party's supervisory function. In his opinion, this function is not fulfilled well and it is weakest at the level of basic party organizations. We have a great deal of supervisory elements both professional and social but their effectiveness is very low.

The success of all endeavors is contingent, above all, upon the people. That is why, cadre policy constitutes an important governing and management instrument and is the subject of particular public interest and opinion. How many people do we have in the party who are genuinely good and to whom we can entrust the most difficult work? Are we able to use them properly? This represents another package of issues discussed at the plenum.

"Not too infrequently we appointed people to various posts more for the benefit of statistics than because of real need," it was said during the deliberations. "A stop has to be put to this once and for all because it is not important how many are to be party members or how many without party affiliation; how many women and how many men but what must be of primary importance is whether a given individual is suitable for a particular position regardless of party affiliation or philosophy of life."

"The success of cadre policy depends to a great extent on the strength of POP [Basic Party Organizations]," stated Janusz Ignatowski from Plock. "A party organization must support good managers and directors by its authority despite all those who prefer mediocrity, weak and undecided people who, to be sure, will not harm anyone but who at the same time will not manage to do anything good. Unfortunately, we still prefer to work with the average, run-of-the-mill people."

"The validation of the cadre policy conducted by the party requires a particularly discerning assessment of managerial cadres from us," it was stated at the plenum. "Primarily those who have an influence on the everyday life of society; who are subject to constant public criticism. It is they who shape the level of public confidence in the party and in the authorities."

#### **Enterprise Directors Air Views**

26000093 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
14 Sep 88 p 2

[Article by Jozef Klis]

[Text] The plenary session of the PZPR Voivodship Committee in Bielsko-Biala held on the 13th of this month was devoted to a discussion of the tasks of the Voivodship party organization in the acceleration of reforming the economy in the Podbeskid region. Thirty directors of the largest enterprises in the region participated in the deliberations.

"During an 8-month period, the industry of the Bielsko-Biala Voivodship yielded production valued at 638 billion zloty, i.e., 10 percent higher than at the same time last year according to comparable prices," it was stated, among other things, in the introductory report paper. During the process of reforming the economy in the Bielsko-Biala Voivodship, all activity should receive the

full support of party echelons and organizations, especially in the area of the new forms of organizing profitable exports and entering into economic cooperation with foreign enterprises. A positive example of this is foreign coproduction in the Andoria enterprise in Andrychow, in the FSM, and in the paper factory in Zywiec with Soviet enterprises, and the formation of two joint stock companies with the participation of foreign capital.

The following constitute disturbing phenomena in the current economic situation: the decline in market production and the low degree of housing implementation. The party secretary at the General Construction Works in Oswiecim, Wieslaw Ceglarz, spoke about this and also about the fact that the implementation of housing construction at, for example, the Oswiecim based KBO [General Construction Works] is hampered by the lack of building material, machinery as well as developed sites. There is a pressing need for defining the real implementational potential of construction enterprises and for putting into practice the new organizational solutions in the construction industry.

During the discussion, there were too few remarks demonstrating the constructive aspects of actions aimed at improving management and too much complaining about the proverbial powerlessness. However, in many cases, the surmounting of these barriers depends not on the people but on the central administrative agencies and ministries. There can be no lack of efficiency and consistency in the implementation of the tasks of the second stage of the reform. "The efforts of people should also not be wasted," stated Wiktor Czulak from the Bielskie Fat Processing Plants. "The people must be convinced that their voices and initiatives are heard and met with understanding and implemented."

At the conclusion, the plenum participants passed a resolution which concretizes the goals and methods of accelerating the reforming of the economy and which indicates the ways in which market production can be increased.

#### **Party Initiatives Lagging Behind**

26000093 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
16 Sep 88 p 4

[Text] How to implement in practice the Resolution of the Eighth PZPR Central Committee Plenum? What conclusions should be drawn by party echelons and organizations from the events which recently occurred in our country? What are the tasks facing them in the light of political and economic changes? These are the questions that were debated at the plenary session of the Party Voivodship Committee in Legnica held on the 15th of this month. This plenum departed from the generally established pattern. Instead of the traditional paper, there was a brief speech made by the PPR



Voivodship Committee first secretary which only signaled the topic of the deliberations. Afterwards, those gathered separated into eight groups in order to analyze the basic socioeconomic problems of the region with the assistance of experts.

Subsequently, the proposals of concrete solutions were presented during the plenary discussion. Jozef Mokrzycki from Jawor stated the following, among other things: "The party structure to date has not withstood the test of time. We should appoint PZPR district and community committees as soon as possible and not keep the party enclosed in plants. Party meetings have also become outdated. Reports papers, speeches, and voices heard in discussions frequently did not contribute anything. After all, if there is a problem to discuss, a brief meeting can be held, if only during lunch break, instead of waiting for an official meeting."

Stanislaw Tomczak, chairman of the ZW ZSMP spoke about cadre policy which, in his opinion, frequently lacks perception. "We do not always know whom to promote to a higher position or who is to step down from it," he stated.

Many questions were addressed to Marian Orzechowski, Politburo member present at the plenum and PZPR Central Committee secretary. Among other things, he stated the following: "The public no longer believes in declarations. We are aware that both the country and the party are faced with great changes. We no longer want to live like this—from crisis to crisis. A new model of exercising authority, of the party and of socialism is forming. Time is working against us now. We ought to be moving forward quickly whereas we can hardly keep pace with these changes. We only act quickly and efficiently when pressed against the wall. This can no longer continue. Economic issues are of primary importance today. However, the key to solving them lies in the sphere of policy. During an 8-month period, we noted positive progress in work productivity, production and exports. Our accomplishments are overshadowed by the price-income spiral and inflation. The condition of the market is worsening. There is no other way but to reform the economy during the coming years. The plan to consolidate the economy in the upcoming years is being prepared in two centers: the Office of the Council of Ministers and the PZPR Central Committee. the fundamental goals which we are placing before ourselves are: the flow of goods to the market, intensification of housing construction, curbing inflation and connecting our economy to foreign markets. Thus, this is a different strategy than has been the case thus far because supplies and construction are of primary importance. The distribution of budget resources is new as is the approach to price and income policies, and to monopolies and tax systems. We have backed out of the idea of freezing prices and wages. This plan will be very difficult to implement because it rejects the premise that no one will lose on the introduction of the reform."

"We need a new national understanding," continued the speaker. The initiative of reaching an understanding with a constructive opposition has again come from the party.

#### Local Party Role Assessed

26000093 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
16 Sep 88 p 4

[Article by Jozef Sadowski]

[Text] How is the Voivodship party organization to become a proreform force in the region? How should it successfully implement social, economic and political tasks? With which forces should we build a front of struggle for a better tomorrow? These are the main problems on which the participants of the PZPR Voivodship Committee plenary session held in Siedlce on the 15th of this month concentrated their attention. The topic of the deliberations were tasks for party organizations and echelons in the light of the resolution of the Eighth Central Committee Plenum.

Representatives of trade unions, workers' councils, youth organizations; secretaries of party organizations from work establishments, and foremen and subforemen participated in the deliberations.

"Despite the fact that there were no strikes or work interruptions in Siedlce Voivodship," indicated Andrzej Ornat, meeting moderator and Voivodship Committee first secretary, "exasperation, anxiety and concern for the future as well as complaints about the worsening material situation of working people were apparent." According to Leonard Bauk, PZPR KMG [main city committee] first secretary in Kaluszyn, "the party in its current situation must rethink anew its position and find the right means of expression for fulfilling the leading and controlling role." "The implementation of our goals," emphasized Teodor Zelezowski, KM party first secretary in Wegrow, "requires the ability to organize broad social forces into a proreform and prosocialist coalition. A condition for achieving success is effectiveness in solving the accumulated problems in the country. Even the best declarations, resolutions and promises no longer count only their everyday, persistent, straightforward implementation in practice."

In presenting the situation in the trade union movement, the chairman of WPZZ, Edmund Pawlusiewicz, stated that the rank of unions is not high in all work establishments. There are directors who do not see in them a partner for conducting talks. In such a situation, it comes to workers protests and conflict.

The plenum members took over the Voivodship party organization plan of activity from the Eighth Central Committee Plenum. With regard to organizational matters, the plenum dismissed Voivodship Committee Secretary Bogdan Wojtczuk from his post. In a secret vote, from among two candidates, Jan Izdebski, the until now



director of the Voivodship Committee cadre policy department in Siedlce, was appointed Voivodship Committee secretary for political-organizational matters.

### **Social Balance Sought**

26000093 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
16 Sep 88 p 4

[Text] "The PZPR confirms the desire to continue the socialist policy of renewal, the reform of the economy, democratization and understanding." This slogan was the guiding principle at the PZPR Voivodship Committee plenary deliberations in Walbrzych held on the 15th of this month. They were devoted to discussing the tasks of the Voivodship party organization in putting the reforms into practice and in overcoming the threats to the people's standard of living.

"We find ourselves in times when many problems hinder and even prevent economic progress and worsen the living conditions of the people. It is necessary to take up activity as soon as possible that would alleviate social frustration and subsequently stimulate our ailing economy not in a temporary but lasting manner"—this is a kind of motto of two papers presented by the KW [Voivodship Committee] Executive Board referring to the above problem from the point of view of politics and economics. The urgent tasks necessary for implementation were pointed out in them, indicating at the same time that the plenum had been preceded by numerous actions aimed at reaching broad social spheres with the decisions made at the Eighth Central Committee Plenum.

It was stated that the stand of the party and economic aktiv, among others, determines the successful and conflict-free solution to social tension.

"We cannot forget even for a moment," it was stated during the discussion, "that the party should be the inspiration behind all actions aimed at eliminating phenomena causing social unrest and tension."

What kinds of problems do the residents of Walbrzych Voivodship have to contend with? Above all, problems concerning housing construction. The functioning of trade and services has an enormous impact on social mood. The fact that the region is constantly developing trade with other Voivodships and with foreign countries is reason for cautious optimism.

Factors that impede the attainment of social equilibrium were discussed openly and with commitment. Franciszek Szymczak, Plant Committee first secretary at the Nowa Ruda Hard Coal Mine took up matters that disturb the mine workers, pointing out, among other things, the decline of motivation to work on Saturdays and Sundays due to the shortage of material. At the same time, he pointed out that despite many unsolved wage problems of this occupational group, the August strikes

missed the mines as a result of, among other things, advance party measures. However, many burning issues continue to exist and they must ultimately be solved.

"There can be no trust without candor and openness in presenting the issues," stated Wlodzimierz (Wowo) Bielicki, a guest at the plenum and artistic director of the Jerzy Szaniawski Dramatic Theater. "However, in our country, the situation varies in this regard which does not make it any easier to win over the public to subsequent programs. Let us also not use the words 'government' and 'party' too often but point out the accomplishments and responsibilities of specific individuals. This also serves to raise credibility."

### **Insufficient Rural Advances**

26000093 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
16 Sep 88 p 4

[Text] The PZPR Voivodship Committee of Zamosc gathered on the 15th of this month at the meeting of the plenum. The current socioeconomic situation in the region as well as tasks arising from the resolutions of the Eighth PZPR CC were discussed.

It was found that during an 8-month period of this year, a more than 7 percent higher production in the Voivodship industry and a 4.6 percent higher production in the construction industry were attained due to higher work productivity. On the other hand, slow and insufficient progress was noted in the agricultural sector which is the main branch of the region's economy. It was pointed out that residents of rural areas are concerned about the strikes which occurred in our country and about the significant increase in contracted prices on industrial goods and on those serving agricultural production. There is a pressing need in the entire Voivodship for concerted action, particularly with regard to the proper functioning of trade, the development of market production, and the development of housing construction and the entire sphere of services. Shortcomings in the quality of work of many party organizations and individual PZPR members evoke concern. The gaining and strengthening of respect for activity taken up by the party as well as attracting young, active people to it is encountering difficulties. Despite the new law on peoples councils which is already in operation, the administration all too often does not include the councilors in the working out of draft plans and programs, expecting only their approval.

"We still have not attained a fair wage system in our economy," stated Henryk Pludowski from Zamosc. "Egalitarianism which directly leads to stagnation and mediocrity is very deeply rooted in social awareness."

"We are waiting for the further development of economic independence in work establishments," stated Barbara Zielinska from Zamosc. One of the main reasons for the current unrest in the country is the too slow

introduction of the second phase of the reform into the work establishment. The rate of changes in this regard requires absolute acceleration."

The director of the PZPR CC Department of Intraparty Management, Alojzy Zielinski, participated in the deliberations.

**Rzeszow PZPR, ZSL on Agriculture**  
26000093 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish  
17-18 Sep 88 p 4

[Article by Ryszard Zatorski]

[Text] The state of the infrastructure of the Rzeszow rural community was assessed and the action to be taken to improve the working and living conditions of farmers more quickly was specified at the joint plenary session on the 16th of this month. Zbigniew Michalak, deputy Politburo member and PZPR CC secretary, and Kazimierz Olesiak, NK ZSL secretary participated in the deliberations. Party Voivodship Committee First Secretary Franciszek Karp and WK ZSL Chairman Franciszek Gutowski presided over the meeting alternately.

The state of farming and of the rural community in Rzeszow Voivodship is determined by private farmers who cultivate 94 percent of all farmland in this Voivodship. These are small and dispersed farms. Therefore, it was pointed out in the discussion and stressed in the introductory paper, that there is an urgent need to consolidate the land in order to make more efficient use of the owned acreage and the agricultural equipment.

In revealing clear progress in all areas of life that determine the remaining of young people on farms, the problem of environmental protection was raised emphatically. These matters were stressed in many of the presentations and remarks made.

"The supply of water to rural communities as already improved," notices Wladyslaw Gajda, a farmer from Strzyzow gmina, "but the word 'sewage' is not known in our community. What's the use of putting in septic tanks when there is no place to take the sewage?"

"Progress in farming, the use of chemical fertilizers also means more toxic substances in our rivers," indicated Adam Daraz from Czarna. He called for support for initiatives pertaining to the construction of new water supply systems because, even though, 60 percent of the residents of the Voivodship live in rural communities, only slightly more than 27 percent of them have use of this convenience.

"There are examples, if only to mention the Swilcza gmina, where there is community effort already under way in constructing a sewage-treatment facility and water supply systems in two villages," pointed out Adam Batleja, KG PZPR first secretary. Within this context, he made reference to the impressive achievements in action

initiatives (among other things, all the villages in this gmina have had gas supply systems installed; new schools and kindergartens have been built as well as stores and service centers) and conveyed the critical remarks of the rural residents concerning difficulties with materials and getting things done by skilled workmen as well as documental delays.

The statement made by Helena Nowak, a farmer from Gorna, had a dramatic tone when she asked where to buy shoes for her children and an ordinary washing machine; she also presented an image whereby due to the lack of a dentist even though there is an office waiting for him in the village, it may turn out that her children will have to wear dentures.

These were not one-sided remarks. Accomplishments were pointed out with satisfaction.

In his remarks, the Party Central Committee Secretary Zbigniew Michalek presented certain factors, among other things, that increase inflation including, for example, the allocating of considerable amounts for the repayment of foreign debt. Such a situation, undoubtedly, has a negative impact on the living conditions of our population including rural communities. However, in the area of trade with foreign countries with agricultural products, we already have a credit balance [saldo dodatnie]—higher income from exports than the cost of imported food goods.

At the same time, the CC secretary took a stand with regard to those calling for rapid restructuring which, as he described it curtly, requires bold decisions so as to take from some in order to give to others.

A gauge of the growing demands of rural communities is housing construction which is developing so successfully in the Voivodship outdistancing inventory investments in rural areas. This is also the case elsewhere because it is the individual and not the inventory that is, after all, the central issue. Zbigniew Michalek also congratulated the farmers for their inventiveness and achievements in construction within the framework of community effort which places this Voivodship in the country's forefront.

**Housing Construction, Radical Changes in Practice Advocated**  
26000083 Warsaw VETO in Polish No 36, Sep 88 pp 5

[Article by Marian Mitkus: "Housing"]

[Excerpt] Many years ago, Deputy Premier Hilary Minc, his boss Boleslaw Bierut, and their buddies dreamed up the idea that the state should handle all housing matters. The authorities—those of the neighborhood, town, and powiat—were to decide who was to live where and in what sort of housing. Allocations were introduced. So-called space departments were expanded. The state took over the production of building materials (private brick ovens, lime production, manufacture of tar paper, tiles,

and so on were closed) and a monopoly was established for apartment block construction contracts. What we called apartment house owners were nationalized, and the Residential Housing Administration, or ADM, was introduced. It also took over major repairs and renovation of most of the holdings. Citizens who wanted to put up their own little shack were under grave suspicion, and short work was made of such initiative. After all the people who wanted to put up their own little houses quickly disappeared, because during the first decade of the Polish People's Republic they knew that any property was usually confiscated.

The state monopoly proved to be a fatal solution. Houses built before the war quickly fell into ruin. They became de facto nobody's property. ADM bureaucrats usually did not care about the condition of the property entrusted to them. Small repairs were neglected. If the roof needed minor repair, a bigger hole appeared later along with water pouring in and rot. No care was given to plasterwork. The bureaucrats shut their eyes to the interiors which were destroyed. Water and snow came through broken windows in attics and on stairways. Because there were no preservation measures for pipes, later it was necessary to make complete replacements. The renovation of neglected buildings dragged on for years. We call the attention of our readers to a cycle of photographic essays entitled "Slumsy" (Slums).

By the early 1950's, most of construction fraternity had become demoralized. Bad work and carelessness became the bywords. The serial "Dom" (House) harked back to that period, as did the figure Niutek Talar, a bungling construction worker at the Mirow work site in Warsaw. In those years the custom of bungling became rooted among such workers. Today not a single house is put up that does not have dozens of flaws. Like crazy rabble, we have to put up with being placed in housing which has crooked walls, shabby furniture, and so on. Modern construction workers are not even capable of laying tile straight, of hanging the doors to fit the jamb, or of roofing a building so it does not leak. It is all one great hoax to which we have nearly become accustomed and which we tolerate because "they" have finally given us an apartment—all this after waiting 10-15 years.

The figures on the magnitude of the housing shortage are widely known. I will not repeat them here. The needs are tremendous, and so is the degree of helplessness! All attempts to correct the situation within the framework of the old system will prove to be of no avail. So just maybe then we should change the system?

The major features of the present system are bureaucracy and monopoly. By bureaucracy I mean the whole package of regulations which various authorities have issued, basically without discussion or consultation with the interested parties.

First, it has been forbidden to put any citizen in an apartment without a formal allocation for that person. Just for filling out the forms (and checking them, and keeping an archival record) it was necessary to employ hundreds of office workers, along with their managers and directors. Departments started to be set up, and applications, appeals, supporting documentation, and so on were placed there, and still are. This whole ceremony of applying for an apartment has become encrusted with subregulations and procedures.

The authorities gave the allocations to the bureaucrats. Now, since it was throughout the entire kingdom that they were to distribute such valuable things, criteria for awarding apartments had to be established, even if they were only pro forma. Therefore, the bureaucrats thought up standards, that is, how many meters per person there "should" be. A circus began to fight for what was considered "additional" space and to establish groups of the privileged. Hence, additional rooms were given to teachers and journalists (but only journalists?!), and physicians. It was necessary to collect information about the benefits to which one was entitled, those concerning pregnancy, diseases, being an invalid or veteran... In some of the towns a prohibition was introduced against becoming a registered inhabitant, but of course there was a list of exemptions that were permitted...

Coming back to housing cooperatives, the bureaucracy there was not greatly reduced, except for a little at the beginning, but the insane bureaucracy spread de facto to other offices. The officials expanded the circus with apartment swaps. It got to the point where a permit was required for a son to switch apartments with his father or brother, even when both of the partners to the exchange owned their own place. Worse yet, housing standards were introduced, and a calculation was made of the comfort "rate" of the people exchanging apartments, and fees were exacted on this figure. There was an outbreak of fiscal awareness, and taxes started to be exacted from each housing shift. The police did not get any sleep either, because they started thinking up various forms of registration and fines for failing to adhere to the "regulations."

Because of the stupid regulations—don't mess with the law—thousands of people had a tremendous amount of work in connection with housing, mostly paper work, to the point where less and less was done on the building sites, and the housing shortage got worse, because more and more of the prewar housing fell into ruin. The cancer of bribes came to dominate the caste of the housing bureaucrats more and more, and callousness and an attitude of "I couldn't care less" became rampant. And so let us tell it all straight out!

Our city planners, architects, and engineers in the construction industry have all gone to the dogs. The neighborhoods that were designed were so poor and ordinary that people took to tents. There was universal adoption of the rectangle, flat roofs, and monotonous levels. Great

doghouses or henhouses, with no color, all of them identical, and shabby. Let us live in thousands of identical neighborhood barracks, doubled up. The large-slab nightmare, the paranoia of the past few years, has made the situation even worse.

During the next period, with greater leeway and attempts to return to normalcy, an effort was made to develop single-family construction. The mediocre city planners, architects, and engineers started up once again, creating catalogs of standardized buildings. Representatives of these three professions made other administration people jealous. They began to approve and issue permits for each bungalow and villa constructed. They were successful in putting down the fantasies, anything that smacked of being different. The towns and villages were filled with standard construction. And supposedly they did all this to protect the landscape, in the name of architectural aesthetics...

The voices of protest, experiments, and proposals for change were all effectively crushed, and all this was in line with the argument that this was out of concern for us working people. Dark kitchens were also introduced into an ideological environment, because such housing will be cheaper and more accessible for workers, teachers, and so on. Paranoia.

I know what I am talking about, when I say that the concept of a monopolistic housing economy and housing construction centralized in the hands of the state government has been a complete flop. The authorities' allocation of apartments cannot pass without criticism. The monopolized building materials industry does not supply the needed quantities of cement, lime, pipe, electric cable, glass, terracotta, woodwork (doors, window frames), gas stoves, or kitchen sinks. In this realm the planned economy is absolutely worthless. The people who have been running this sector of the economy should be put out of action, including those who killed ingenuity, lost their sound mind, or demonstrated exceptional indolence. Awards were given without restraint!

We have to change the system! How? Which way? How great can the risk be? Who is to do it? Who should be driven out? ... It is a hard job once the swamp has reached so far. But the effort, after all, must be made!

It would seem that first of all we should get rid of the notion that housing for citizens is the concern and responsibility of the state. Here we could adopt the notion that each citizen will act independently to get a roof over his head. For 40 years we have shaped the passive attitude which reflects the sayings "I received an apartment," "I was given...." and "They don't want to give housing to young people."

The adoption of such a concept calls for profound changes in ownership relationships. We have to end the practice of giving out apartments, quarters, and housing and instead popularize the notion of personal ownership

of an apartment, house, or villa, with the complete right to free use of the property, to sell, buy, or exchange it. Let us consider the fact that everyone takes care of his own property and does not allow it to fall into ruin.

Consistently following this line of reasoning, we should eliminate all allocations by the authorities and their involvement in the size of apartments. You have the money—and the second stage of the reform will encourage you to get it—so you build your own place, buy one, or exchange it for another (after paying an additional sum)! The rules of the game would be tough: housing is not going to drop out of the sky for you, and nobody is going to make you a present of it.

We should also revoke most of the regulations, especially the square and cubic foot limits and the prohibition against having more than one apartment. If I am a hustler, I have to have the right to build a little house, for example, for my only daughter, and nobody should punish me if I build it even 3-4 years before she comes of age.

I am not hiding my head in the sand, and I am not pretending not to know that many families would be in financial difficulty. They are not going to be able to afford to put down large sums all at once. Therefore, a credit system should be built up in a rational fashion, but, this is not an insurmountable problem, after all. On the other hand, the shift to a strict policy of condominiums would commit the financial resources of those citizens who already have the funds, and others would begin to acquire the funds, realizing that it all depends on them alone when (and if) they will have the four walls they desire. The desire each of us has to own our own housing, this most basic form of property, is a very great incentive. Let us remember the saying: It's crowded, but we don't moan. After all, it's our own!

## YUGOSLAVIA

**Situation of Croatia in Crisis Discussed**  
*28000026 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian*  
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[Interview with Drago Dimitrovic, secretary of the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee, by Jelena Lovric and Mladen Maloca: "Struggle for Trust"; date and place not given]

[Text] As soon as we sat down, even before we made ourselves comfortable and turned on the tape recorder, and before we asked the first question, Drago Dimitrovic, the secretary of the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee, who these days is in an even greater hurry than otherwise, immediately began the conversation, and—either because time was precious to him, or because he was seeking efficiency, or because he was avoiding courteous introductions, or because he considered it necessary to eliminate all possible disagreements even before the start—stated that we should not ask him

to speak about the emotions that have overflowed the Yugoslav public scene. Such a conversation is simply nonsensical, because it suffers from the naivete that everything can be cleared up through arguments. In this sense, he says, he is not an appealing interlocutor, and he is not a real partner in settling accounts, because he considers this counterproductive, not just because it expends energy pointlessly, throwing evidence at those who, blinded by their own emotions, cannot see it at all, but more because in such a situation even arguments become additional encouragement for those to whom they are addressed to close up ranks. This, Dimitrovic said, would be the reason for his leaving anything unsaid or avoiding certain subjects.

"Believing that we will live for a considerable time to come with the problems of national projects, both Albanian, and Slovene, and Serbian, and possibly others, each of which has its own strategy, the Yugoslav idea can survive only if oil is not poured onto the fire," Dimitrovic said. "Sometimes that is not easy, and at times it is very difficult, and sometimes, perhaps, it can even appear to be a sign of weakness, because today it is more difficult to keep a cool head than to perish recklessly. Consequently, the key issue is how to behave politically and act in order to move from an atmosphere of overheated emotions into an area of reasonableness." Dimitrovic added that consequently everything that was being done today in the republic was not so much because of others and with a view toward others, as it was "for our public, so that we can open up prospects, increase the degree of security, and reduce the need to become homogenized, because of a feeling of danger or fear."

[DANAS] Do you think that nationalism is our fate in the long term?

[Dimitrovic] I do not see any reasons why it would not be. A lot of things nourish it. Let us mention just the imitative concept of the development of Yugoslavia, i.e., development without one's own creativity, without one's own creative identity as something that is recognizable to groups and individuals. Where can our frustrations end, except in nationalism, when we cannot come together on any other values? Even what is called self-management, which has been proven to be a trend in civilization, has not become a factor in identification, or a proof that we are capable of world breakthroughs. A society that does not have internal creativity cannot inherit great results on the world scene. It may have quantitative achievements, but it cannot develop its own identity. In our country, the imitative concept of development has borne the splendid fruit that we have to deal with: survival and redistribution on the social level, and nationalism in interethnic relations. We are dealing with topics from times in which the tasks of the comprehensive development of man and global cooperation for the sake of survival were unknown.

[DANAS] How can the peaceful and reasonable approach that you advocate in resolving political situations oppose the wave of national spontaneity, dissatisfaction, and rebellion, in which everything is all right, including nationalism?

[Dimitrovic] Rebellion cannot be suppressed by means of political slogans. It will be calmed down only if the key points of public dissatisfaction begin to be affected by changes which will have a positive effect upon the more rational part of the rebelling masses, upon those whose dissatisfaction is primarily motivated by real reasons. Consequently, the rational strategy is not to oppose the manifestation of rebellion, but rather to fight the events and occurrences that have caused it. By moving away from abstract discussions, from general politicization, to the realm of real vital problems, one can change the mood of the public. Results have always brought confidence. The LCY conference established the framework within which it is possible to act concretely and successfully. In Croatia, we see clear possibilities for reducing the burden on the economy in several months by reducing budgetary expenditures, preventing the accumulation of surpluses by the SIZs [self-managing interest communities], improving the efficiency of administration, the judicial system, and the SIZ network, and other actions. There will be a noticeable increase in personal incomes through a reduction in withholdings from them, and changes in the law on restrictions and payments of personal incomes will make it possible for those who perform better to see this reflected in their personal incomes. It is thus being shown that real room for changes lies in the area of frequently voiced ideas.

The same thing applies to resolving the hot spots in the political crisis. We should not engage in politics over Kosovo, but rather do concrete work there. The self-protection and legal system should ensure human rights so that people can live freely. We should use economic and other initiatives to achieve the prerequisites for improving relations on a lasting basis. The same is true of other issues. Obligations can be determined on a concrete and practical basis, and then how those who do not achieve results will be held accountable can be determined. This will create a diligent spirit and a working atmosphere, and that will entail and restore confidence. I thus view reasonableness as a practical approach. Calmness shows recognition of the possibilities.

[DANAS] And in regard to other issues, for example, responsibility?

[Dimitrovic] It was decided quite clearly at the First LCY Conference that responsibility would be determined in the LCY leadership and in all institutions, up to the level of assessing who is trusted. This, consequently, is not just on the level of who is guilty, but also of who the people believe to be capable of providing guidance and leadership in emerging from the crisis. In this regard, one must accept that expressions of a lack of

confidence in individuals do not always have to have their roots in specific events and acts. In politics, confidence or lack of confidence is sometimes stronger than anything else, stronger than any other fact in the life of a politician. Consequently, affirmation and consistent implementation of the positions of the First LCY Conference is the only possibility for rationalization, and that is why we are insisting on them so much. Without this, a favorable political atmosphere cannot be created among the public, nor can the crisis be resolved. In particular, it will not work if we are constantly chasing after events, and only reacting afterwards to one step or another. In this sense, renewal of the Yugoslav initiative, which will play an active role in both the social and ethnic context, is the fundamental prerequisite for emerging from the crisis. If the leadership does not have this, then we really have to find one that will create it.

[DANAS] Hasn't the Yugoslav political leadership lost that Yugoslav initiative by not reacting to the dissatisfaction and criticism expressed in the partywide discussion? At that time, during the preparations for the congress, it could have inspired and formulated a Yugoslav concept that could perhaps have gotten us out of the crisis.

[Dimitrovic] As far as the organization of actions concerning the 13th Session of the LCY Central Committee, i.e., the partywide discussion, is concerned, I would call it hara-kiri, since that can only be done by someone who does not know any other way to change things except by spilling out his own guts, but that only increases the feeling of sickness. Arousing the Yugoslav public merely through criticism, without then having the strength and willingness to redirect developments from that dissatisfaction, is politically a completely senseless step, through which the Yugoslav leadership demonstrated its impotence. Today we are consequently in a much more unfavorable position. An enthusiasm existed then which, with greater wisdom, could have been used to break through the resistance to creating a new Yugoslav coalition. When that failed, parochial interests and programs with their own specific interests developed on the basis of that same problem.

[DANAS] How can a Yugoslav initiative occur now in that situation?

[Dimitrovic] It seems to me that it is possible only if we concentrate very effectively, and in a manner recognizable to the public, on the positions of the First LCY Conference. It is not any kind of long-term vision, but it is a sufficient framework for a year, or a year and a half, in order for us to create new business conditions, accomplish certain possible progress within the political system as well, and initiate the process of changes in the LC. I believe that this would be enough before the congress, and then it could go further from there. I assume that in that way the position of the Yugoslav leadership would be gradually improved; it would be a slow process of renewal, no longer born on wings, but guided by wisdom.

The public should now be involved for that purpose, since it is preoccupied with some different viewpoints. It is up to us to give concrete proof and wage a struggle for confidence. That is certainly a more difficult path, but also a better one, without manipulation. Nothing can be obscured here; only results count. The leadership must seriously realize its position with respect to the public; one can only go before the people with achievements, and only these can be a factor in bringing people together.

[DANAS] In this context, how do you view the upcoming 17th Session of the LCY Central Committee, which all of Yugoslavia is awaiting anxiously, but which different circles are awaiting with different feelings and even hopes?

[Dimitrovic] I think that the 17th Session of the LCY Central Committee can be successful only if we move forward from the positions of the First Conference onto practical, specific ground, as much as possible. This is because, with respect to changes, nothing is more valuable than creating the conditions necessary for adopting the Constitution by the end of the year, and reducing the problem of Kosovo to specific tasks and actions, and specifically determining responsibility where necessary. I do not believe that relations can be stabilized in any way whatsoever outside a concrete context, and that is why the preparations for that session have been so hard and long. It has to pull out onto the scene all those who represent opposition, obstruction, ignorance, and sloth. If we leave that concrete context and attempt to resolve the seething Yugoslav situation with yet another new platform, then I am afraid that the 17th Session would also turn into yet another expression of our impotence. Going down to the level of the concrete situation is probably the only way for us to cease using a black-and-white technique of dividing sympathizers and enemies. If questions were asked and arguments were given on the basis of actual achievements in the development of society, people throughout the country would probably become more willing to accept other people's experiences, without, as they do now, valuing most the various boxing skills, and without us all isolating ourselves a little, and building ramparts and defensive lines on our own thresholds and using long-range artillery to try to prove who is right.

[DANAS] Can responsibility be interpreted differently in different situations?

[Dimitrovic] In the last few months we have had cases indicating the manipulation of the public with respect to determining responsibility. Remember the proceedings for determining the responsibility of the Federal Executive Council [FEC] in mid-1988? At that time, the demand for accounts to be rendered by vote for the failures of economic policy and the 6:2 ratio were turned into a claim that those who were not in the majority were separatists. Today, proceeding from an assessment that the time is politically ripe, the "defenders" are launching

an initiative for determining the responsibility of the FEC. In our distorted perspective, one could expect a reversal in which those who were arbitrarily attacking yesterday are now beginning to defend themselves. I believe that this will not happen, however. It is good for us that the issue of responsibility is being raised as a regular examination on the basis of self-management and legal solutions. It is time to present arguments and offer the public a look at who is contributing to the exacerbation of the crisis, and how, through his insufficient involvement. If this reversal after four months really means increased awareness that the issue of responsibility has to do with work and development, and is not exclusively a political issue, then it is a step forward in the development and elaboration of the practice of implementing the principle of responsibility in society.

[DANAS] You mentioned the phenomenon of the public. What is the public in Yugoslavia today? Is it what is happening at the mass gatherings and what has very great repercussions in certain news media, or is the public the rest of Yugoslavia that is fed up with the uproar?

[Dimitrovic] I would not divide the public in that way, since from talks in widely different circles within the republic, and even some outside it, I have not gotten the impression that people's positions with respect to certain black marks in our development are essentially different. Dissatisfaction with stagnation and interethnic confrontations, a feeling of insecurity, and a feeling that Yugoslavia is in jeopardy are present in many circles. In some cases this has even extended to national programs. In others that has not yet happened, but if things continue this way, it is no longer far off. That means that the Yugoslav project will fade and perhaps even disappear. The roots of the problems are thus identical. The views on many problems are too. For example, in not one conversation in Croatia have there been any differences in characterizing the Kosovo problem. The differences occur when one determines whether certain processes regarding Kosovo may have an effect only upon resolving the Kosovo crisis, or whether they bear within themselves the potential for disrupting some other relations in Yugoslavia. The confrontations seem much stronger because we are primarily dealing, superficially, only with exacerbated positions.

[DANAS] Perhaps they are only easier to notice, because there is a part of the public which is not so large, but is very vocal and aggressive.

[Dimitrovic] I am talking about the majority. I am not saying that there are no people who are acting on the basis of completely different positions and with other interests, ones who see in this situation a chance to promote various other projects. I am talking, however, about what I perceive as the essence of the Yugoslav community, about those who certainly care about affirmation of the fundamental values of Yugoslav society and the achievements of our civilized heritage. In such

situations, not only is room created for classic ethnic divisions, but people also become involved in all of this who would like to make a stronger breakthrough into the fabric of the self-managing socialist orientation, and redirect it differently, those who are driven by ambitions and frustrations, those who would set up Yugoslavia differently and perhaps even rearrange it. It would not be good to lose sight of this, but it would be very dangerous if we dealt only with this.

[DANAS] Was the Yugoslav public surprised by the latest events?

[Dimitrovic] If we are talking about events like those in Vojvodina and similar ones, there is nothing surprising about them. We will readily agree that a leadership without the support of the public, especially in its own area, cannot survive. That is the reality, equally significant for the leaderships and for the people, because just as it is essential for all of the leaderships to realize that the times of adroit forum games have passed and that there cannot be any political survival without the support of the public, it is likewise essential to realize that the further development of society is not a matter for others, but rather for one's own involvement. After all, it is logical that there cannot be any democratic or self-management development without the broadest possible participation and involvement of the people.

[DANAS] What do these changes in Vojvodina mean?

[Dimitrovic] Certainly the end of one concept and understanding of politics, but more than that, however. People's accumulated dissatisfaction has been expressed through the medium of politics, rallies, and other events; this has given some people hope that a solution to social problems or national ambitions is close, but it has led others to fear and doubt whether some of the foundations for living as a community might be jeopardized. This has also defined a clear demand, which a Yugoslav program must satisfy. It must necessarily give hope to everyone that the social problems are being solved, but also room for national feelings to be expressed. At the same time, it must build barriers and halt everything that can arouse people's fear, doubt, and anxiety.

[DANAS] Where do you see the roots of the fears?

[Dimitrovic] It varies. It seems to me that most people are concerned about the fact that positions and actions with a nationalistic and similar incendiary meaning and content are alive on the scene, although until now this society has clearly sanctioned them politically and legally. Now this is alive as part of the political environment without any politically clear condemnation or legal characterization. The lack of legal security and the indefinite nature of political positions necessarily give rise to questions and anxiety. Naturally, the question is how to change this. I believe that there is no other choice than respecting the fundamental values of this society, and taking steps based on Yugoslav legal and other



practice, or changes in that practice with agreement at the Yugoslav level. Admittedly, some ideas will expire along this path of seeking agreement, but without this there cannot be any peace or stability.

[DANAS] What is Croatia's role in the creation of a Yugoslav political program? Is there anything that could be called a Croatian initiative? How would you define Croatia's position, since some people claim that it is wisely keeping quiet, and others that it is keeping quiet out of cowardice?

[Dimitrovic] We do not have any sort of program that could be called just a Croatian one. In particular, we do not have one that would be a counterpart to any national program existing in Yugoslavia. A lot of effort and work has been invested in having certain of our commitments affirmed in those places and in the Yugoslav bodies responsible for the corresponding areas. One can easily recognize the involvement and the results achieved by personnel from this republic in formulating the amendments associated with changing the economic system, formulating the determinations of the First LCY Conference... Thus, we have tried to work as much as possible at the Yugoslav level, including both politics and professional areas, in seeking and formulating positions and solutions that would be acceptable nationwide. Our other point of departure is based on the view that it is not difficult to have conflicts, and that one does not even need much sense to do so. We have no interest in quarreling with anyone in Yugoslavia, nor in thus frustrating our public. After all, we have many major problems. We still do not have legal solutions for many of them, and that is what is disturbing. In that context, we see room for our own action in taking operational steps to implement the Yugoslav orientation for Croatian conditions. That is how we should ensure comprehensive development and prosperity. I must stress that there are many difficulties with respect to carrying out this task, and that seeking reasons for failures outside of Croatia is not realistic for this. Naturally, the question arises of whether the Croatian public is satisfied with such an orientation. There are different views, but people are most inclined toward a model which is Yugoslav and Croatian, but also necessarily open to the world. Furthermore, we are seeking to work on preserving good interethnic relations within the republic, to build bridges with respect to areas where those relations are strained, to offer people chances to act without fear, to avoid having the risks that every initiative entails give rise to dramatic tensions, and to have them be as acceptable to people as possible.

[DANAS] There are views that the quietness of the public political scene in Croatia is a consequence of the deliberate prevention of lively activity after the 1970's. Consequently, the question is being posed of whether this is just a matter of a more sober attitude toward the problems, a lack of interest, or something else.

[Dimitrovic] Obviously, we are finding ourselves more and more in situations in which it is not easy to be quiet either. I suppose that the next few months will show how much strength there is and how much of a need for voicing certain commitments, perhaps even more vocally. But I think that the calm approach that we are trying to take toward the public, and the fact that we are willing to talk about everything and look quite calmly and soberly at our own position and at the country's problems, opens up room and gives people a feeling of security that they will not find themselves in conflict with political bodies if they think or say something different.

[DANAS] What are interethnic relations in Croatia like? Apart from the general assessment that nationalism is on the rise everywhere, with respect to this republic specifically views are heard, on one hand, that Croatian nationalism is operating through institutions, and on the other hand, that it is virtually being claimed that nationalism, so to speak, does not exist in Croatia.

[Dimitrovic] The quality of interethnic relations can be analyzed from various standpoints. Our opinion is that views on nationalism in Croatia should be built on the basis of events and people's conduct, especially today. Facts from court records and our political reports suggest the conclusion that at this time we do not have any tensions that would substantially destabilize the positive interethnic relations in the republic, or at least we do not have them out in the open. Perhaps here and there there may be some kind of incident. Of course, we do not have any illusions about the fact that some nationalists, regardless of whether they are here or abroad, now as in the past, do not accept either Yugoslavia as it is or Croatia as it is. If our situation becomes exacerbated, and as it does, room will be opened up for their initiatives to gain in strength.

[DANAS] Recently people have been talking about certain trends in areas inhabited mostly by Serbs.

[Dimitrovic] Certain specific processes are now taking place among a considerable number of Serbs in Croatia, because they can perceive the differences appearing in assessing certain events in Serbia on a quite specific emotional level. People react differently to those projects for national rebirth, sometimes quite emotionally, especially if their nation is involved. It is our desire and intention, by showing maximum respect for a democratic framework and dialogue, to create the necessary prerequisites so that no one will feel any tension because he lives and works here, and so that everyone will really perceive Croatia as his homeland, regardless of his nationality. Calmness and reason can also help here. That does not mean that there will not be certain temptations, but I think that the public has to be convinced that the leadership is extremely interested in making the conditions for our life in common as good as possible, just as the public has to be certain that the leadership is not prepared to trade in the rights of



peoples and national minorities. Certain difficulties of individual areas are being manifested today as the possibility of a fusion of social and national dissatisfaction, which would then be much more complicated to resolve, but I am convinced that there are economic and political forces to overcome this.

[DANAS] How do you interpret the fact that in spite of that assessment, other areas almost continually discover various incidents or hotbeds of nationalism in Croatia, as if it is absolutely unable to free itself from that liability of the 1970's, or as if the most dangerous and only real nationalism that can threaten Yugoslavia is coming from this area?

[Dimitrovic] The need to have Croatia portrayed as nationalist and separatist is certainly not based on determining the truth and building good interethnic relations, but rather on different interests, with which there is often no point in debating. Naturally, this does not mean that we do not want and do not need to engage in an open discussion of facts and trends. Our interests do not lie in concealing anything, above all because of the fact that we are not bearing the blame for the 1970's or any other years. As far as the threat to Yugoslavia is concerned, we advocate discussing it from a positive standpoint, i.e., with respect to what strengthens Yugoslavia, and who is contributing what to its material and spiritual development. That will make it easier for us to recognize our friends without peering about for enemies.

[DANAS] Was that what inspired your assessment, which was unusually decisive for this leadership, that ethnic gatherings in this area would be equivalent to counterrevolutionary action?

[Dimitrovic] We said political gatherings on an ethnic basis. That formulation is sufficiently broad and sufficiently precise, and it is not even new. Political gatherings on an ethnic basis in this area have not contributed to the development of fraternity and unity, and consequently they should have a broader ethnic content here, not only in terms of their participants, but also in terms of the ideas and positions that they express. The question is not just whether representatives of other peoples and national minorities are assembled; the crucial thing is for the content to be given a positive Yugoslav orientation. That is what we are talking about. We have not had any particular problems in being resolute on this, since it is not anything particularly profound. The experience of the communist movement and the struggle for this Yugoslavia has never been along the lines of ethnic homogenization.

[DANAS] Allegedly there have also been attempts in Croatia to hold protest meetings here as well.

[Dimitrovic] There have been certain initiatives from some local communities in connection with solidarity rallies. That is being discussed, and ways are being sought to have these desires reoriented toward solving the problems which they are pointing out.

[DANAS] One of Yugoslavia's biggest problems is Kosovo. People in Serbia are not only suggesting, but even openly claiming, that they are the only ones who are fulfilling their obligations in this regard.

[Dimitrovic] We feel that both involvement and responsibility for solving the problems in Kosovo are increasing in this republic, and I could not accept the assertion that we are doing this in conflict with the obligations we have undertaken. I likewise cannot accept the view that someone has done everything, with views being uttered from the same place about how nothing has changed. That is illogical. We agreed upon the tasks for resolving the Kosovo crisis at the Yugoslav level, and it makes sense for assessments to be expressed from that same level about how much has been done and by whom.

[DANAS] Are emissaries from Kosovo being talked about in this republic as well?

[Dimitrovic] I do not think that is what it should be called. We are an open republic that is visited by tourists. A lot has been said and a lot of impressions have remained, and then it was discussed politically. Seriously—we cannot link the problem of the mood of the Croatian public to what might possibly be offered to us from outside. Our concept is an open society, and one not open just on one side, but also from and for different sides. Consequently, we do not have anything in advance against anyone, most of all because the public feels free to do its own thinking. No one today can or should protect it from anyone, including various emissaries. That time has passed. We have complete confidence in our political public and in its critical opinion, and in its maturity and ability to assess its short-term and long-term interests.

[DANAS] Can we ask at this point about the weekly DANAS, which has recently been the target of criticism and is constantly suspected of being an expression of Croatian policy?

[Dimitrovic] I think that assessment is not fully deserved. Naturally, I do not want to say that what is happening in Croatia does not have a certain influence upon you, unless you want to claim differently, just as you cannot separate yourselves from events in Yugoslav journalism. Our commitment to develop public news media in Croatia that will have broad support and nationwide acceptability has also always determined our attitude toward the weekly DANAS. I think that DANAS has done a lot of good and positive things; after all, this has influenced its successes in circulation and has enhanced its public acceptability. What I have to state as criticism, however, is my feeling that within the framework of differences in views on the crisis in Yugoslavia, DANAS has not found it difficult to enter into polemics and feuds, and from time to time it descends to a level that is not appropriate for journalism, because DANAS

will go further if it is dominated by a Yugoslav and even a European orientation that would give it the strength to resist any attempts to use it as a tool, and even attempts to interpret it in that way.

The essential thing for us is to have the kind of news media that will possess its own authentic line in the formation of public opinion, which DANAS has succeeded in achieving, and for that very reason it should not let itself be drawn into altercations and intrigues and thereby become the opposite of its overall Yugoslav orientation. I do not want to evaluate any one issue or article, but, with respect to the future, one should, without avoiding the problems, somehow rise above them, so as not to fall into the trap of black-and-white coverage.

[DANAS] Whether DANAS will be black-and-white depends a great deal on the leadership here, which perhaps ought to be magnanimous in regard to criticism at its own expense.

[Dimitrovic] If we accept that relations between politics and journalism in Croatia are no longer a one-way street, then development becomes interdependent. Relations are thus built as a two-way street. There are also collisions on a two-way street, however. I think that we have entered a situation in which we can talk, each on the basis of his own tasks and each with his own obligations, but actually on the basis of the same business of the development of society, regardless of whether we disagree from time to time.

[DANAS] You stated that there should be personnel changes in the leaderships, at both the federal and republic levels. What, specifically, does that mean for Croatia?

[Dimitrovic] In implementing even formally the decision by the First Conference, we have an obligation to conduct evaluation proceedings for the possible determination of responsibility, at appropriate levels, and primarily in the Croatian LC. Naturally, this cannot take place outside of what is stipulated by the statute. There have been certain unclear aspects associated with the implementation of that decision. It was thought that we

had done this during the recent electoral procedure, when in effect there was a discussion of the entire composition of the leadership. The overall mood in Yugoslavia, however, and the critical attitude of public opinion in this republic will probably require that that procedure be conducted in a different way as well. Our Central Committee will hold discussions along these lines and adopt a decision.

[DANAS] Does that mean that this is still at the level of generalities?

[Dimitrovic] Well, let us say that it is general enough to be implemented at the level of the agreement that we will reach at the 17th Session of the LCY Central Committee, unless something brings us to that subject before then, of course.

[DANAS] Finally, what do you expect next in the development of our crisis?

[Dimitrovic] I believe that the current preoccupation with political turmoil will be surmounted, along with the attempts to impose initiatives that would guide Yugoslavia in a different way, but without originating in Yugoslav action and agreement. After that, we are faced with the Yugoslav social crisis, in all its complexity. With such low personal incomes, with such prices and inflation and the existing level of politicization, along with the weaknesses present in the functioning of the legal system and our developmental weakness, serious upheavals await us. If we are aware that transformation can be achieved only by radically dealing with the inefficiencies of the system and also major changes in the structure of society's work, then the conflicts inherent in that situation are quite clear. That has to be faced, and the more decisively the better. We are paying dearly today for the decades of indecisiveness and belief in miracles. Perhaps that had to be and still has to, since the path that brings those with knowledge and ability to the surface usually is not agreement, but rather the overcoming of obstruction and resistance. Consequently, the people who will give new content to the Yugoslav project of self-managing socialism should still see a chance in all of this for changes to take place much more rapidly than in the past.

## INTRABLOC

**Warsaw Pact Commander on Parity of Forces**  
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[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union Victor Kulikov: "Active Defense Requires Military Mastery—On Several Questions of Military Parity and the Principle of Sufficiency"]

[Text] The document on the military doctrine of the member states of the Warsaw Pact reads, in part: "The Armed Forces of the allied states will be kept in a sufficiently high state of combat readiness to prevent them from being surprised. In the event an attack against them should be undertaken nevertheless, they will hand the aggressor a crushing defeat."

That is a warning, to be taken very seriously by the aggressor, to reflect on the outcome before starting a war. Our alliance does not strive for military dominance, such as would be necessary to carry out an offensive war. But at the same time we will not permit the other side to attain such supremacy either. We will preserve the approximate equilibrium between the Warsaw Pact and NATO with the required minimum number of soldiers and weapons, while at the same time striving for an ever lower level of armament.

His opinions on related questions concerning military-strategic parity and adequacy of defense were recently expressed in the Soviet military press by the Supreme Commander of Warsaw Pact Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov. The following contribution contains excerpts from this article. A detailed, editorially processed version will be published in MILITÄRWESEN 10/88.

History shows that every political program is linked to a realistic balance of forces. That is also the case today, since two divergent social systems are facing each other whose development influences the entire international politics. When considering the potential of one side, it must be kept in mind that it includes the sum total of the material and spiritual strengths of the peoples and states concerned, with a specific role ascribed to the military aspect. Lenin often pointed out that a correct attitude toward national defense included a strict observance of the balance of forces of the sides. This has again and again turned out to be true, and most of all in the very recent past. It, thus, became apparent that socialism, in order to assure its security, must have the same military potential at its disposal as does a possible aggressor, which finds expression particularly in the military-strategic balance. In this connection it can be stated that it was possible to achieve a balance such as this only at the beginning of the 1970's. This was without a doubt a significant historical achievement, which, as was also pointed out at the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU, contributed to the failure of the plans that the imperialist

forces in power had with respect to winning a nuclear war. In this way, the military balance became an important factor in the securing of peace and international security....

### An Important Factor in the Securing of Peace

As long as there are influential reactionary forces who do not abandon their hope for social revenge and accelerate the arms race, the military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States, as well as between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and its stabilizing role in international relations, will be maintained.

With respect to the preservation of the military-strategic parity, the CPSU recently developed a position which in essence represents a new principle. In accordance with this position, neither a superiority of forces of the USSR in its relationship with the United States nor of the United States in its relationship with the USSR is permissible. In explaining this position, Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev noted that, for example, the Soviet Union is not striving for a change in the strategic balance in its favor, for the simple reason that a policy such as this would strengthen suspicion on the other side and increase the instability of the situation as a whole.

The member states of the Warsaw Pact are willing to look into and eliminate the currently existing historical, geographical and other imbalances and asymmetries in the structure of the military potential of the two sides. The point of departure, however, must be that the general balance of forces, which is currently in an approximate state of equilibrium, is not disturbed.

### The Human Being Plays the Decisive Role

In connection with solving questions related to military-strategic parity, it should also not be forgotten that, in this parity, the human factor, i.e., the level of training of the personnel in the armed forces of the two sides, is not considered.

For that reason, one of the most important tasks of the military cadres consists of assuring the adequate level of its specialized mastery and an adequate state of combat training of troop and naval units. An effort must be made to turn into reality the course that has now been taken toward placing greater demands on military training. Particular attention is to be given to questions that are related to defense against aggression. Here it is especially important to learn how to organize and conduct an active defense, to plan an effective firefight against the enemy as well as the conduct of counterattacks and counterstrikes. All this is unthinkable, however, without a well-trained cadre of leaders and troops. In his day, Friedrich Engels wrote that an active defense requires energetic, experienced and skilled generals, highly disciplined and mobile troops, and most of all

very skillful and reliable brigade, battalion and company commanders, since here especially everything depends on rapid and circumspect actions by the individual units and elements.

#### **Constantly High Alertness and Unconditional Combat Readiness**

In the training of the personnel, it has to be assumed that weapons and combat technology alone cannot assure the success of the operation and combat. Required are outstanding knowledge, masterly control of the technology, which must be evidenced above all by the fact that the combat characteristics of this technology are exploited to the maximum extent. If the personnel are not available who with their specialized knowledge are capable of employing the latest achievements of military technology, it is pointless to spend dozens or hundreds of millions of rubles for this technology.

For that reason, one of the most important tasks of party-political and organizational work, among others, is to make it completely clear to every member of the Armed Forces that a continuing high level of alertness and the unconditional willingness to carry out all orders given by superiors resolutely and with maximum effectiveness is one of the most important prerequisites for maintaining the military-strategic balance and preventing a war.

In closing, let it be stressed that the Soviet Union and the socialist sister states advocate the maintenance of the military-strategic parity on an ever lower plane within the bounds of reasonable adequacy of defense. They are not striving for military superiority, but at the same time will not tolerate the superiority of the other side. In their policies, the steadfast struggle for peace and their readiness to hand any aggressor a devastating defeat are organically linked together.

### **GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

#### **Improvements Noted in Worker Militia Training** *23000045 East Berlin DER KAEMPFER in German* *No 11, Nov 88 pp 1-2*

[Article by Maj Gen Wolfgang Krapp: "Successful Training Year"]

[Text] The units of the armed militia groups of the working class demonstrated impressively that in the 35th year of their existence they are ready and capable of carrying out their mission of protecting industrial plants and territories in an organized and united manner. Under the direct supervision of the party, the members of the plant militia groups made a significant contribution to preserving the peace, and to strengthening the economic achievement and political stability of our

state. Just as at the place of work, class solidarity, allegiance to the party, the effect of setting a good example, and the striving for maximum achievements characterized the training.

A goal-oriented leadership by the executive party organs, forthright actions by the commanders, as well as a high performance capability on the part of the militia members, assured continuity in the development and stability of all militia collectives. Contributing to the successful overall record through effective leadership and support were the responsible sections of the German People's Police and plant militia schools.

The efforts were directed primarily at stabilizing and expanding on the results achieved thus far. Marked by the desire to continue the stable development, test situations during training were mastered, and numerous initiatives were put into effect in the units in order to prepare in a worthy fashion for the 35th anniversary of their existence. In this way, the members of the plant militia groups gave simultaneous expression to their strong support of the policies of our Workers' and Peasants' State. They proved in word and deed that the party of the working class and our socialist state can rely at all times on the comrades of the plant militia.

#### **Units Point to a Splendid Record of Achievement**

Goal-oriented and varied political-ideological work was a pledge for deepening the understanding of the political mission of the plant militia groups, to make new requirements evident, and to motivate the fight for high achievements. Accordingly, the objective of our party, namely, that the 35th anniversary of the existence of the militia groups be made into an event of great political significance embracing all segments of society, from the outset became each militia member's personal concern. Numerous activities connected with the cultivation of tradition and public relations work helped to further develop an understanding of the mission of the militia groups, and to explain the historical continuity of their development as well as the perpetual unity of the political task and military contribution to protecting socialism and securing the peace.

In summing up their competitive programs, the units are able to point to a splendid record. Here, in keeping with the appeal of the militia group district "Erwin Panndorf," the realistic and effective organization of the training, the further intensification of all measures of the plant militia service, and the assurance of a high level of operational readiness, were the center of attention. The increase in combat strength and operational readiness achieved thus far resulted primarily from the creative application of such basic findings of competitiveness in the militia groups as:

—consistent application of the achievement principle,

- visualization of the contribution of each individual member,
- utilization of the achievements of the best as the yardstick,
- direction of initiatives toward the main links for further improving performance.

#### **Rapid Generalization of Positive Elements**

In the future, as well, it will be necessary to broaden the effectiveness of, and expand purposefully on, the existing positive experiences gathered in the conduct of the socialist competition. Especially worth giving attention to is the generalization of the manner in which peak performances are achieved. In the primary sector of qualifying the militia groups, namely the political and operational training, it was possible to take additional steps toward its complex and realistic organization. In all districts, it became apparent that the requirements for further intensification, as the main path toward the achievement of good training results, were more resolutely observed. Complying with this political mission to an increasing extent are qualified military, methodological, and safeguarding measures.

The unit commanders insured a qualified and pragmatic preparation and execution of the training. Beginning with a coordinated training plan which took into account the political and economic conditions of the units, appropriate points of emphasis were worked out. Through the thorough analysis of the results of the preceding training cycle, it was possible to make the training objectives and content more unit- and region-oriented, in keeping with requirements. An increased concentration on a high level of training preparation has proved successful.

#### **Performance Increase Confirmed in Many Ways**

The performance shown during high points of the training in 1988 underscores the estimate made here. It was possible to conclude the firing training of the AAA units with the best score achieved to date. All firing objectives were satisfied with at least a rating of "good." Most of the districts improved their performance as compared to the previous combat firing. All in all, 93.9 percent of the firing objectives were satisfied and a rating of "very good" was achieved. The tactical training exercises carried out confirmed the correctness of a long-range coordinated orientation and the preparation for the training high points that have taken place at most of the units.

During the training exercises, the units proved that they are capable of carrying out successive tactical actions dynamically and resolutely. Under complex situation conditions, the commanders, staff members, platoon, and squad leaders demonstrated leadership qualities equal to the occasion in the course of the actions and in the implementation of decisions.

Despite great physical stress, the combatants demonstrated a marked will to achieve and a solid performance capability. In addition, however, the exercises also revealed differences in the performance level of the units. Questions related to the foresighted organization of military teamwork, to the command of maneuvers with forces and resources, to the resolute implementation of security regulations, as well as to the strict command of training, are to continue to be at the focal point of efforts to achieve a more effective organization of all measures from the standpoint of content.

The unselfish commitment and the great performance of the combatants, noncommissioned officers, and commanders, with the many measures which in this anniversary year had an effect on every last unit, earned a high level of popular esteem.

Firmly incorporated in the broad popular movement to prepare for and honor the 40th anniversary of the founding of the GDR, the members of the militia groups of the working class, with a high level of achievement at their working place and in their training, will also in the future, entirely in keeping with their time-tested motto of competitiveness, perform their act of peace for the strengthening of our republic. The results of the training year 1988 and the experiences and knowledge gained thereby represent a good starting point for this.

In the coming weeks, the objectives of the new training year will be staked out on the "day of combat readiness," in time-tested fashion:

- Convincing political-ideological work, rigid leadership, and coordinated activity of all those responsible are the best prerequisites for integrating all militia members and collectives into the fight for maximum performance.
- In assemblies of militia members, it is necessary, on the basis of a concrete assessment of what has been achieved, to identify the requirements and to blend the competitive programs with the self-initiated and creative contributions of each individual member.
- Especially in political and combat training, everyone, from the lowest militia member to the commander, without exception, is called upon to make his personal contribution, with all his strength, to a high level of effectiveness, quality and efficiency of every training hour, and to strive for a high level of professionalism in dealing with the weapons and technology entrusted to him and/or in the command of units.
- The inspections of the political and combat readiness, primarily on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the founding of our republic, will mark the occasion on which the obligation of the worker/militia member's oath to our party will be honored.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### Increasing Number of Cars Affects Transportation Planning

23000027 East Berlin DER VERKEHR in German  
Oct 88 pp 305-307

[Article by Fritz Kabus (Office of Transportation of the Cottbus bezirk) and Petra-Juliane Wagner (Central Transportation Research Institute of the GDR, Center for Transportation Economy): "General Transportation Planning and Motorization"]

[Text]

#### 1. Preliminary Comments

General transportation planning is again assuming greater importance. The recognition is growing that the decisions of today must also take into consideration social, economic, ecological and other requirements and conditions of tomorrow, and/or that the future effects of such decisions in these areas must be included in present calculations.

The revised edition of the general transportation planning regulations takes this into account.

"Motorization"—or, more precisely, the increase in the number of motor vehicles intended for road use—is having a growing affect on the most diverse spheres of social life. As everyone knows, it manifests itself not only as a positive factor but also as a disruptive factor. The following presentation continues the discussion of problems covered recently by the panel of experts on "Regional Transportation Planning." The objective is to contribute to the solution of the questions raised and to stimulate additional research work—research which the transportation institutions alone will not be capable of conducting. The authors would like to investigate problems in motorization as part of general transportation planning. They are more likely to raise questions than be able to answer them.

The authors are certainly not advocating the spontaneous development of individual transportation and undifferentiated "needs planning." It has been the experience of history that this form of needs planning has already failed in even more highly motorized countries.

This can be attributed to highly diverse cause-effect mechanisms, and in the end it has human, urban and ecological aspects.

#### 2. The Growth in Motorization

Currently there are about 5.5 million motor vehicles registered in the GDR. To this number must be added small motorcycles, which are not required to be registered and are estimated to total 1.9 million units. The

total number of vehicles is increasing annually by between 4 and 5 percent, the growth being accounted for mainly by passenger cars and small motor cycles.

In 1986 the figure for passenger cars passed 200 cars/1,000 residents. Statistically, in 1987 more than one half of all households had the use of a car. The car dominates the motorization of road traffic. It is no longer possible to imagine daily life without the automobile. For an increasing number of our citizens it provides a high degree of mobility and individuality for changing their location. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, along with the steady growth of passenger car traffic, its benefits have to be partially restricted, and that the demands on natural resources associated with motorization and its negative consequences are assuming dimensions that are pertinent to our entire society.

The following factors are of special significance for the future course of private vehicular motorization: the degree of motorization attained, purchasing power, price, the delivery of new vehicles, technical-economic conditions for the use of automobiles (including their service life).

These and other influences on motorization derive from peoples' way of life, overall traffic policy conditions, the demographic structure of society, givens in regional structures, and the value society places on motorization.

Any forecast of motorization would have to include all these influences. However, we do not have the more precise insight into the effect of the influencing factors and their future development to do this. That is why, for simplicity, we are using a nonlinear extrapolation of available time sequences. The logistic function applicable to vehicle growth is:  $M = MS/(1 + a \cdot e^{-b \cdot t})$ . Where:  $M$  = Passenger car motorization figures at the time under study  $MS$  = Passenger car motorization figures when saturation is reached  $a, b$  = parameters determined from the time sequence of actual values  $t$  = reference time.

The function assumes that the saturation condition is known (fig. 1).

At present, calculations are based on a predicted value of 3.5 residents/vehicle (equal to 266 vehicles/1,000 residents). This value was established at the beginning of the 1970's for the forecast period that could be surveyed at the time. The question comes up whether, from today's perspective, this standard value as a degree of saturation can still form the basis for long-term planning. In view of the household structure, the degree of saturation of 3.5 residents/vehicle would mean that even in the distant future only about 70 percent of households would have the use of an automobile. In view of the level of motorization already reached in the GDR that is highly unlikely. Doubtless there will be households which, for physical or mental causes, because of particular attitudes and for other reasons, will not own an automobile. On the other hand, the number of households with more




Figure 1. Passenger Car Motorization Figures in the GDR

Key:

1. Passenger cars/1,000 residents
2. Year
3. Passenger car motorization figures

than one automobile is growing. In absolute numbers, the percentage of retiree households with an automobile will also increase (during retirement the existing automobile is used for as long as possible).

Proceeding from this observation, the authors today assume a saturation of about 2.7-3.0 residents/automobile (that is about 330-370 vehicles/1,000 residents). Occasionally reference is made to restricted supply, and doubts are raised about even reaching a saturation of 3.5 residents/vehicle. This argument does not hold up; supply only indirectly determines the degree of saturation, it is only a factor for the point in time when this parameter is reached.<sup>1</sup>

The comparison of motorization figures from different cities and municipalities also points to a clear territorial differentiation. Studies in kreis Calau (Cottbus bezirk) show significant differences between communities with a population under 2,000 and those with a population over 2,000. In the first group the motorization figure is about 15 percent above that of the second group, with only slight scatter. Accordingly it seems appropriate to examine in depth further territorial structural influences and

to trace their effect up to the point when saturation is reached. Data taken from the system of representative traffic polls have shown that the levels of motorization increasingly approximate one another in the cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants that were studied.

Overall, there is an urgent necessity for detailed research on motorization, so that forecasts based on territorial differentiations, social demographics and sociological factors, disaggregated forecasts, so to speak, of their future development under socialist conditions, can be drawn up. Wrong estimates would lead to considerable social burdens. Any further postponement of research on this problem cannot be justified in view of the level of motorization that has already been reached.

### 3. Motorization and Mobility

It is strikingly clear from the system of representative traffic polls (SrV) that mobility, expressed in changes of location per unit of time, has grown considerably, determined primarily by individual private motorization. Compared with 1972, with 2.35 changes of location per person per day, it had already risen to 2.98 by 1982. The results of the surveys conducted in 1987 are awaited with interest. With the SrV to "gauge" levels over the long term, we have at our disposal a valuable planning aid in forecasting mobility. Depending on the influencing factors of territorial structures, the saturation point for mobility viewed over a long period might be set at 3.3-3.4 changes of location per person per day. The trend can, as in the case of motorization, be described with a logistic function.<sup>2</sup> In these observations one cannot overlook the fact that long-term changes, in behavior during free time and in communications technology for example, could influence mobility. The choice of the method of transportation must be seen in conjunction with mobility. It stands and falls with the availability of transportation.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the factor of time is a decisive parameter in choosing the means of transportation. This generally leads to a preference for the automobile as an individual method of transportation.<sup>3</sup> Against this, there is the impossibility of providing this means of transportation with the necessary infrastructure for every type of trip. This is especially true for business traffic, which causes uncontrollable peak time road traffic loads, as soon as it relies predominantly on individual means of transportation. Similarly, the area needed by stationary traffic, particularly in city centers, can only be met in a limited fashion, for a great variety of reasons.

It is known that one of the most important tasks for general transportation planning is to find out which modal split (the ratio of dividing passenger traffic between individual and public mass transportation) is helpful for the particular territory in question, relative to

the various purposes of the trips, how it is can be made functionally efficient through the appropriate infrastructure and how it can be implemented.

Clearly an array of the most diverse instruments is needed to manage this task. They include city-planning measures, transportation solutions, transportation policy rules, economic stimulation, and legal regulations. The overall design must be laid out strategically and allow some latitude for territorial differentiation.

Tangible assistance is needed to work on the general transportation plans so that valid solutions for the future can be proposed to the political decision makers.

#### 4. Consideration of Motorization in City and Territorial Planning

Construction of housing in the major new residential areas placed and is placing severe demands on their transportation connections and accessibility. Transportation planners are involved and they have accumulated experience as they found solutions to their tasks.

The upsurge in the turn to residential construction in the inner city, the start of remodeling of the city centers is also a challenge to consider anew how to solve transportation problems. It is also a unique chance for a "traffic compatible" design for these city centers (the adjective "traffic compatible" is intended to convey that the interests of passenger and freight traffic are considered to the extent needed in the planning of the city). Local politicians, city planners, and traffic planners bear a great responsibility to city dwellers and for fulfilling all the functions that an inner city has to perform for the city as a whole and for the environs.

In the 1970's traffic planners, taking a projection of motorization and mobility as their basis, determined the future volume of individual transportation, designed transportation facilities accordingly and made the appropriate requests for land to city planning. This method of approaching the problem was recognized to be a blind end: unrestrained development of individual transportation is unmanageable from the point of view of the infrastructure and would jeopardize the survival of a city. From a methodological point of view it was possible to obtain an overview of this needs planning and it was to some extent mathematically precise. The way the question has to be asked today, "how much individual transportation can the particular city tolerate, what expenditure for transportation is indispensable to the functional efficiency of the city and the attractiveness of urban life?" is methodologically definitely more complicated and has not yet been answered completely.

At present, best-case variations for the modal split are set up, and the best of them is found by comparing several variations. More sophisticated methods and optimization procedures would be desirable. The initial steps are described in footnote 4. The methodological lacunae

often lead to subjective judgments about the role of transportation in the organism of the city, particularly of individual transportation, and inadmissible cuts are made, for example, in solutions to the problem of stationary traffic.<sup>5, 6</sup>

Answers to the following questions are also needed: what percentage of changes in location must be covered by public transportation, simply from a social perspective while ignoring any aspects of city planning? And: how can an "optimal" modal split be implemented in the reality of everyday traffic? Answers and solutions appropriate to socialist conditions have to be found to these questions. Behavioral patterns and organizational rules must be developed so that restrictions are accepted consciously. They should not take effect on their own, and the end result should not be that the decision that it would have been better not to have started an automobile trip at all is made only after arriving at one's destination.

The role of individual passenger transportation also has to be considered for the regional area. The wholesale transfer of guidelines for urban transportation to the management of changing location in the country would be wrong from the outset. Additional studies must be conducted to give the planner some direction as to how he will have to design interurban public passenger transportation, for example, or relationships between the city and its environs in the face of growing individual motorization. As in city planning, it will be necessary to give social aspects primary consideration and to differentiate them spatially and temporally more strongly than before with regard to the motives for travel. The accessibility of cultural and sports (venues) sites, vacation areas, and so on is assuming increasing importance.

#### 5. An Infrastructure for Individual Transportation

General transportation planning must proceed from the notion that, in the forecast period, it will succeed in designing the necessary infrastructure for the sociopolitical, economic and ecologically based and warrantable (defensible) development of individual transportation in accordance with technical regulations. Planning must formulate the possibilities for growth and the surface area requirements. But it cannot be a simple strategy of "need driven" expansion of (road) traffic installations, but it must be (planned) from the beginning in such a way that restrictions for stationary traffic and organizational measures are used consciously as guiding elements.

Calculations of the one-time and running expenses (the latter as maintenance and transportation costs) show that improvements to the infrastructure are amortized in a few years—even if these amortizations hardly show up?...in a national total economic bill.



Reactions today to inadequate transportation facilities are touchy. Apparently the automobile, as the most expensive durable consumer item, is currently acting as a stimulus in a socialist society. This stimulation will only have an effect if the prerequisites for the use of this item are there in a certain degree.

Considerations about the infrastructure must also take into account that it also serves the movement of freight as well as individual transportation and directly affects society's economic interests.

#### Footnotes

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#### POLAND

##### Laws on Foreign Capital Companies: Inconsistencies Viewed

26000131 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish  
27 Sep 88 p 3

[Interview with [Sejm] Deputy Zdzislaw Skakuj and Marek Niedzwiedzki, expert from the "Polonia" Society, by Maria Dunin-Wasowicz; date and place not given]

[Text]

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: A second reading of the law on foreign capital companies was scheduled for today's Sejm debate. Is there a possibility that the Sejm will not pass this law or perhaps not even consider it?

Zdzislaw Skakuj: Everything is possible as long as it complies with the Sejm rules and regulations.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: I feel that it would be a good idea to work for another week or two on its still controversial provisions. In this way, the new administration would have the chance to take a critical look at the draft plan accepted by the previous Council of Ministers. After all, what matters is that a legal act be created that would not be threatened by successive, hasty amendments.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: Exactly. We don't see foreign businessmen pushing and shoving to do business with us these days...

Zdzislaw Skakuj: The bureaucratic interpretation of many rules and regulations may lead to a situation in which we will have to deal with ineffective legal solutions. However, there are many of those who are interested in coproduction [with foreign countries]. Negotiations with Western companies are under way for the joint implementation of important economic ventures. And this is irrespective of how the fate of the law turns out.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: Irrespective?

Zdzislaw Skakuj: The undertaking of these tasks comes from the mutual business interest of Poland and its partners in these tasks. The lower degree of obtained profits in the case of large-scale investments plays a lesser role.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: Wait just a minute here. The law does not pertain to large-scale, individual capital investments made on the basis of government contracts. After all, this is supposed to be a kind of motor coach which can be boarded by anyone on condition that we sell him a ticket.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: Those wanting to board this coach will have to wait 2 months for this ticket, i.e., permission to take up business operations in Poland.

Zdzislaw Skakuj: It is not all that long if only considering what has been happening thus far.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: A bigger problem is that a heap of documents will be required from future foreign partners for this purpose, a part of which we could calmly forego. Can information about how many people will work in a joint venture be cause for refusal to grant permission? It should only be a business visa which is obtained after information about who will be doing what in our country is checked by Poles.

Zdzislaw Skakuj: I always say that it is possible to make things easier for foreign investors but only if this does not infringe upon Poland's affairs.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: No one is questioning that as a country we have the right to make an independent decision as to whether we will admit a potential business partner or not. Before we do this, we have the right and obligation to check him out thoroughly down to his [coat] lining. However, he cannot be expected to provide a detailed account for this purpose of something which has as yet not come into being.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: Those concerned claim that they encounter vagueness in the law at every step.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: Executive acts are the problem.

Zdzislaw Skakuj: All of a sudden—four. More importantly, the draft plans of these acts are ready. One of them specifically defines capital investments which bring income tax breaks that can come to 40 percent. Today, I can only say this much—that specifics in keeping with common sense are adopted in this decree.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: Perhaps, but I will allow myself a lack of trust in that which the government proposes. From the time that in 1982, the income tax rate was raised from 50 percent to 85 percent with one stroke of a pen in the law on Polonia-type firms, it is not surprising that foreign investors are now demanding outright guarantees of security for their operations.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: Does history have to repeat itself?

Marek Niedzwiedzki: No, but it may. For example, an entry is still found in the law that is being drafted identical to the law on Polonia-type firms but this time from 1986. At that time, the minister of finance obtained the authorization to work out special, simplified principles in keeping with the modern ones of joint venture bookkeeping. And what happened? For two and a half years the fisc was inactive! I doubt whether the minister was finally able to produce a sensible legal act in this regard. I fear that things will remain as they have been, i.e., bad.

Zdzislaw Skakuj: Just a minute. It is understandable that foreign investors expect at least such conditions for conducting their business activity in our country as they have at home. For the time being, that is out of the question. However, the possibility of creating a one-person joint venture is foreseen in which the investor will concurrently possess supervisory council and general assembly powers. The making of independent decisions, without unnecessary discussions, with regard to the most important matters concerning a joint venture should lessen the consequences resulting from coming in contact with Polish reality.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: In a word, capitalists are to learn to like socialism?

Zdzislaw Skakuj: Without exaggeration. No foreign investor will agree to work under conditions which affect Polish enterprises. After all, our financial-economic law forces enterprises to produce indexes. There is no way that this state of affairs can be tolerated any longer. Only when this situation changes, will Polish managers have the chance to run their enterprises in such a way that their fundamental goal will be profit. I would say that the law on joint ventures should accelerate changes in Polish economic law. The issue of the effective participation of workers in enterprise management by distributing workers stocks and bonds should also be taken care of as soon as possible.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: I would be glad if this did happen.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: Fine. But what does all this concern an Englishman who does not know what bank lines look like?

Zdzislaw Skakuj: This may perhaps be of no concern to a native Englishman but to one that was born in Poland, this means a lot. Despite what is being said about businessmen, they are not only concerned about money. Sentiment for the homeland also counts. That is why, a Pole from abroad will come to our county to open up a company and not to Denmark where the income tax is lower.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: Agreed. However, I feel that the discussion on the law has blinded us to the rest of the world and we have perhaps forgotten what this magnet will be that will attract foreign capital. A good law does not take care of everything. The only thing being, that this law that is being drafted is not at all a good one, although, it is better than its two predecessors. We boast that the 40 percent income tax ceiling is as much as 25 percent lower than the same kind of tax imposed on state enterprises. That is a mistaken point of view. What ought to be done is to compare the projected, total tax liabilities, of which there are a lot, with that which is being offered by other countries. When we do this, we come out decidedly worse.

Zdzislaw Skakuj: The view prevails in financial circles that sharing profits 50-50 with a sovereign or state budget is still within the laws of propriety. Every percentage point bargained out below 50 percent is a privilege for a businessman.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: The situation is completely different if I invite a guest to help me out at home. Let us not forget that others are also looking for foreign capital. Therefore, we must—whether we want to or not—entice the potential investor more effectively and in a more attractive manner. And that is why, when the smallest doubt appears during the creation of a law, we should always ask ourselves the question: Do we really want to attract foreign capital?

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: That, I would think, goes without question.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: It seems to me that this is not so obvious for everyone. Perhaps that is why some of the articles in the law are formulated in such a way that a businessmen to whom we have already given the supreme consent of the Polish state to conduct production or business activity, may be treated by administrative agencies according to the principle: "You, too, may turn out to be a thief." Meanwhile, managers should be given the opportunity to conduct independent activity in our market as well as in foreign markets without, of course, breaking the law. However, this does not mean that we are to go to extremes and push the laissez-faire principle in Poland.

Zdzislaw Skakuj: A lot depends on whether the administration, in interpreting the rules of the law, will act in accordance with state interest. Let us take the rule regarding the necessity of forming a Chamber of Commerce and Industry for Foreign Investors. I am of the opinion that this chamber should have a self-governing character while membership in it should raise the rank of union members.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: Of what good are statements that the draft plan of the law allows excessive freedom in interpreting its rules and regulations. This was mentioned many a time in the Sejm. Concrete formulations even appeared which would not allow such practices. However, they remained only in the formal records and do not carry any legal power. I don't know if through such a law we shall gain the trust of foreign businessmen.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: It would seem that the saying about the principle of confidence in business is a truism.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: Definitely. We must, for example, check out those interested in business ventures with us. However, let us not go overboard.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: The law regarding joint ventures could become an alternate source, as opposed to drawing credit, to obtaining foreign exchange. What are the possibilities in this situation of this becoming fact? For it looks as if the fear of the appearance of capitalistic cases in Poland has resulted in that the law will repel foreign investors instead of attracting them.

Zdzislaw Skakuj: Those who claim that this capitalism is so terrible most likely believe in Marx's "Capital" but do not understand the essential workings of capital. Capital is a tool for achieving specific social and economic goals. Neither in socialism nor in capitalism can they be implemented without using capital. We are not supposed to become the object of capital's manipulations but we are to manipulate it in order to improve the standard of living in Poland.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: And do this without drawing credit. The transfer of foreign exchange will occur only when the conditions are worked out. And this in turn depends on the partners in a joint venture. The state only observes their operations and collects taxes. However, if one of the partners of a joint venture will have his hands tied, then nothing will succeed. I feel that 90 percent of the issue lies outside the letter of the law. Those who come today to seek permission to conduct business [in Poland] first see the airport—a pitiful sight—tomorrow, they will want to install telephones in their firm and the day after, a telefax machine. We know what kinds of problems this poses. A decent law would give us 10 percent of hope that this businessman, used to conveniences, will forego luxury and will want to do some battling in our country.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: He will ultimately have cheap labor at his disposal.

Zdzislaw Skakuj: Above all, excellent professionals. Intellect costs huge sums of money in the West while here at home—not much, to say the least. I would say this: as for times of administrative management, the law is not bad. However, it loses when it comes in contact with a freely competitive economy.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: Thus, I shall repeat: it is not good, although, better than its predecessors. However, it should be admitted that it is unique in our legislative system. Nearly every clause is a so-called special adjustment. Therefore, we are to create and approve one big lex specialist—which will not be so easy to do...

Zdzislaw Skakuj: ... the law sanctions, for example, foreign-exchange turnover in the country.

Marek Niedzwiedzki: Exactly. It is no wonder then that so much unhealthy emotion surrounds this draft plan.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: As the saying goes: "Don't lie down in a sick man's bed."

Marek Niedzwiedzki: It isn't as bad as all that. No one has as yet lost anything because of this law. However, it is worth keeping in mind that owing to it a law will appear in Poland that will create new, unknown changes.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY: Thus, the question: "Do we want to attract foreign capital to our country?" remains current. Thank you, gentlemen.

**'Timid' Voices Propose Energy Imports To Aid in Industry Restructuring**  
26000110b Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish  
22 Sep 88 p 2

[Unattributed article: "New Look at an Old Problem—Not Energy Export but Import?"]

[Text] "Creates an opportunity," they said about the Ministry of Industry's plan. "It is an illusion," they said about the plan by the Electrical Power and Lignite

Community. On 21 September, most of the members of the State Council of Electrical Power Economy spoke their minds about the possibilities for equalizing the fuel and energy balance in Poland in the next few years.

On what did they base their views?

"For two terms of office, I did not participate in the work of the Council," said Professor Włodzimierz Bojarski, "because I could not get my views across. Now the Ministry of Industry finally has a new way of thinking and it is thinking in terms of economics. What this means," he continued, "is that it is looking for ways to even the fuel and energy balance not by regulating sales as it once did but by regulating demand."

No one doubts any longer what we will have to face in the next few years: shortages of energy, whether that be in the form of coal, petroleum or even electricity can paralyze even the best economic concepts. Some demand that we "build new coal mines and power plants" while others want "conservation and more efficient use of power resources."

Regardless of whatever action we take, it is now too late to avoid the effects of the coming shortage. New coal mines are an investment with a very long construction cycle. Changes in the way we use energy also cannot be made overnight. Both methods require enormous investments.

It might seem that in this hopeless situation, the Ministry of Industry's proposed concept might allow us to alleviate energy shortages and also make structural changes reaching into the future.

The express development of our economy could only be accomplished at enormous social cost. No one would support it! We must increase consumption. At the same time, the costs for growth of the fuel and energy industries will continue to rise and when they are needed, the

reassignment of considerable funds for agriculture, food and housing construction will leave nothing for restructuring of industry. Therefore, express development is not the road to take.

The ministry is therefore considering ways of considerably limiting the economy's demand for particularly energy-intensive materials such as metals and cement as well as ending the export of goods whose production requires a great expenditure of energy. This is also true of coal whose export has become entirely unprofitable.

"The representative of Weglokoks," said Professor Zygfryd Nowak, "recently told me that his firm was earning one dollar for every 281 zlotys spent while Kasprzak was having to put 3000 zlotys into every dollar it made and that coal export is very profitable. That is a complete misunderstanding brought about by juggling figures." Another council member said: "If we consider the total and real costs of coal mining, we have to admit that we are losing a lot of money."

Council members agreed with the thinking behind the ministry's somewhat "timid" proposal to totally drop the concepts by which we have so far been guided. What is needed is not the export of energy in its direct (coal) and indirect forms (energy-intensive products) but its import, especially in the second form. "The resources for that," said Konstanty Chmielewski, "should come from money previously allotted for the development of inefficient sectors of the economy."

There is still no one who can say for sure whether or not such an idea is realistic. In the Council's opinion, it does create opportunities because if energy shortages make it necessary in a few years to limit production, it is the industries that consume the most energy that will be hit first. The key to the success of this variant is to triple exports over the next 12 years. These must be highly manufactured and profitable goods that can find buyers in other countries.

It was stated that it is an illusion to count on the possibility of making a large increase in investments to increase power and heat production in the next few years. For its own merits, the program presented by the Community is impeccable and properly scales its goals but there is no chance that it can ever be realized.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### Situation of Nation's Jews Described

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UND WELT German 4 Nov 88 p 31

[Article by Juergen Engert: "Victims of the Skinheads and the SED—The Fate of the Jews in the GDR: Something Between Anti-Fascist Creed and Foreign Policy Needs"]

[Text] It was in July of this year. Five young people stood before a municipal court in East Berlin. They had sullied, damaged, or destroyed some 222 gravestones in the Jewish cemetery on Schoenhauser Allee. The skinheads had underscored their actions with painted Nazi and anti-Semitic slogans. They were sentenced to between 2.5 and 6 years in jail for "rowdiness, public deprecation, and other criminal offenses."

The verdict brought Stephan Hermlin, the author who is also known in the West, who is a Jew by birth and a Communist since 1931, to the scene. He felt equally provoked by the designation of the skinheads as "rowdies," as he was by the "incomprehensible leniency" of the court. The emigre and resistance fighter stated: "What kind of a peculiar thing is this? I know what a rowdy is. That is one who, when he has had too much to drink, accosts passersby on the street or even demolishes telephone booths. But a rowdy is not a person who stands in the street with others of similar persuasion and calls out 'Long live Barbie!' or chants the letters NSDAP for minutes at a time." And Hermlin warned the party and the state that, in view of accumulating anti-Semitic excesses in the GDR, it should not cushion itself with the idea of a "quiescent or calm anti-Fascism," but rather to react along the lines of Morgenstern's "Palmstroem," namely that: that which must not be, cannot be.

If Honecker repeatedly affirms that anti-Fascism is the fundamental law of the GDR, then this is no empty phrase for him, then this occurs with conviction. Since the Communists have been in power in one part of Germany, they have been proclaiming that the elimination of the economic and social causes of Fascism have also overcome anti-Semitism. The honestly perceived shock that skinheads now show up not only in East Berlin, but also in Dresden, Halle, and Cottbus who consider Hitler, Himmler, or Skorzeny to be their role models, who become ecstatic at the thought of the "Third Reich," who defame Jews as South Sea Island "kanakas," and who permit their xenophobia to manifest itself in violence, is all the greater. These eruptions did not fall out of the sky. As early as 1978, the Synod of the Association of Protestant Churches in the GDR called upon Christians to pay attention as to "where, today, in our midst, people are becoming victims of prejudice."

The background for the reminder was the then vehemently anti-Israeli policy of the GDR Government and its unconditional stand supporting the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The diagnosis of the church in 1978: "Justified criticism of the policies of the present state of Israel must not be misused as a source or a pretext for renewed anti-Semitism." In 1982, Jewish author Stefan Heym warned publicly against hostility against Jews in the GDR. The same was done by Peter Kirchner, chairman of the East Berlin Jewish Congregation; he said: "If a maturing young person is fed negative data regarding Israeli Jews almost daily for political reasons, he can hardly avoid applying these negative images also to Jews in his own vicinity." The remarks by Kirchner were all the more noteworthy because there is an agreement with the state according to which Jewish congregations in the GDR will abstain from making political commentaries on the situation in the Near East and according to which those in power in East Berlin will, for their part, forego demanding that the congregations take a stand.

Today, some 3,800 Jews live in the GDR. In the eight Jewish religious communities, however, not more than about 380 persons are registered, most of them in East Berlin, followed by Dresden, Leipzig, Erfurt, Magdeburg, Halle, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Schwerin. After 1945, these were primarily Jews, shaped by communism, who returned from exile into the Soviet Occupation Zone, including officials of the former KPD who—such as Albert Norden and Paul Merker—occupied key positions in the party apparatus of the SED. Added to these were intellectuals such as Anna Seghers, Hans Mayer, Ernst Bloch, Stephan Hermlin, Stefan Heym, Alfred Kantorowicz, and others.

All Jews, including those who survived in Germany, were assigned privileges to compensate them for their suffering under the national socialist regime. Privileges which persist for "persecutees of Fascism" include the following: Their retirement ages have been reduced by 5 years; they receive an honorary pension of 1,350 marks; they are accommodated in convalescent homes and old-age homes on a priority basis. Until 1952, the Jewish minority in the GDR experienced no problems as a result of external circumstances. Their special status was covered by the Soviet Union; after all, Moscow had voted at the United Nations for the establishment of the State of Israel. Otto Grotewohl, the Social Democrat, together with Ulbricht, the cofounders of the SED, even offered the State of Israel reparations.

But the situation changed abruptly in 1952. Stalin claimed that there was a "Zionist conspiracy"; there were trials of Jewish doctors in the Soviet Union for allegedly seeking the life of the dictator in the Kremlin; in Czechoslovakia, the Jewish party secretary Rudolf Slansky was executed as a "Western agent." East Berlin quickly followed Moscow's example. A large-scale "purge" took place in the GDR, organized by Erich Mielke, who is still responsible for state security to this

day. It was particularly the Jewish emigres who had emigrated to the West that came into the cross hairs of persecution. Officials lost their positions, they were expelled from the party. Old-time Communists such as Paul Merker were brought to court as "agents of Zionism" and of "American monopoly capitalism." Support was withdrawn from the Jewish congregations. Jews were placed under surveillance and spied upon. Many fled to the West. After the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953, the anti-Jewish crusade in the GDR came to an end. However, anti-Zionism persisted. Once more true to the example of the Soviet Union, which was working on establishing a dependency of the socialist camp in the Near East. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was repeatedly requested by East Berlin to halt the restitution payments to Israel immediately because they were nothing short of a means for rearming against the Arab people.

Domestic policy components must be separated from these foreign policy components which resulted from the guardianship with the Soviet Union exercised over the GDR. The holders of power were and are anti-Fascists, first under conditions in the Soviet Occupation Zone and later on in the GDR. Many of whom, like Honecker, had been imprisoned by the Nazis for their convictions. They divided the German people into two halves—one anti-Fascist and one Fascist. And they fixed them as far as locations are concerned: the anti-Fascists in the east; the Fascists in the west. This has to do with the self-assertion of a new state; it has to do with the Cold War; but primarily with an explanation provided by Stephan Hermlin: "It is difficult to govern people over the long term if they somehow feel guilty." This is a sentence which might also apply to the founding fathers of the Federal Republic of Germany. Hermlin relates the consequences of exculpation in the GDR as follows: "...in practice, things are such that a large portion of these Jews perceive themselves as the progeny of fighters...." Of fighters against Fascism, that is to say.

In the GDR, anti-Fascism has been ritualized. In the lower grades of the schools, the history of national socialism is a subject of instruction; in the ninth grade, more than 30 hours are devoted to the study of the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and World War II; the pogrom of 9 November 1938, the so-called Reichskristallnacht, is officially commemorated and each year in September, in commemoration of the victims of Fascism, wreaths are also placed at Jewish cemeteries in the

GDR; every young person visits a concentration camp at least once during their period of education. The attempt by GDR propaganda to pillory the Western media for the neo-Nazi intrigues misses the true causes and has, in the meantime, already been abandoned. Instead, perceptive persons are asking whether something is not amiss with the educational methods. This is because the preachings from the pulpit are obviously going in one ear and out the other. Civil rights advocates, including the churches, are taking their final conclusions a step further. Neo-Nazism is being explained as being one among several denials vis-a-vis a system which is incapable of developing any bonding power.

The cemetery desecrators, the neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic skinheads are not part of the antisocial residue of the GDR. Those who stood before the court had been considered good students up to that time, good apprentices, good workers. According to Hermlin, they lack the opportunity to identify with society. The fact that this identification is lacking is the deep-seated cancer that exists in the GDR and it extends far beyond the skinheads.

The problem is not mitigated by the fact that Erich Honecker—according to information provided by Edgar Bronfman, president of the Jewish World Congress—confessed to being coresponsible for the holocaust, confirms the right of the State of Israel to exist, and considers the assumption of diplomatic relations to be possible. Honecker recently spoke with Bronfman on two aspects. First: The Soviet Union is about to modify its relationship with Israel. In this regard, the GDR does not want to stand aside. Second: normalization with regard to the United States is not possible around Israel and around Judaism. East Berlin intends to spend some money in this regard. There is talk of some \$100 million of reparations to Jewish victims of national socialism. In his talk with Bronfman, Honecker also placed weight on the financial support for Jewish congregations in the GDR, as well as the agreed-upon reconstruction of the New Synagogue on Oranienburger Strasse, with 300 seats, which was the center of Jewish life in Berlin until the Reichskristallnacht. Stephan Hermlin's doubt is to be entered into the records of both German states: "I have always turned away from the thesis that the past has been overcome. At best, the past can be overcome in the same manner as Sisyphos rolled his block of stone up the mountain. It slips from his grasp time and time again and he must begin anew."